State v. Haukos, Minn.Ct.App., 5/27/2014. The state charged Mr. Haukos with fourth degree criminal sexual conduct (vulnerable adult). After a lot of wrangling over the state’s failure to make adequate discovery disclosures and other things, the state added a charge of fifth degree criminal sexual conduct. For each of the counts the trial court made a finding of probable cause. Following a bench trial, the trial court convicted Mr. Haukos of the fifth degree charge but acquitted him of the fourth degree charge.
At sentencing the trial court questioned whether registration under the predatory offender statute was required in the face of the acquittal of the fourth degree charge. After all, registration is not required for a fifth degree criminal sexual conduct conviction. The state said that once the Complaint charged a “triggering offense,” by which it meant an offense that upon conviction requires registration, then it was a done deal; any conviction “arising out of the same set of circumstances requires registration.
At that point the defense challenged probable cause for the fourth degree charge. The trial court determined that the state’s position of prohibiting any scrutiny of the “triggering offense” went too far. The court considered the probable cause challenge despite its lateness. The court decided that there had to be probable cause for the “triggering offense” in order to require registration for a conviction for a different offense. Because there was probable cause to support the fourth degree charge Mr. Haukos was required to register. His conviction for the fifth degree charge was for conduct arising out of the same set of circumstances of the fourth degree charge.
The court of appeals agreed that there had to be probable cause for the “triggering offense.” The court also agreed that there was probable cause for the fourth degree charge. In doing so, the court winked just a bit at the tardy defense challenge to probable cause; after all Rule 10.01 says to make that challenge before trial or be considered to have waived it implicitly saying that the defense could make the late challenge but could not go beyond the face of the complaint in doing so. Now, that same rule says that the trial court can grant relief from waiver for good cause. Both the trial court and the court of appeals considered the probable cause challenge on the merits, which at least implies granting relief from any waiver. The court’s authority for this middle ground – the rule and State v. Lieberg, 553 N.W.2d 51 (Minn.Ct.App. 1996) – do not support this this middle ground of allowing a late challenge but confining it to the face of the Complaint.
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