Continuance Without Adjudication Authorizes Juvenile Court to Order Restitution

In the Matter of the Welfare of I.N.A., Child, Minn.Ct.App., 9/5/2017.   I.N.A. pleaded guilty to criminal damage to property. The juvenile court continued the case without adjudication, imposing various conditions, one of which was to pay restitution in excess of twelve grand.  

On appeal, I.N.A. argued that when the juvenile court does not adjudicate delinquency it does not have statutory authority to order restitution as a condition of the continuance without adjudication. There are multiple statutes that get put in play to answer this question.  The juvenile delinquency restitution statute says:

If the court finds that the child is delinquent, it shall enter an order making any of the following dispositions of the case which are deemed necessary to the rehabilitation of the child:

. . . .

(5) if the child is found to have violated a state or local law or ordinance which has resulted in damage to the person or property of another, the court may order the child to make reasonable restitution for such damage[.]

Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 1 (2016). 

During a continuance without adjudication the juvenile court can also order restitution.  Minn.Stat. 260B.198, subd. 7(a).  Finally, the general restitution statute says:

“A victim of a crime has the right to receive restitution as part of the disposition of a criminal charge or juvenile delinquency proceeding against the offender if the offender is convicted or found delinquent.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1 (emphasis added). 

The court of appeals goes with subdivision 7 and concludes that even when the juvenile court continues a child's case without a finding of delinquency it retains the authority to pay reasonable restitution.

Having reached that conclusion, the court also determined that the juvenile court did not make adequate findings to support the disposition:

The district court found that ordering I.N.A. to pay “smaller” monthly installments of restitution “serves to rehabilitate [I.N.A.] by demonstrating the amount of time and money that goes into maintaining our cities’ public park systems.” While this may be an implicit finding regarding “why public safety and the best interests of the child are served by the disposition ordered,” it is not an explicit written finding addressing the statutory factors. Further, the district court did not explicitly discuss in its written order what alternative dispositions were recommended to the court and why such recommendations were not ordered. 

The court also determined that the juvenile court had not adequately explored I.N.A.'s ability to pay the twelve grand:

We cannot determine based on the record and restitution order before us whether the district court abused its discretion by making a finding unsupported by the evidence or against logic and the facts on record, because the order is unclear as to how much the district court expects I.N.A. to actually pay per month, and over what period of time. By ordering “smaller monthly installments,” we are unsure whether the district court meant that the total $12,529.90 would be divided up equally into smaller payments during I.N.A.’s continuance without adjudication, or whether the court meant to require I.N.A. to pay small, good-faith installments during the stay-of-adjudication period.3 The difference between these two dispositions is substantial, particularly for a child in I.N.A.’s situation, and additional findings would aid our analysis of whether the district court fully considered I.N.A.’s income, resources, and obligations to pay such restitution. Further, if the district court meant “small” good-faith payments, and a balance would remain after the stay of adjudication, it is unclear if the court anticipated that this balance would be docketed as a civil judgment against I.N.A. pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subds. 1(c), 3 (2016). If a civil judgment is to be docketed, the record and restitution order does not indicate whether the district court considered the lasting impact that such a large judgment could have on I.N.A. in the future.

Whether An Out of State Juvenile Conviction Would Have Been Certified For Adult Prosecution in Minnesota Is Not a Blakely Jury Question

State v. Edwards, Minn.Ct.App., 8/14/2017.  A jury convicted Mr. Edwards of second degree assault.  Mr. Edwards complained on appeal that the trial judge had screwed up the jury instructions by omitting the statutory definitions of "great bodily harm" and "bodily harm".  He had not, however, made that complaint during trial so the court of appeals applies the "plain error" standard of review to reject this assertion. The court of appeals jumped straight to the third part of the "plain error" test, whether any error affected Mr. Edwards' substantial rights.  The court said, no, it didn't.

The trial court included two juvenile convictions from Wisconsin in computing Mr. Edwards' criminal history score.  The Guidelines require that the "fact finder" determine whether those juvenile convictions would have been certified for adult prosecution in Minnesota.  Mr. Edwards said that this question needed to be put to a jury under Blakely because it was a "fact" which increased the penalty for the crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum. The court of appeals said, no, this comes under the prior conviction exception to Blakely and may be determined by the judge.  The court said that the trial court can make this determination because the fact of the prior convictions is not an element of the new crime. Whether a juvenile conviction from another state would have been certified for adult prosecution in Minnesota is also a legal question and not a "fact" question (like did Mr. Edwards have a knife when the comitted the assault).  

