State v. Ivy, Minn.Ct.App., 12/14/2015. The state charged Ms. Ivy with fourth degree assault of a peace officer. The peace officer in question, who during his "day job" is a St. Paul officer, was working off duty at Regions Hospital when Ms. Ivy caused a scene. The officer's job title at Regions is that of a "uniformed security officer." Uniformed security officers get to wear police uniforms with a hospital ID. Regions also employs "hospital safety and security officers." They wear cargo pants and pullover shirts.
Because of Ms. Ivy's boorish and obscene behavior the officer in question asked her to leave. In the course of escorting Ms. Ivy off the premises she ended up tearing the officer's shirt, and clawing his face with her hands and fingernails which left scratch marks and blood on his face. It was only then that the officer in question arrested Ms. Ivy; before that he was only going to throw her out.
The jury convicted her of the assault. She argued on appeal that the evidence had been insufficient to prove that the officer in question was either executing a lawful arrest or executing any other duty imposed by law. Minn.Stat. 609.2231, subd. 1. Ms. Ivy said that the officer in question was only enforcing hospital policy - behave yourself - and not executing any other duty imposed by law. The court said, well that may be, but the officer in question was also protecting the health and safety of the hospital's patients and preventing a breach of the peace. And surely those are two duties "imposed by law" upon a St. Paul cop. More importantly, the officer in question had probable cause to have arrested Ms. Ivy for trespass because she had sneaked back into a part of the emergency room where she did not have authorization to be. And she was causing a scene: disorderly conduct. That the officer in question decided initially only to remove Ms. Ivy from the premises rather than arrest her does not mean that he was not exercising a duty imposed by law.
There's also a Batson issue. A prospective juror stated that she had two cousins who had been charged with crimes, one with whom she was close. She also stated that an officer had pulled her over one time and she believed that the officer had used her boyfriend's prior gang involvement as a reason to search her car. Finally, she described a negative hospital experience where her mother was refused service for the ostensible reason that she had no proof of insurance. Because the prospective juror believed that the explanation for refusing service was racially motivated, she behaved rather badly toward hospital staff. Both this prospective juror and Ms. Ivey are African American. The state struck this prospective juror and Ms. Ivy objected.
The state said that the prospective juror's hospital experience of a loved one whom she believed was not getting appropriate care because of race and her rather naughty response to that service refusal were both race-neutral reasons for excluding her. The state then doubled down on the experience of the prospective juror's cousins with the legal system and the incident when an officer pulled her over to satisfy the requirement that these reasons not be pretextual. Both the trial court and the court of appeals accepted these assertions. Ms. Ivy fails in her Batson challenge.
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