Aiding Offender After the Fact Does Not Require That Offender Be Convicted of a Crime

State v. Townsend, Minn.Ct.App., 12/7/2015.  Mr. Townsend pled guilty to aiding an offender after the fact.  In between the plea and sentencing, the "offender" went to trial on a charge of first degree murder and got acquitted.  Oops. Mr. Townsend thought he should get his plea back, but both the trial court and the court of appeals say no.

It's a bit more complicated than that, of course.  Mr. Townsend had bought a gun off a Mr. Shufford.  Not long after, however, Mr. Shufford asked to borrow the gun back "because he intended to rob someone."  Mr. Townsend loaned him the gun.  Later that same day, Mr. Shufford reported to Mr. Townsend on the outcome of the robbery:  he'd had to "slump the guy."  Mr. Shufford showed Mr. Townsend and two other guys the dead body and the four of them then helped themselves to money from the deceased's wallet.

Mr. Townsend said that he couldn't be guilty of aiding an offender after the fact when the offender wasn't convicted of anything.  His plea, he said, was not accurate and thus invalid.  The statute in play, Minn.Stat. 609.495, subd. 3 says that:

“[w]hoever intentionally aids another person whom the actor knows or has reason to know has committed a criminal act, by destroying or concealing evidence of that crime, . . . [or] receiving the proceeds of that crime . . . is an accomplice after the fact.

The pattern jury instructions for aiding an offender after the fact require that the state prove that Mr. Shufford committed the crime of first degree murder.  Of course, the state utterly failed in that endeavor in Mr. Shufford's trial.  But, never mind about that because Mr. Townsend's plea colloquy in which he admitted the aforesaid facts gave him "reason to know" something that Mr. Shufford's jury did not know:  that Mr. Shufford had, committed first degree murder: 

Townsend admitted the following at the plea hearing: (1) he lent Shufford his gun because Shufford intended to rob someone; (2) Shufford told him that the robbery had gone “sour” and that he had to “slump” the victim; (3) Townsend went with Shufford to the site of the murder and Shufford showed him the dead victim in a car, saying that the victim is “not waking up” because Shufford “slumped him”; and (4) Townsend knew the gun had been used to kill the victim. These admitted facts “support a conclusion that defendant’s conduct falls within the charge to which he desires to plead guilty

The court of appeals readily admits that this is grossly unfair but somehow it declines to give Mr. Townsend back his guilty plea under either the more forgiving "fair and just" standard or the "manifest injustice" standard for withdrawal of a plea.