Juvenile's Three Consecutive Life With Possibility of Release Sentences Do Not violate Miller/Montgomery

State v. Ali, Minn.S.Ct., 5/17/2017.  Mr. Ali shot and killed three men during a robbery of a local market when he was sixteen years old.  A jury convicted him of these murders and he now is serving three consecutive life sentences, so he must serve ninety years in prison before he is even eligible for parole release.  Now, he could live that long, but it's statistically not likely.  He argues here that the three consecutive life sentences, even with the possibility of release, are the "functional equivalent" of life imprisonment without possibility of release. The sentences thus violate the Miller/Montgomery Eighth Amendment prohibition of sentencing juveniles to life without possibility of release except "for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility."

Justice Hudson, writing for all but Justice Chutich who dissented, took the easy way out and punted:

Because Miller and Montgomery involved the imposition of a single sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and the United States Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the issue of whether consecutive sentences should be viewed separately when conducting a proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, we decline to extend the Miller/Montgomery rule to include Mahdi and other similarly situated juvenile offenders.

Back in the nineteenth century, 1892 to be exact, SCOTUS threw out a bit of dictum that essentially said that Eighth Amendment analysis focuses on the sentence imposed for each specific crime, and not on the cumulative sentence. , O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892).  This was good enough reason to ignore this century's "juveniles are different" Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, something this court is already pretty good at doing.  See Jackson v. State for the sordid history.

Juvenile Traffic Offenders Placed on Probation Are Not "Dependent on a Juvenile Court" For Special Immigrant Juvenile Status

In the Matter of the Welfare of:  A.S., Juvenile, Minn.Ct.App., 7/5/2016.  A.S. was born in Mexico.  To avoid beatings and other "punishments" at the hands of both his parents and grandparents back in Mexico he came to the United States and moved to Minnesota.  At age 17 he was cited for underage drinking and driving, a juvenile traffic offense.  The juvenile court stayed adjudication and placed A.S.on probation for up to twelve months on certain conditions.

A.S. moved for findings that would allow him to apply for "special immigrant juvenile" status.  SIJ status provides a means for abused, neglected and abandoned immigrant youth to obtain lawful permanent residence and a path to citizenship under federal law.  A requirement is a state court finding that the immigrant either has been "declared dependent on a juvenile court" or has been "committed to, or placed under the custody of" a state agency or department or an individual or entity "appointed by a [s]tate or juvenile court.  The juvenile court declined to make such findings, concluding that merely being placed on probation does not meet the requirement that the immigrant be "dependent on a juvenile court." Nor does it mean that the immigrant has been committed to or placed under the custody of a state agency, in this case the probation department.

The court of appeals affirms the juvenile court's decision.  A.S. gets caught in the trap created by the exclusion of "juvenile traffic offenses" from the definition of "delinquent child."  The juvenile court never placed A.S. in foster care or in a similar setting, nor was A.S. placed in a guardianship.  Without any real guidance on identifying which dispositions may result in "dependency on a juvenile court" the court just says this isn't one of those instances.

Absence of Finding That Facts of Juvenile Petition Had Been Proven Precludes "Continuance Without Adjudication" Disposition

In the Matter of the Welfare of:  C.J.H., Child, Minn.S.Ct., 4/27/2016. The state charged C.J.H. with third degree criminal sexual conduct, attempted third degree criminal sexual conduct, and underage drinking. At his first appearance, the lawyers told the juvenile judge that there was an agreement for a "continuance for a dismissal" under juvenile rule 14.01, subd. 1.  Under the agreement C.J.H. had to provide a factual basis to the attempt charge.  Also, if he were unsuccessful with complying with the terms of the continuance for dismissal this factual basis would be submitted to the court with the understanding that this would likely result in a finding of guilt.  Although the prosecutor and the judge kept saying that C.J.H. was "pleading guilty" or "was guilty" the judge never made a finding that the allegations had been proven.  And never said that he was guilty.

Eventually C.J.H. violated the terms of the agreement and the juvenile court then adjudicated him delinquent.  C.J.H. appealed and said for the first time that, wait a minute, he hadn't really done a continuance for dismissal; rather, he'd done a "continuance without adjudication." He'd admitted to the crime, he'd waived his trial rights, so the only thing missing was the adjudication.  C.J.H. said this because if that were true then by the time the juvenile court violated him the court's jurisdiction had expired. Justice Hudson essentially says, nice try but no.  Despite the sloppiness of the initial appearance the Justice said that because the juvenile judge never made a finding that the allegations of the petition had been proven, something that the rule on continuances without adjudication requires, there was no "continuance without adjudication."  

