Court Limits Falsely Reporting Police Misconduct Statute to Defamatory Statements

State v. Crawley, Minn.S.Ct., 8/8/2012.  This comes up from the court of appeals, read here.  Here’s how that post described what happened:

Ms. Crawley filed a report of police misconduct, asserting that an officer forged her signature on a medical release to obtain her medical records.  When a nurse said that she had seen Ms. Crawley sign the release, the state charged her with falsely reporting police misconduct and falsely reporting a crime.  Falsely reporting misconduct is:

Whoever informs, or causes information to be communicated to, a peace officer, whose responsibilities include investigating or reporting police misconduct, that a peace officer . . . has committed an act of police misconduct, knowing that the information is false, is guilty of a crime . . . .

Ms. Crawley argued that this statute was “viewpoint discrimination” because it only criminalized false statements that criticize police.  The appellate court points out that making a false statement that attempts to absolve a police officer of misconduct would not be punishable under this statute.  That makes prosecution turn on content, which you can’t do.  R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, (1992)

The court of appeals concluded that the statute was unconstitutional.  In a 4-3 Opinion, Justice G. Barry Anderson reverses the court of appeals and construes the statute, Minn.Stat. 609.505, subd. 2 narrowly to criminalize defamation, a category of speech not protected by the First Amendment.  The statute is a content-based regulation of speech because prosecution under it depends entirely on what the person says.  The statute punishes “a substantial amount of protected speech in addition to unprotected speech.  The statute is thus facially unconstitutional.  The majority then saves the statute by limiting it to speech that is defamatory:

Under our narrowing construction, we conclude that the only speech reached by section 609.505, subdivision 2, is defamation.14 Because under our limiting construction we require the State to prove that a person, in order to be convicted under the statute, has informed a peace officer of an act of police misconduct by another officer, the first element of defamation―communication to a third party―is fulfilled. The statute also requires the communicator of the information to know that it is false, fulfilling the second element. Because an act of misconduct is an allegation that affects a peace officer “in his business, trade, profession, office or calling” the requirement for defamation per se is satisfied. See Bahr, 766 N.W.2d at 920 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, requiring the State to prove that the officer receiving the information reasonably understands the information to refer to a specific individual satisfies the fourth element.

Justice Stras, joined by Justices Paul H. Anderson and Meyer, dissented, saying that the statute punishes statements critical of government officials, statements at the “very center” of the First Amendment.