State v. Carridine, Minn.S.Ct., 5/9/2012. A jury convicted Mr. Carridine of premeditated murder in the first degree for the shooting death of Lorenzo Guffie. Mr. Carridine said that he shot Mr. Guffie without intending to in self defense. Before that, however, the two men argued, first inside a bar and then out on the street, over whether Mr. Guffie had robbed Mr. Carridine,. The state and the defense disagreed over which side was the aggressor in the argument, each saying that it was the other who “started it.” The state’s witnesses said that once the argument moved outside that Mr. Guffie got in his car and began to drive away. Mr. Carridine went up to the car, said something like “get me some” and shot at the moving car six times. Mr. Carridine said that it was Mr. Guffie who drew down on him and that it had been his intent only to shoot at the car door.
The main issues on appeal had to do with jury instructions on self defense and on jury strikes. The state removed two potential jurors of color for cause, to which Mr. Carridine objected on Batson grounds. Alas, the court continues its streak of never reversing a conviction for this reason (or, maybe there’s been one). The state’s first strike was of J.C., an African American woman. Here’s the court’s summary of her qualifications:
The state’s second strike was of P.G., an Asian-Pacific Islander:J.C. is a nurse at the V.A. Medical Center. About 20 or 30 years earlier she testified as an alibi witness in her brother’s assault trial. Her brother was convicted and served time in prison. Although J.C. testified that she respected the jury’s verdict, she said she was “disappointed” with the decision and that it made her feel “sad.” Although she said that she would be able to listen to the testimony and be impartial, she said the trial “will bring up memories of the past.” The State asked her if she felt comfortable sitting in judgment of another person, and she replied, “Not completely. . . . I would have to – I would have to pray and ask for guidance to do the right thing.”
P.G. was unemployed and looking for work. The State asked P.G. how he would view the State’s witnesses, who may have lifestyles that he does not particularly like, and P.G. responded that he would not judge them by their “nature of looks or how they sit” but would “look at the facts.” When asked if the witnesses’ prior bad acts would affect whether he believed their testimony, P.G. replied that he “would go by the weight of the facts.”
The court accepted the state’s reasons for striking J.C. as race neutral. As to P.G., the court said that the defense had not even made out a prima facie case.
Before trial, Mr. Carridine had pled guilty but then asked to withdraw that plea; he sent the judge a letter in support of that request in which he told the judge what had happened which led him to believe that he had a self defense claim. At trial, the court permitted the state to impeach Mr. Carridine. The supreme court ducks the question whether this was impermissible impeachment by saying that even so the error was harmless.
Because Mr. Carridine maintained that it had not been his intent to kill anyone, the supreme court says that it was error to have given the jury CRIMJIG 7.05, justifiable taking of life, which includes language about intentional killing. Instead, the jury should have been given CRIMJIG 7.06, which does not include language about intentional killing. The court reviewed this error under a “plain error” analysis and concluded that the error had not affected Mr. Carridine’s substantial rights. The court also concluded that there was enough evidence to have warranted the instruction on revival of the right of self defense.
Finally, the court considered and rejected a number of claims of prosecutorial misconduct.
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