Even though there  hadn't been an adjudication and even though the case had been continued.

Intermediate Child Placement Order Is not "Final Order" Subject to Appeal

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of E.G. and K.G., Sr. Parents,  Minn.Ct.App., 3/14/2016.  This is a CHIPS case (child-in-need-of-protection-or-services) appeal brought by the parents of the two minor children.  The parents admitted to the allegations of the petition, and the district court transferred physical and legal custody to the county for foster care placement of one child and for home placement of the other child subject to the county's protective supervision.  Six months later, the district court directed that the child who had remained in home placement be transferred to foster care. The court's dispositional review hearing a week later continued the foster care placement.

The parents appealed this order.  The court of appeals questioned its jurisdiction, specifically whether the appeal was from a "final order." The court concluded that because the dispositional review hearing resulted in an order that is not "final" because any party may request a review hearing at least every ninety days.  Also, the district court had yet to conduct a permanency hearing to determine the permanent status of the two kids.

Continuance of Juvenile Delinquency Proceeding, Accompanied by Child’s Admission to Charged Offense, Is a Continuance Without Adjudication, Which Limits Jurisdiction to 180 Days.

In the Matter of the Welfare of: C. J. H., Child. Minn.Ct.App. 5/18/2015.  Juvenile court has its own set of rules and that’s what this case is all about.  Specifically, under those rules did C.J.H. get a continuance for dismissal in which case the juvenile court maintained jurisdiction until C.J.H. hit his nineteenth birthday?  Or, did C.J.H. get a continuance without adjudication in which case the juvenile court could maintain jurisdiction only for one hundred eighty days from the date of the order?

The state petitioned C.J.H. with third degree criminal sexual conduct, attempted third degree criminal sexual conduct, and consumption of alcohol by a minor.  At his first appearance, C.J.H. admitted facts which established his guilt of attempted third degree criminal sexual conduct.  He also waived his right to a speedy trial, to remain silent, to confront witnesses, and conceded that he was waiving his right to defend himself at a later date.  The juvenile court then  said something to C.J.H. that everyone in the courtroom understood to amount to a continuance for dismissal until his nineteenth birthday. 

Sure enough, C.J.H. violated the conditions of the continuance but he did so more than one hundred eighty days from the date of the order.  C.J.H. said that what the juvenile court had actually done back at the first appearance was to give him this continuance without adjudication which meant that because the one hundred eighty days was up the court no longer had jurisdiction.  The juvenile court said, no, everyone knew damn well that what had happened was a continuance for dismissal, stayed to age nineteen.

The court of appeals says that C.J.H. has it right.  A continuance for dismissal, which is authorized under Rule 14, is a continuance without a finding that the allegations of the petition have been proved.  The kid does have to waive his right to a speedy trial.  Here, C.J.H. did that and then some; he waived just about everything that could be waived to the point of agreeing that if he got hauled into court on a violation all that had to happen for adjudication was to read the transcript from the first appearance. 

On the other hand, a continuance without adjudication under Rule 15 does require that the juvenile court find that the allegations have been proved.  Although the juvenile court did not say the exact magic words – the court finds, blah blah blah - it did hear and accept C.J.H.’s admission to the elements of attempted CSC, and it did say that C.J.H.’s admissions established a factual basis for the charged offense. 

The upshot is that the court of appeals concluded that what C.J.H. did looked for all the world like a Rule 15 continuance without adjudication, which limits the juvenile court’s jurisdiction for to hundred eighty days.  The court thus had no jurisdiction to entertain the violation and to adjudicate guilt.  That adjudication is thus vacated.

Juvenile Offender Properly Tried in District Court After Attaining Age Twenty-one; & Court Properly Imposed a Harsher Sentence After Successful Challenge to Previous Convictions

State v. Vang, Minn.S.Ct., 5/7/2014.  In 2001, the state filed a juvenile petition against then-14 year old Jerry Vang.  The petition charged him with first and second degree felony drive by murder, and with attempted first degree felony drive by murder.  Even though the court never certified Mr. Yang to adult court these charges somehow got presented to a grand jury, which indicted him.  Mr. Yang plead guilty to those charges, but the supreme court vacated those convictions and sentences because the adult court didn’t have subject matter jurisdiction to impose the adult sentences.  Vang v. State, 788 N.W.2d 111 (Minn. 2010).  In fact, it was the juvenile court that had taken the guilty pleas and imposed the sentences.

