Jury Appropriately Instructed on Domestic Abuse Pattern Evidence and Relationship Evidence.

State v. Matthews, Minn.S.Ct., 3/18/2010.  Mr. Matthews strangled to death his former girlfriend, Kristine Larson.  Among other offenses, a jury convicted him of first degree premeditated murder, and first degree domestic abuse murder; the trial court sentenced him to life without possibility of release on the first degree premeditated murder.  During trial, the state introduced twelve incidents between Mr. Matthews and Ms. Larson, all to establish relationship evidence and six also to establish past acts of domestic abuse.

On appeal, Mr. Williams complained that the trial court had improperly instructed the jury on the past pattern of domestic abuse element of first degree domestic abuse murder.  He complained that the trial court had failed to distinguish between past pattern of domestic abuse evidence and relationship evidence, suggesting that the jury had relied upon relationship evidence to support a finding of past pattern of domestic abuse. 

Now, the appellate court elected to review this alleged error, even though the trial court had not sentenced Mr. Williams on this offense, and even though there had been no objection raising it at trial.  The appellate court acknowledged that relationship evidence is more inclusive than pattern domestic abuse evidence; that is, some acts of relationship evidence would not meet the definition of pattern domestic abuse.  The trial court had determined that six of the twelve incidents that it admitted for relationship evidence purposes, which involved acts when Mr. Matthews hit, physically restrained, or threatened Ms. Larson with violence, were also admissible as domestic abuse evidence.  Before the state offered testimony of each of these twelve incidents, the trial court instructed the jury:

The purpose of this evidence, members of the jury, is to assist you in evaluating whether there is a past pattern of domestic abuse, which is one of the elements of one of the charges, Domestic Violence Murder. Some of the evidence is also being introduced to illuminate the history of the relationship between Mr. Matthews and the deceased, Kristine Larson.

In the final jury charge, the trial court instructed the jury:

Minnesota statutes define domestic abuse to include assault, which consists of either (1) committing an act with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm, or death, or (2) intentionally inflicting, or attempting to inflict bodily harm upon another . . . . Third . . . the defendant engaged in a past pattern of domestic abuse against Kristine Larson. A past pattern consists of prior acts of domestic abuse, which form a reliable sample of observable traits or acts, which characterize an individual’s behavior.

The appellate court conceded  that the instruction that the trial court gave during trial was ambiguous.  Nonetheless, because the final jury charge limited the definition of domestic abuse to assault and did not include such behavior as stalking and harassing phone calls, the instructions as a whole did not constitute plain error.

Mr. Matthews raised three prosecutorial misconduct arguments, which he alleged occurred during the state’s closing argument.  Under a plain error review, the appellate court declined to find such plain error.