Supreme Court Limits Admissibility of Battered Woman Syndrome

State v. Hanks, Minn.S.Ct., 8/1/2012.  Ms. Hanks killed Matthew Albert, whom Justice Meyer, writing for a unanimous court, described as her “romantic partner.”  She shot him in the head.  Here’s why the court thought Albert deserved his “romantic partner” sobriquet:

Albert was not involved in the lives of his children. Albert preferred that Hanks stay at home with the children rather than work outside the home. Albert controlled the family finances and did not give Hanks money. Albert got angry when Hanks went out socially and “wanted [Hanks] socially isolated.” Albert disabled Hanks’s vehicle so she could not drive it. Albert made threats to kill L.G., Hanks, his children, and himself. One of Hanks’s children stated that “Dad hit mom!”

Do you see the romance here?  Here’s how Ms. Hanks recalled the shooting:

Hanks testified that on the day of the shooting, she and Albert were up fighting until four or five in the morning. She was exhausted and felt like her head was “exploding.” When she returned to the house to get her child’s boots, Albert was lying in bed handling the gun, saying that he wanted to be in a safe or better place. Hanks said she did not remember holding the gun or pulling the trigger, but admitted to shooting Albert. She testified that she did not plan or intend to shoot Albert.

Ms. Hanks retained an expert who was prepared to tell the jury that she was a battered woman.  This expert defined battering as “a pattern of physical and psychological coercion that may create ongoing fear of safety among victims.”  Ms. Hanks argued to the trial judge that the expert’s testimony was admissible because it was relevant to the issue of premeditation –did I mention that this was a murder 1 charge – that it would help explain to the jury why Ms. Hanks behaved as she did, including her contradictory statements to the police.  The state cried foul.  The trial court excluded the expert’s testimony, and Justice Meyer said that this exclusion was not an abuse of discretion.

The court narrowly construes past cases on the admissibility of battered woman syndrome to approve the exclusion of this evidence.  Justice Meyer first reads Hennum to limit such defense testimony to a claim of self defense.  State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 1989).  She then reads Grecinger to apply only to the state’s efforts to clean up the credibility of a battered woman in the prosecution of her batterer. State v. Grecinger, 569 N.W.2d 189 (Minn. 1997).   These two opinions are actually much more expansive:

Expert testimony on the syndrome is admissible “for the specific purpose of bolstering the defendant's position and lending credibility to her version of the facts.”  State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Minn. 1989).  It is also admissible to help the jury understand the behavior of a woman suffering from the syndrome, including staying in a relationship, not reporting abuse and changing accounts of the abuser’s actions; that conduct “might otherwise be interpreted as a lack of credibility.”  State v. Grecinger, 569 N.W.2d 189, 195 (Minn. 1997). 

Appellant’s Brief.  Such information is also helpful in understanding “counterintuitive behaviors commonly associated with” battered woman syndrome.  State v. Obeta, 796 N.W.2d 282, 291 (Minn. 2011).

Hanks testified that on the day of the shooting, she and Albert were up fighting until four or five in the morning. She was exhausted and felt like her head was “exploding.” When she returned to the house to get her child’s boots, Albert was lying in bed handling the gun, saying that he wanted to be in a safe or better place. Hanks said she did not remember holding the gun or pulling the trigger, but admitted to shooting Albert. She testified that she did not plan or intend to shoot Albert.  Her expert would have offered these insights into this behavior:

[B]attered or controlled women may give contradictory versions about what happened, which is the case here.  The defendant originally denied shooting the victim and later admitted to it. The expert in this case will testify that battered/controlled women, after years of abuse, can suddenly “explode” and act out without thinking or planning-thus negating premeditation, which is a possible explanation of what occurred here.  (It is also possible that the testimony of the expert combined with the testimony of lay witnesses, may establish a factual basis for manslaughter).
In essence, expert testimony is necessary to provide an honest and true version of the characteristics and traits of battered women syndrome victims.

The court affirms Ms. Hanks’ sentence of life without possibility of release.

A Felony Sentence Permissively Consecutive to a Gross Misdemeanor Sentence is Calculated at the Defendant’s Actual Criminal History Score Rather Than at a Zero Criminal History Score

State v. Campbell, Minn.S.Ct., 5/9/2012.  A jury convicted Mr. Campbell of a slew of charges but for simplicity’s sake the two that are pertinent were gross misdemeanor criminal vehicular operation resulting in bodily harm and felony fleeing a police officer resulting in death.  The trial court gave Mr. Campbell a 12 month sentence on the gross misdemeanor and then stacked a 234 month sentence for the felony fleeing.  The court got to 234 by sentencing at Mr. Campbell’s actual criminal history score of 3, rejecting Mr. Campbell’s argument that this consecutive sentence should have been sentenced at a criminal history score of 0.  Justice Meyer, writing for a 4 member majority – Justices Stras, Page and Paul H. Anderson dissenting – sides with the trial court.

These sentences are consecutive based on the multiple victim exception, Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.F.2.f. and Minn. Stat. §§ 609.035, subd. 5 and 609.15, subd. 1(b) (2010).  Mr. Campbell argued successively to the court of appeals that under the Guidelines permissive consecutive sentences are sentenced at a zero criminal history score.  The pertinent Guidelines provision that’s in play here is 2.F.2.  Here’s what the Guidelines say:

For each offense sentenced consecutive to another offense(s), other than those that are presumptive, a zero criminal history score, or the mandatory minimum for the offense, whichever is greater, shall be used in determining the presumptive duration. (Emphasis added.)

The majority decided that “to another offense” is ambiguous, largely because the Guidelines, themselves, do not define the word “offense.”  That being so, then the majority can then easily choose to limit the phrase to felony crimes, which takes 2.F.2 out of the equation here and permits the trial court’s result to stand.  Justice Stras, on the other hand, finds no ambiguity at all; he says that no matter where you look, an “offense” is defined to be any “crime or transgression of the law, whether a misdemeanor or a felony.”  See The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1222 (5th ed. 2011).  Justice Stras cites a litany of definitions that are the same, including these from two editions of Blacks Law Dictionary: 

Black’s Law Dictionary 1186 (9th ed. 2009) (“A violation of the law; a crime, often a minor one.”);

Black’s Law Dictionary 1081 (6th ed. 1990) (“A felony or misdemeanor; a breach of the criminal laws; violation of law for which penalty is prescribed.”).

To give the majority its due, Justice Stras counts up the number of times that the Guidelines uses the phrase “felony offense” and finds a total of 19 times!  From this proliferation of the phrase Justice Stras concludes that if the Guidelines had wanted to limit 2.F.2 only to felony offenses sentenced consecutively to other felony offense it knew how to do that.

It remains to be seen just how expansive a read this opinion will be given down in the trenches of trial courts.  This opinion could certainly push prosecutors to add misdemeanor and gross misdemeanor offenses to initial felony charges as additional coercion to get a plea.  Imagine a young black male who allegedly strangles his girlfriend as she is attempting to call 911; to prevent that call this young black male pushes aside his girlfriend’s sister to get at the phone.  Is a misdemeanor assault charge against the sister on the horizon, and because there are two victims, may the felony strangulation sentence be stacked at a higher criminal score on top of the misdemeanor sentence? 

The Guidelines do not apply to misdemeanor/gross misdemeanor sentencing.  State v. Kier, 678 N.W.2d 672 (Minn.Ct.App. 2004); the exception, at least until now, had been that a defendant could not be required to serve more total time in confinement on consecutive misdemeanor/felony sentences than he would have to serve if he were sentenced consecutively on two felonies.  State v. Dulski, 363 N.W.2d 307 (Minn. 1985).