By the time the convictions and sentences were vacated, Mr. Yang was past age twenty-one.  There’s a statute that says that once an individual turns twenty-one, the district court and not the juvenile court has original and exclusive jurisdiction even if the offense occurred before that individual turned eighteen.  So that’s where the supreme court sent the case when it vacated the previous convictions and sentences.  The state re-filed the same indictment in the district court.  Mr. Yang plead not guilty, went to trial and was convicted.  Before that, however, he argued that the case should go back to juvenile court because he still had never been certified to adult court.  Writing for six members of the court – Justice Wright not participating – Justice Dietzen latches onto this statute and thus side steps the messy and unseemly business of getting juveniles into adult court simply by waiting out the clock.

Mr. Yang challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the convictions.  Mr. Yang apparently shot at two guys –killing one and injuring the other – while he was, himself, either in or having just got out of a car.  He fired seven shots in a narrow alley, striking a garage twice and, of course, killing and wounding the two victims.  Mr. Yang’s actions put two different mental states in play:  intent to kill and reckless discharge of a firearm at or toward a car or building.  Mr. Yang argued that if he had the intent to kill then he had not recklessly discharged the weapon with which he tried to carry out the deaths.  The court concludes that these are distinct mental states that are not mutually exclusive.  The state has to prove both, but in this case they did.

The trial court instructed the jury that it had to find that Mr. Yang recklessly discharged a firearm at or toward “ a person.”  The statute requires that the discharge be at or toward a motor vehicle or building.  Minn.Stat. 609.66, Subd. 1e.  The court assumes without deciding that this instruction was an error, but concludes that the error did not create a reasonable likelihood that it had a significant effect on the verdict. 

Mr. Yang tried to extend both Miller v. Alabama and Florida v. Graham, to adult sentences of life with the possibility of release, where the adult was a juvenile at the time of the offense.  The court isn’t going there, even though Mr. Yang’s consecutive sentences create a near life without parole sentence, something the court barely mentions.  Mr. Yang must serve a minimum of thirty years before becoming eligible for parole consideration on the life sentence.  If and when he is granted parole, he must then serve a ninety (90) month sentence on the attempted murder conviction.

Mr. Yang argued that the trial court could not impose a sentence that was greater than the original sentence.  The court says that in this instance it can because the first sentence was the result of guilty pleas and this one was the result of jury verdicts.  The court based this result on “public policy” and not constitutional grounds.  This prompted a concurrence from Justice Stras, who does not believe that there is any such thing as “public policy” which can guide judicial decision making.  Justice Stras would have reached the constitutional due process issue – vindictiveness – and then rejected it for Mr. Yang.

Last, Mr. Yang complained that he got bad advice from one of his attorneys, the advice being to reject a plea offer - the terms of which were not stated in the opinion - and go to trial on a claim of self defense.  Cf.,, Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376 (2012).  The trial court did instruct the jury on that claim.  Just before the shooting, which took place in a narrow alley, the deceased had threatened Mr. Yang (and had beaten him in a previous fight).  There was no opportunity for Mr. Yang to retreat.  The court went on to describe the evidence presented in support of the self defense claim:

Appellant presented evidence at trial that David intended to seriously harm or kill him. Appellant testified that David and Kou had come to his house on July 6, that David had “rushed” him without provocation, and that David and Kou beat him while he was on the ground and then David grabbed a shovel and tried to seriously injure him. Appellant stated that the fight made him “afraid” that David intended to seriously harm or kill him, and his fear continued until the day of the shooting. A couple of days later, David had driven by his house and “flicked” him off, and then two days before the shooting, David came by the house looking for appellant. On the day of the shooting, appellant stopped in the alley in order to smooth things over with David and Kou. But David “got angry.” When appellant got out of the car David stepped toward him and yelled at him in a threatening manner. Appellant testified that he experienced fear because David was only five or six feet away, was bigger than him, and he remembered being beaten to the ground by David in the previous fight. There was also evidence that appellant did not have an opportunity to retreat because the alley was narrow, there was a fence and two cars directly behind him, and the driver had also gotten out of the car and appellant did not have the keys to the car. When asked if he felt that he had any alternative to shooting the gun to save himself, appellant replied “no.”

