Jury Properly Instructed on Doctrine of Transferred Intent.

State v. Bakdash, Minn.Ct.App., 5/20/2013.  Mr. Bakdash was at The Liberty Bar, doing some dope and drinking a lot. When he left, he got into an argument of sorts with either one or two unidentified males according to Mr. Bakdash’s buddy; or with A.E., according to Mr. Bakdash.  Mr. Bakdash then either drove slowly up onto the sidewalk to “scare” either the unidentified male(s) or A.E.; or, he drove pell mell down the sidewalk, nipping (apparently) A.E., killing B.V.H., and injuring S.B. and K.H.  The state charged Mr. Bakdash with a dozen crimes for the death of B.V.H. and the injuries to S.B. and K.H. 

A jury acquitted Mr. Bakdash of first degree murder and attempted first degree murder, but convicted him of the ten other charges.  He argued on appeal that the trial court ought not to have included instructions on transferred intent on the murder and attempted murder charges.  The first and second degree murder statutes require the state to prove that Mr. Bakdash intended to effect the death of a person or “another.”  The “another,” the court says, incorporates the doctrine of transferred intent.  State v. Sutherlin, 396 N.W.2d 238 (Minn. 1986).  Mr. Bakdash said, no, transferred intent does not apply to crimes against unintended victims when those crimes are either different or are of a more serious nature than crimes committed against the intended victim.  Mr. Bakdash said that he only intended to scare A.E., and did not intend to harm the A.E. or anyone else.  The court of appeals said that when the intended harm is the same or substantially similar to the unintended harm then transferred intent applies.  Mr. Bakdash’s use of the car to drive up onto the sidewalk made the car a dangerous weapon.  The jury could, and did, reject his claim that he only intended to scare the unidentified male(s); and could and did conclude that he intended to cause the death of a person.

Mr. Bakdash also argued that submitting transferred intent instructions to the jury was a constructive amendment of the indictment.  He said that the grand jury never knew of A.E.’s existence but, rather, heard evidence of his attempted murder of two victims, and of his first degree murder of the third, all under a theory of direct intent.  The court rejects this argument, essentially saying that Mr. Bakdash had ample notice that transferred intent was a potential issue and thus his rights were not violated.

Finally, Mr. Bakdash complained that the trial court should have ordered the disclosure of the full grand jury transcript.  Rule 18.04 says that the court may order the disclosure of a grand jury transcript to a defendant, “for good cause”.  It’s difficult to tell from the opinion, but it appears that Mr. Bakdash did get a transcript of witness testimony; it was the rest of the transcript that he didn’t get.  The court said that he had not established a particularized need for the rest of the transcript.