Juvenile Certification is Not Offense Specific

State v. Grigsby, Minn.S.Ct., 8/1/2012.  This comes up from the Court of Appeals, read here.  Here’s the pertinent part of the introduction from the previous post:

Mr. Grigsby Jr., shot and killed J.S. in part, apparently, because J.S. declined to shake hands with Mr. Grigsby Jr.  A juvenile petition charged Mr. Grigsby Jr. with second degree intentional murder, on which the juvenile court certified him to stand trial in district court.  Mr. Grigsby Jr. sought to remove the trial judge (who had also presided over the certification proceedings). In the district court the state added a charge of second degree felony murder. 

The jury acquitted Mr. Grigsby of second degree intentional murder, the only offense on which the juvenile court certified him to adult court, but convicted him on the added charge.  He argued that the district court could not sentence him on the added charge, that the certification was offense specific.  Justice Meyer, writing for the entire court, rejects this argument.

The juvenile jurisdiction statute, Minn.Stat. 260B.101, subd. 1 says ““[w]hen a child is alleged to have committed, after becoming 14 years of age, an offense that would be a felony if committed by an adult, the juvenile court may enter an order certifying the proceeding for action under the laws and court procedures controlling adult criminal violations.”  The certification statute, Minn.Stat. 260B.125, says, “When the juvenile court enters an order certifying an alleged violation, the prosecuting authority shall proceed with the case as if the jurisdiction of the juvenile court had never attached.”  Justice Meyer concludes that “the proceeding” includes non-certified offenses that arise out of the same behavioral incident as the offense specified in the certification order.  In doing so, the Court dispenses with the language of the rule, Minn.R.Juv.Delinq.P. 18.07, which requires that the certification order state “that adult court prosecution is to occur on the alleged offense(s) specified in the certification order.”

Mr. Grigsby also argued that if the plain language of the juvenile rules won’t do then his due process rights have been violated.  He fails here, also:

treatment as a juvenile is not an inherent right but one granted by the state legislature, therefore the legislature may restrict or qualify that right as it sees fit, as long as no arbitrary or discriminatory classification is involved.

Further, due process does not require the state to notify Mr. Grigsby of all of the lesser included offenses that he might face in adult court arising out of the same behavioral incident.  So:

In sum, Minn. Stat. § 260B.125 unambiguously permits the certification of a “proceeding,” and that “proceeding” includes non-enumerated offenses arising out of the same behavioral incident as the offense enumerated in the certification order. When the State does not rely on less serious offenses as a ground supporting a motion to certify the proceeding to adult court, and when notice of less serious crimes will not help the child mount a defense to the State’s motion, due process does not require the State to notify the child of all the less serious offenses he might face. Following a valid certification order, a child no longer has a recognized liberty interest in a juvenile adjudication for offenses arising out of the behavioral incident that was certified to adult court, and therefore due process does not require a district court to provide the child another hearing on the certification issue.