Without really much of an explanation, the court says, somewhat disturbingly, that whether the advice to reject the plea offer and go to trial was “objectively unreasonable” was a “close call.”  The benefit of the doubt went to the lawyers.  Whether this would have been so had the trial court not instructed on self defense is an unanswered question.

Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse It’s Discretion in Certifying Juvenile to Adult Court

In the Matter of the Welfare of J.H., Minn.S.Ct., 3/19/2014.  This comes up from the court of appeals.  Read about it here.  Justice Dietzen, for a unanimous court, reverses the court of appeals, which, in turn, had reversed the juvenile court.  Contrary to what the court of appeals had said, in certifying a juvenile to adult court the juvenile court is not required to expressly weigh the seriousness of the alleged offense and the child’s prior record of delinquency separate from the other statutory factors.  Further, the juvenile court is not required to specifically delineate how its determination of these two factors impacted its certification decision.

Miller v. Alabama Not Retroactive in Minnesota

Chambers v. State, Minn.S.Ct., 5/31/2013.  Justice Dietzen, in a 5-2 opinion, holds that Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), does not apply retroactively in Minnesota.  Mr. Chambers, whom I’ve represented on and off – including the filing of this post conviction petition – since the day after the crash is serving a life without possibility of release for a homicide committed when he was a juvenile.  Miller held that a mandatory life without possibility of release for a juvenile homicide offender violates the Eighth Amendment. 

Justices Page and Paul Anderson dissented.  Ultimately, SCOTUS will have to answer the question whether Miller is retroactive.

ADDENDUM:  Some of the postings/links got messed up in the flurry of the last Opinions from Justice Paul Anderson.  This one among them.  Here's what I had written the first time I posted about this case:

In a 5-2 Opinion, Justice Dietzen announces that the rule of Miller v. Alabama,  does not apply retroactively in Minnesota.  Miller announced last year that a mandatory sentence for a juvenile who has been convicted of a homicide of life without possibility of release violates the Eighth Amendment. 

A jury convicted Tim Chambers of first degree homicide back in the late ‘90’s.  At sentencing, his trial attorney – me – argued that a mandatory sentence of life with possibility of release violated the Eighth Amendment (and the companion state constitutional provision).  The trial court disagreed, and the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the life without parole sentence on direct appeal, rejecting my continued argument to the contrary. 

Justices Paul Anderson and Page dissented.  Here’s part of the introduction to Justice Anderson’s dissent:

I cannot understand, much less appreciate, why the majority is so drawn to the continued imposition of a cruel and unusual punishment. The majority consciously avoids the clear and principled lines of legal analysis available to it to remand this case to the postconviction court. The postconviction court should be allowed to fix the constitutionally defective portion of Chamber’s sentence—its mandatory nature—and to resentence Chambers in accordance with his constitutional rights as articulated by the Supreme Court in Miller.

Expungment of Juvenile Records Held by Executive Branch is Limited to the Order of Expungment

In the matter of the Welfare of J.J.P., Minn.S.Ct., 5/22/2013.  This is a companion case to that of M.D.T., the adult expungment opinion.  The focus here is expungment of juvenile records.  J.J.P. petitioned the district court to expunge his executive branch records under the juvenile code’s expungment provision, Minn.Stat. 260B.198, subd. 6.  The district court denied the petition but the court of appeals reversed.  The court of appeals said that this statute created broad authority to expunge all juvenile delinquency records held by executive branch agencies, and that rather than the balancing test contained in chapter 609A the guidelines in the delinquency rules which address the imposition of a disposition in a delinquency case applied.

Justice Dietzen concludes that this juvenile statute authorizes the court only to expunge executive branch records of the order adjudicating the juvenile delinquent.  This statute says:

Except when legal custody is transferred under the provisions of subdivision 1, clause (4), the court may expunge the adjudication of delinquency at any time that it deems advisable.

There are a lot of statutes that pertain to the creation, maintenance, distribution and destruction of juvenile records among the judicial and executive branches of government, and there are a lot of different “records” that go into the pile.  Only one among these many different “records” is the actual order adjudicating a juvenile delinquent.  So, borrowing Justice Stras’s dictionary, Justice Dietzen tells us what the definition of “adjudication” is.  He employs as narrow a definition as can be – the actual order of adjudication.  In doing so, the court authorizes executive branch agencies to keep all of the paperwork in the run up to that actual order.  Things like the juvenile petition, motions, arrest history, on and on, can stay in the file cabinet. 

