Monday, June 25, 2012

A Murder Committed So That a Child is Intended to Find the Body May Be Aggravating Factor

State v. Robideau, Minn.Ct.App., 6/25/2012.  After remand from the Minnesota Supreme Court, go here, this case is back in the court of appeals.  You will recall that a jury convicted Mr. Robideau of stabbing his girlfriend to death.  The court imposed an aggravated sentence based, in part, on the presence of a child in the house where the stabbing occurred.  The child did not see, hear, or otherwise witness the stabbing.  The court of appeals affirmed the aggravated sentence, reasoning that Mr. Robideau knew it was highly likely that the child would discover the body, which is exactly what happened.  See here.  The supreme court reversed the court of appeals, saying that the child’s mere presence in the house where the murder occurred was insufficient to support a departure.
In its remand, the supreme court dropped in this lesson plan for what should occur next:
The State argues for the first time on appeal that when a child discovers the body of a murdered parent, the crime is significantly more serious than the typical murder, and warrants treatment as a new aggravating factor. A defendant who commits a murder in such a way that the child is intended to be the first to discover the body of a murdered parent may warrant treatment as a new aggravating factor. But that issue was not presented to the district court, and thus is not properly before us. Moreover, the district court did not find that Robideau intended for D.C. to discover his mother's body.
Sure enough, the trial court adopted this lesson plan and imposed the aggravated sentence yet again.  Mr. Robideau appealed again and the court of appeals upholds the trial court again.  Mr. Robideau argued that such conduct would constitute the uncharged crime of child endangerment, which the court of appeals characterized as “absurd” because child endangerment requires that the defendant have assumed responsibility for all or a portion of the child’s care, the same child whom he intended find his dead mother.  Mr. Robideau also argued that whatever he did to ensure that the child discovered his mom’s dead body occurred after the murder was complete and thus not subject to being an aggravating factor.  The court of appeals said that the treatment of the body of a murder victim is part of the murder so yes it is subject to being an aggravating factor.
Turning to the facts to support that Mr. Robideau intended that the child find his dead mom, the court of appeals found plenty of them:
Robideau did not attempt to remove the body or summon help to the scene. [The victim’s] car was still parked in the driveway in the morning, so D.C. knew that his mother was still in the house. D.C. was unlikely to leave the house, especially without his mother’s permission, because it was January and because he was too young to drive. D.C. knew that his mother would be up and packing the house in the morning. Robideau knew that D.C. was the only other person in the house, and that no one was planning to come to the house to help [the victim] pack for her upcoming move. Thus, Robideau knew that [the victim’s] dead body would be in the house in the morning, that D.C. would be alone in the house in the morning, and that D.C. would not be able to leave without consulting his mother for permission. The inevitable result of all of these factors is that D.C. would find his mother’s lifeless body.
Finally, Mr. Robideau complained that the state had not given sufficient notice of intent to seek an aggravated sentence on this basis.  The court of appeals gives the state a pretty easy go of this, letting some pretty vague, sloppy language suffice for the requisite notice.

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