Fleeing a Police Officer By Means Other than a Vehicle is Specific Intent Crime

State v. Wilson, Minn.S.Ct., 5/22/2013.  This comes up from the court of appeals.  Read about that here.  A jury had convicted Ms. Wilson of misdemeanor attempting to evade or elude a police officer by some means other than fleeing in a motor vehicle.  She wanted an intoxication instruction because she maintained that this crime was a specific intent offense.  Both the trial court and the court of appeals said, no, that the language, “for the purpose of” did not make the crime a specific intent crime. 

Justice Wright, with Justices Paul Anderson and Page dissenting in part, sides with Ms. Wilson.  The court concludes that the plain language of the statute creates a specific intent crime.  “For the purpose of” means the same thing as “with the intent to.”  (Only lawyers would argue about this.)  “Purpose,” the court says, is synonymous with “intention;” and the phrase “in order to” is synonymous with the phrase “for the purpose of.”  The statue in play here requires proof that Ms. Wilson attempted to evade or elude a peace officer for the purpose of avoiding arrest, etc.  That’s a specific intent requirement. 

The court goes on to address how the trial court is to decide whether a defendant, charged with a specific intent crime, is entitled to a jury instruction on voluntary intoxication.  The court states that the offer of proof from the defendant must be viewed in the light most favorable to that defendant, something it’s apparently not said before this.  The court then reviews Ms. Wilson’s offer of proof.  That she had been drinking at a bar, that she smelled  like she had been consuming alcohol and that she was intoxicated would not have been enough.  However, the remainder of her proof about being very confused, having a different look on her face, etc.,  met the requisite burden.  So, she was entitled to the instruction.

Not having got it, however, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  The court concluded that the state had presented more than enough evidence that Ms. Wilson had formed the requisite specific intent.  Justices Paul Anderson and Page disagreed with this conclusion and would have sent the case back for a new trial:

While the jury may have, could have, or might have reached the same verdict it did, I am unable to form a clear and firm conviction beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same verdict if it was properly informed.