J.J.P. wanted this expungment so that the Department of Human Services could not disqualify him from direct patient contact, thereby preventing him from becoming a paramedic.  The court says that expungment of the order of delinquency accomplishes this goal because DHS must have that order in order to disqualify.  The concurrence by Justice Paul Anderson in which Justice Page joins  – takes issue with this rosy picture.  And, points out that if the order of adjudication is expunged then all these executive branches have no statutory authority to keep any of the file.  The concurrence also proclaims that the juvenile expungment provision empowers actions to seal records more expansive than just the order, and that limiting expungment to the order of adjudication is an illusory remedy.  Justice Wright concurred in that particular conclusion about the scope of the expungment authority.

The court then turns to the phrase “deems advisable.”  The court rejects both approaches from the lower courts:  Chapter 609A balancing criteria, and juvenile disposition rules.  Instead, the court adopts the different balancing test in exercising a court’s inherent authority to expunge records.

Criminal Sexual Conduct Statute Unconstitutional As Applied to Fourteen Year Old Charged With Sexual Misconduct With Thirteen Year Old Cousin.

In the Matter of the Welfare of:  B.A.H., Minn.Ct.App., 4/22/2013.  Okay, two cousins, well under sixteen, are having a sleepover.  Staying up late, drinking Dad’s pilfered liquor, doing a little mutual sexual “experimentation.”  Here’s what Judge Toussaint said took place between B.A.H. and X.X.:

While lying in bed together, B.A.H. removed X.X.’s jeans and put his mouth on X.X.’s penis and sucked on it. B.A.H.then asked X.X. to suck on B.A.H.’s penis, but X.X. declined. At that point, B.A.H.removed his own clothing, straddled X.X., and placed X.X.’s penis into B.A.H.’s anus. B.A.H. began masturbating and moving up and down on X.X.’s penis. B.A.H.asked X.X. to touch him, but X.X . declined.

When the Corner Stone types talked to X.X. he said that it wasn’t like  B.A.H. had forced him into  playing around; rather, B.A.H. had just convinced him to do it.

The state charged B.A.H. with violating Minn.Stat. 609.342, subd. 1(g), which required the state to prove that B.A.H. had a “significant relationship” with X.X.; that B.A.H. engaged in sexual penetration with X.X. who was under 16 years of age.  Hmm.  Seems like that could go either way. 

And that’s exactly what the court of appeals concluded.  In its view, the state could just as likely have charged X.X. as B.A.H..  Or both.  Since the state chose only to charge B.A.H. the court said that it had engaged in arbitrary charging, in violation of B.A.H.’s right to equal protection.  The court winks at the near unfettered prosecutorial discretion to determine who and what to charge to reach what seems like the correct outcome:

Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(g),is unconstitutionally vague and encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement when applied to situations where both parties are under the age of 16 and each person has a significant relationship to the other because, in such a case, the statute does not provide any basis for establishing  which party is the actor.

Juvenile Expungement Request Sent Back to District Court to Give Human Services Opportunity to be Heard

In the Matter of the Petition of H.A.L.,, Minn.Ct.App., 4/1/2013.  The juvenile court adjudicated Ms. H.A.L. for something to do with a burglary.  A year or so later, the court discharged her, whereupon H.A.L. filed a petition to expunge her record.  H.A.L. wanted to go into either nursing or physical therapy but she neglected to serve her papers on the one agency that could stop her plans cold:  the Department of Human Services.  The court heard the petition and ordered that DHS seal its records.

DHS cried foul, relying on this statutory provision:

Notwithstanding expungement by a court, the commissioner may consider information obtained from juvenile courts as part of a background study for any individual applying to work in a licensed program or from the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension], unless the commissioner received notice of the petition for expungement and the court order for expungement is directed specifically to the commissioner.

Minn.Stat. 245C.08, subd. 1(b).  The court of appeals concludes that this section trumps the more generalized statutory discretion of district courts to expunge juvenile adjudications “when it deems such action advisable.”  Minn.Stat. 260B.198, subd. 6.  The court sent the case back to let DHS have its say; after that, if the court wants to order DHS to seal its records it’s free to do just that.

