State v. Heiges, Minn.Ct.App., 3/30/2010. A jury convicted Ms. Heiges of second degree murder for the death of her newborn daughter. After delivering the baby, she drowned the baby in the bathtub. Roughly five months later, Ms. Heiges confided to A.B. that she had drowned the child. A.B. reported this to the police, who commenced an investigation. Police interviewed Ms. Heiges several times, during which she eventually made similar admissions. DNA testing of some blood that police found in the bathroom did not exclude either Ms. Heiges or the purported father; and some of the DNA possibly was from the child.
Before trial, Ms. Heiges argued that the state did not have sufficient evidence to corroborate her confession to police, as required by Minn.Stat. 634.03; the charges should, therefore, be dismissed. the trial court denied this motion. During trial, another witness came forward, R.C., who was permitted to testify that Ms. Heiges had told her of a plan to go “up north” to deliver the baby and then bury it in the woods. R.C. was also permitted to testify that after the child’s death Ms. Heiges told her that she had gone through with the plan to kill the baby. At the end of the trial, Ms. Heiges moved for an acquittal, again arguing that the state had not sufficiently corroborated her confession. The trial court denied this motion.
Minn.Stat. 634.03 provides that a defendant’s confession is not sufficient to support a conviction “without evidence that the offense charged has been committed.” In addition to evaluating other evidence presented at trial, here, the appellate court also has to decide whether the statements that Ms. Heiges made to friends after the child’s death but before the start of a criminal investigation are subject to this corroboration requirement. (Admissions made prior to a criminal act do not require corroboration. See State v. Smith, 264 Minn. 307, 313, 119 N.W.2d 838, 843 (1962).) The appellate court concludes that it is not. This is because the rationale behind the corroboration requirement is to prevent an accused from making a false confession under the pressure of a police investigation.
This conclusion also means that the trial court may rely upon Ms. Heiges’ pre-investigation admissions to friends to corroborate her confession to police. These admissions, along with other evidence presented at trial, satisfied the corroboration requirement.
Ms. Heiges also complained about some of the instructions, about permitting R.C. to testify, and about the denial of a departure motion, all to no avail.
Judge Randall dissented.
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