"Carrying" a Pistol in a Public Place Includes an Unloaded Pistol That Is In a Secure Case

State v. Larson, Minn.Ct.App., 4/24/2017.  Mr. Larson, who has a valid permit to carry a pistol, went down to the First National Bank Building intending to partake of the shooting range that's in the basement of that building.  He rode downtown to the bank building, got out of the car, walked to the building on a public sidewalk, and went inside.  All the while he was holding a closed gun case which contained an unloaded pistol.  Because it turned out that Mr. Larson was under the influence of alcohol the city prosecutor charged him with carrying a pistol while under the influence of alcohol based on his act of holding the pistol in a case on a public sidewalk.

He moved to dismiss the charge.  He said that the statute did not extend to possession of an unloaded pistol securely enclosed in a gun case.  The trial court disagreed, and the court of appeals affirms.

When the legislature enacted the statute to permit persons to carry pistols in public it excluded a person's ability to do so if that person were under the influence of alcohol.  The statute does not, however, define "carry" so the court hauls out the dictionaries to give it a go:

Because the term “carry” is not a defined statutory term, we first address whether there is an ordinary usage of the word “carry,” which provides the term’s plain meaning. Occhino, 640 N.W.2d at 359. And ordinary usage may be determined with the aid of dictionary definitions. State v. Haywood, 886 N.W.2d 485, 490 (Minn. 2016). Here, “carry” has been defined as “[t]o convey or transport.” Black’s Law Dictionary 257 (10th ed. 2014). It also has the meaning of “[t]o keep or have on one’s person.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 294 (3d ed. 1992). Using these definitions, we conclude that, by its plain meaning, “carry” in Minnesota Statutes section 624.7142, subdivision 1, subsection 4, prohibits transporting a pistol on one’s person while under the influence of alcohol in a public place. Because the statute prohibits carrying “about” the person’s clothes or person, this includes situations in which the pistol is unloaded and in a case. See Minn. Stat. § 624.7142, subd. 1(4). 

The court also points to other statutes where the legislature was more precise in its language.  For instance, there is a statute that prohibits carrying a BB gun, rifle, or shotgun in a public place but expressly provides that "carry" doesn't including toting those weapons around unloaded in a fully enclosed case.  Minn.Stat. 624.7181, subds. 1(b)(2),2.  

Revisor’s Notes are Just That and Have No Force of Law; Buckle Up.

State v. Wendorf, Minn.Ct.App., 5/19/2012.  Minnesota has a statute that says “wear your seatbelt.”  Minn.Stat. 169.686, subd. 1(a).  An officer stopped Mr. Wendorf back in May, 2010 only because he was not wearing a seatbelt.  Mr. Wendorf made challenges to this statute:  first, the statute prohibited an officer from stopping a motorist solely for a seat belt violation; and second,the statute, as published by the Revisor of Statutes, failed to provide notice that a motorist could be cited under this statute absent another moving violation.

Before 2009, officers could not stop a motorist for a seat belt violation unless there was another violation along with it.  The 2009 legislative session thought it had eliminated this prohibition and authorized officers to stop motorists just for seal belt violations.  There was nothing pretty, however, about how they went about it.  This, in turn, created a lot of busy work for the courts and lawyers.

The 2009 legislative session made three successive changes to the aforementioned statute.  The first change eliminated  the prohibition of stopping a motorist solely for a seat belt violation.  The second change mooted the first change by deleting the sentence that the first change had amended, but again removed the prohibition.  The third change was identical to the second change but then included additional stuff that had nothing to do with the prohibition.  When all this hit the Revisor’s desk, they published the last revision to the statute – the third change - but added a note that mentioned and printed the language from the first change; this included, in italics, the very prohibition that seemingly had been repealed not once but twice and perhaps three times.

Here’s how the court summed up this mess:

Here, the earlier and later amendments are irreconcilable because [the first change]retained the restrictive-citation provision and [the third change] repealed it and also deleted the language [the first change] amended.

Plain and simple, a Revisor’s note is not “the law.”  The last passed legislation on the elimination of the prohibition is “the law” so  the officer could stop Mr. Wendorf solely for the seat belt violation.

The court rejects Mr. Wendorf’s various due process challenges to this statutory entanglement.