Juvenile Court Abused Its Discretion in Certifying Juvenile to Adult Court

In the Matter of the Welfare of J.H., Minn.Ct.App., 3//4/2013.  The juvenile court certified J.H. to adult court; he appealed.  The state had charged J.H. with first degree criminal sexual conduct, conspiracy to commit first degree criminal sexual conduct, kidnapping, and committing a crime for the benefit of a gang.  J.H. was in a bedroom as several other males sexually assaulted G.K.  J.H. did not assault G.K. or hold her down during the assault.

There are six statutory factors that the juvenile court must consider in making a certification decision:

(1) the seriousness of the alleged offense in terms of community protection, including the existence of any aggravating factors recognized by the Sentencing Guidelines, the use of a firearm, and the impact on any victim;

(2) the culpability of the child in committing the alleged offense, including the level of the child’s participation in planning and carrying out the offense and the existence of any mitigating factors recognized by the Sentencing Guidelines;

(3) the child’s prior record of delinquency;

(4) the child’s programming history, including the child’s past willingness to participate meaningfully in available programming;

(5) the adequacy of the punishment or programming available in the juvenile justice system; and

(6) the dispositional options available for the child.

Factors (1) and (3) must be given greater weight in this determination.  In re Welfare of P.C.T., 823 N.W.2d 676, 684 .(Minn. App. 2012).  The juvenile court concluded that only factor (3) favored EJJ designation and that all of the remaining five factors favored adult certification.  The court of appeals reverses this determination.  The court concluded that the juvenile court had abused its discretion by determining that J.H.’s programming history, the adequacy of the punishment or programming available, and the dispositional options available favor adult certification. 

The court also concluded that the juvenile court had also abused its discretion by giving greater weight to the seriousness of the offense but not to J.H.’s prior record of delinquency.  The court said that the juvenile court accorded the proper weight to the seriousness of the alleged offense (which favored certification), but that it failed to accord the proper weight to J.H.’s prior record of delinquency (which favored EJJ designation). 

By reversing the juvenile court on statutory grounds, the court avoids addressing J.H.’s constitutional challenge to the certification process. 

There was a vigorous dissent.

Breaching of Time Deadlines –Without Objection - by Which to Hold Certification Hearing Does Not Divest Juvenile Court of Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

In the Matter of the Welfare of:  R.D.M., III, Minn.Ct.App., 1/28/2013.  There is a juvenile statute, Minn.Stat. 260B.125, subd. 2(4), that says that hearings to certify a juvenile to adult court must be held within 30 days of the filing of the certification motion unless good cause is shown, in which case the hearing had to be held within 90 days of the filing of the motion.  The juvenile delinquency rules also establish a 90 day deadline for certification hearings. but the rule also says that the juvenile may waive the right to the scheduling of the hearing.  No one disagreed that the certification hearing in this case did not occur within the 90 day deadline.  R.D.M. argued that because of missing this deadline the juvenile court lost subject matter jurisdiction to hear it at all.

The court of appeals rejected this argument, saying that the failure to comply with the time requirements does not deprive the juvenile court of subject matter jurisdiction to hear and determine the certification motion.  It may be that had R.D.M. challenged the untimeliness of the certification hearing he would be entitled to relief.  However, not only did R.D.M. not object or otherwise complain about the untimeliness of the certification hearing, he actually contributed to it both by agreeing to waive the time requirements and then requesting a continuance of the (already late) hearing.

Court Reverses E.J.J. Certification by De Facto De Novo Review

In the Matter of the Welfare of P.C.T., Minn.Ct.App., 12/3/2012.  As P.C.T. was standing next to his cousin, someone killed  him.  P.C.T. perhaps knew who did the deed – the Opinion is coy about that – and he may have put together  a posse to go after the killer.  In any event he and his posse allegedly went on a drive-by shooting spree, which accomplished nothing except to get himself charged with six counts of aiding and abetting attempted second degree murder for the benefit of a gang.  

At the time, P.C.T. was on juvenile probation.  He’d been going to school, working the program although not consistently.  He’d never been in a residential treatment program.  The state wanted to certify P.C.T. as an adult but the juvenile court decided to keep P.C.T. under juvenile jurisdiction E.J.J. status.  Neither the state nor the court of appeals liked that decision.  The state appealed and the court of appeals reversed the juvenile court in a snarky, rather hostile opinion.

Retaining a juvenile in juvenile court must serve public safety.  The legislature says that the juvenile court has to consider six factors:

(1) the seriousness of the alleged offense; (2) the culpability of the child in committing the alleged offense; (3) the child’s prior record of delinquency; (4) the child’s programming history; (5) the adequacy of punishment or programming available in the juvenile system; and (6) the dispositional options available for the child.

