State v. Moore, Minn.S.Ct., 5/14/2014. Mr. Moore called 911 to report that his wife, Mauryn, had attacked him with a knife while he slept, that he had grabbed the knife from her and stabbed her. The medical examiner counted sixty-four sharp force injuries, including one to Mauryn’s neck which was “not survivable.” The medical examiner also concluded that the injuries to Mr. Moore were not life threatening and may very well have been self inflicted. A grand jury indicted Mr. Moore on first degree premeditated murder. A jury convicted him of that offense, as well as of a lesser included (apparently) offense of first degree domestic abuse murder.
Mr. Moore argued on appeal that the first degree premeditated murder statute is unconstitutional because there is no principled difference between that offense and second degree intentional murder. Justice Page, writing for a unanimous court, said that because this claim had not been presented to the trial court it would not be considered. And then, in a footnote, he considered it anyway. He said that the statutory definition of “premeditation,” Minn.Stat. 609.18 (along with case law) adequately distinguished between the two. Premeditation requires both forming the intent to kill and then mulling it over for “some appreciable time.” See State v. Moore, 481 N.W.2d 355 (Minn. 1992). Indeed, Justice Page (again) implicitly rejects some language from Moore, (derived from State v. Neumann, 262 N.W.2d 426 (Minn. 1978) that strongly suggested that the two – forming the intent to kill and mulling it over – could occur “virtually instantaneously”.
Mr. Moore also complained about the trial court’s instruction of what premeditation meant. Here’s what the trial court said:
Premeditation means that the defendant considered, planned, prepared for or determined to commit the act before the defendant committed it. Premeditation, being a process of the mind, is wholly subjective, and hence not always susceptible to proof by direct evidence. It may be inferred from all the circumstances surrounding the event.
It is not necessary that premeditation exist for any specific length of time. A premeditated decision to kill may be reached in a short period of time. However, an unconsidered or rash impulse, even though it includes an intent to kill, is not premeditated.
[Emphasis added.] Based on a couple of earlier cases that made similar arguments – State v. Goodloe, 718 N.W.2d 413 (Minn. 2006), and State v. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 2010) – Justice Page concluded that the inclusion in this instruction that premeditation “may be reached in a short period of time” was not erroneous. Alas, just four years ago in the Anderson opinion, Justice Page said that it was time to revise this very instruction to address this problem.
Mr. Moore next argued that the state had not adequately proved premeditation. Justice Page identified three categories of evidence that are relevant to an inference of premeditation: planning activity, motive, and the nature of the killing. State v. Hughes, 749 N.W.2d 307 (Minn. 2008). Working from this description of the evidence Justice Page determined that each of these categories of evidence supported the jury’s finding of premeditation:
Moore was a jealous and controlling husband. Moore and Mauryn had weekly arguments that sometimes turned physical. Mauryn wanted a divorce. On the night of the killing, the couple fought for over an hour. During that argument, a downstairs neighbor heard a woman yell, “Stop.” Mauryn was cut in vital areas of her body, including a 2-inch deep cut along her throat and numerous stab wounds to her chest and back. Mauryn’s body was found in the couple’s bedroom, but the weapon was procured from the kitchen. Moore continued to stab Mauryn after she was dead or had lost a significant amount of blood. Moore’s injuries were not life threatening and were self-inflicted.
Justice Page next rejected claims from Mr. Moore that the trial court had improperly admitted evidence of “history of the relationship.” He then ducked a claim that challenged the admissibility of hearsay statements of Mauryn’s, about Mr. Moore’s controlling and abusive ways that she had made to several of her friends. The Justice said that even if this was error, it was harmless.
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