Circumstantial Evidence to Support Conviction of Vehicular Homicide, Leaving the Scene, Insufficient.

State v. Al-Naseer, Minn.S.Ct., 9/16/2010.  This is a criminal vehicular homicide case, leaving the scene of the accident.  Mr. Al-Naseer was driving west on Highway 10 in Clay County when his vehicle gradually crossed the fog line (the one on the right shoulder) and hit Kane Thomson, who was changing a flat tire.  Mr. Al-Naseer also rolled over the flat tire that Mr. Thomson had removed, dragging it down the highway.  Mr. Al-Naseer’s vehicle gradually made its way back onto the road and kept going.  The impact caused considerable damage to the right side of Mr. Al-Naseer’s vehicle.

In an earlier appeal (one of many), the supreme court had held that for a defendant to be found guilty of criminal vehicular homicide (leaving the scene) the state had to prove that the defendant knew that he had been involved in an accident with a person or another vehicle.  State v. Al‑Naseer (Al‑Naseer IV), 734 N.W.2d 679, 688-89 (Minn. 2007). 

Mr. Al-Naseer argued on this appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support his leaving the scene conviction, because evidence to prove the mens rea element was circumstantial and consistent with rational hypotheses other than guilt.  A conviction based on circumstantial evidence is subject to “heightened scrutiny.”  State v. Bolstad, 686 N.W.2d 531, 539 (Minn. 2004):

This heightened scrutiny requires us to consider “whether the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved support a rational hypothesis other than guilt.” State v. Taylor, 650 N.W.2d 190, 206 (Minn. 2002). In other words, the circumstances proved must “be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” State v. Bias, 419 N.W.2d 480, 484 (1988).

Last year, a plurality of the court seemed to change the rules for reviewing convictions based on circumstantial evidence, saying that you draw inferences only from the “circumstances proved.”  State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320 (Minn. 2010).  Here, though, the court of appeals had declined all together to apply any circumstantial evidence standard of review.  The court of appeals thought that this standard only applied when every element required for conviction had been proved entirely by circumstantial evidence.  The supreme court here says, no, we never said that and we aren’t saying that now. 

Applying this circumstantial evidence standard of review to the mens rea element, the supreme court finds the state’s proof lacking; it didn’t prove that Mr. Al-Naseer had actual knowledge that here had been an accident that involved either a person or a vehicle.  The circumstances proved, says the majority, supported both an inference that Mr. Al-Naseer knew he had hit Mr. Thomson and an inference that he had fallen asleep behind the wheel at the time of the accident.  Both inferences being reasonable, the state looses.

Chief Justice Gildea, joined by Justice Dietzen, dissented.  Justice Stras took no part in the decision, not having been on the court at the time or argument.