Some factors – (1) and (3) - are more equal than others.  The juvenile court found that these two factors – as well as the third one -  weighed in favor of certification, while the remaining factors weighed in favor of retaining jurisdiction.  The court of appeals went off on the fourth factor, disagreeing with the juvenile court:

Having failed to achieve a reliable and consistently positive outcome in any of the programming respondent has tried so far, we are not inclined to agree with the district court that the public safety will be served by placing respondent in yet another juvenile delinquency program.

And this:

It is telling that respondent has hardly darkened the doorstep of a school or participated in online schooling in more than a year, except for his schooling at the juvenile detention center while being held for these charges.

The court of appeals also disagreed that the fifth factor supported retaining jurisdiction:

While [the probation officer who did the certification study] conceded that sending respondent to the adult correctional system would ensure public safety, her testimony did not offer an equivalently promising assessment of the public safety benefits of residential placement in the juvenile system.   Bach’s conclusion that EJJ provides a better public safety outcome is speculative at best, especially since respondent has never been placed in residential treatment.

The court of appeals substituted its view of the case for that of the juvenile court judge.  Instead of reviewing for abuse of discretion the court engaged in a de novo review:

By making public safety the predominant concern, the statute assures the public that an offender as dangerous as the respondent will not be shooting up another neighborhood anytime soon. He should be certified to stand trial as an adult.

Juvenile Certification is Not Offense Specific

State v. Grigsby, Minn.S.Ct., 8/1/2012.  This comes up from the Court of Appeals, read here.  Here’s the pertinent part of the introduction from the previous post:

Mr. Grigsby Jr., shot and killed J.S. in part, apparently, because J.S. declined to shake hands with Mr. Grigsby Jr.  A juvenile petition charged Mr. Grigsby Jr. with second degree intentional murder, on which the juvenile court certified him to stand trial in district court.  Mr. Grigsby Jr. sought to remove the trial judge (who had also presided over the certification proceedings). In the district court the state added a charge of second degree felony murder. 

The jury acquitted Mr. Grigsby of second degree intentional murder, the only offense on which the juvenile court certified him to adult court, but convicted him on the added charge.  He argued that the district court could not sentence him on the added charge, that the certification was offense specific.  Justice Meyer, writing for the entire court, rejects this argument.

The juvenile jurisdiction statute, Minn.Stat. 260B.101, subd. 1 says ““[w]hen a child is alleged to have committed, after becoming 14 years of age, an offense that would be a felony if committed by an adult, the juvenile court may enter an order certifying the proceeding for action under the laws and court procedures controlling adult criminal violations.”  The certification statute, Minn.Stat. 260B.125, says, “When the juvenile court enters an order certifying an alleged violation, the prosecuting authority shall proceed with the case as if the jurisdiction of the juvenile court had never attached.”  Justice Meyer concludes that “the proceeding” includes non-certified offenses that arise out of the same behavioral incident as the offense specified in the certification order.  In doing so, the Court dispenses with the language of the rule, Minn.R.Juv.Delinq.P. 18.07, which requires that the certification order state “that adult court prosecution is to occur on the alleged offense(s) specified in the certification order.”

Mr. Grigsby also argued that if the plain language of the juvenile rules won’t do then his due process rights have been violated.  He fails here, also:

treatment as a juvenile is not an inherent right but one granted by the state legislature, therefore the legislature may restrict or qualify that right as it sees fit, as long as no arbitrary or discriminatory classification is involved.

Further, due process does not require the state to notify Mr. Grigsby of all of the lesser included offenses that he might face in adult court arising out of the same behavioral incident.  So:

In sum, Minn. Stat. § 260B.125 unambiguously permits the certification of a “proceeding,” and that “proceeding” includes non-enumerated offenses arising out of the same behavioral incident as the offense enumerated in the certification order. When the State does not rely on less serious offenses as a ground supporting a motion to certify the proceeding to adult court, and when notice of less serious crimes will not help the child mount a defense to the State’s motion, due process does not require the State to notify the child of all the less serious offenses he might face. Following a valid certification order, a child no longer has a recognized liberty interest in a juvenile adjudication for offenses arising out of the behavioral incident that was certified to adult court, and therefore due process does not require a district court to provide the child another hearing on the certification issue.