State v. McClenton, Minn.Ct.App., 4/20/2010. A jury convicted Mr. McClenton of first degree aggravated robbery, and fifth degree possession of a controlled substance. On appeal, he complained of numerous things, among which were the preclusion of evidence of a defense of involuntary intoxication, and admission of criminal complaints during the Blakely penalty trial. (There’s a lesser included instruction error.)
Mr. McClenton accosted T.G. on the street corner, demanding money. Eventually, T.G. gave Mr. McClenton money but being dissatisfied Mr. McClenton punched T.G. in the head. T.G. thought that Mr. McClenton may have been under the influence of drugs. The first officer to meet up with Mr. McClenton, shortly after the street mugging, thought that he was in a “cocaine psychosis.”
Defense counsel asserted a mental illness defense, and an intoxication defense. The Rule 20 examiner found that Mr. McClenton was, indeed, in a “drug-induced psychosis” at the time of the offense, but – under something of a delusion herself about whether she’s a doctor or a lawyer -demurred opining whether he had a viable mental illness defense, reasoning that a psychosis induced by a voluntary injection of drugs did not qualify. Defense counsel countered, however, that the psychosis was the result of an involuntary intoxication: unbeknownst to Mr. McClenton, the drugs that he voluntarily ingested were laced with some unknown substance that caused him to commit the street mugging in a more untoward fashion than would have been the case had he only ingested unlaced narcotics. The trial court demanded an offer of proof on this assertion; when it was not forthcoming, the trial court precluded the defense.
The appellate court dodges the messy analysis of what, if any, proffer or offer of proof defense counsel may have made to the trial court. Instead, it just rejects the existence of the defense of “innocent intoxication” – intoxication resulting from an innocent mistake about the character of the substance taken - at least “under the facts of this case.” After all, to recognize such a defense would just encourage drug abusers to seek out the “least pure” drugs available. Here’s the appellate court’s conclusion:
[W]e hold that a defendant who voluntarily smokes marijuana, which unbeknownst to him is laced with some other controlled substance, is not entitled to an involuntary-intoxication defense based on the resultant effects of the combined substances.
At the Blakely hearing, the state introduced copies of various criminal complaints to show a pattern of criminal conduct. The state conceded on appeal that admission of the probable cause portions of the complaints to which Mr. McClenton had not previously admitted was plain error. However, the appellate court was able to cite other evidence to support a pattern of criminal conduct, and thus he could not show prejudice.
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