Doctrine of Transferred Intent Applies to Establish Intent Element of Criminal Sexual Conduct.

State v. Austin, Minn.C.Att., 9/28/2010.  Mr. Austin spent July 29, 2008 drinking a lot, really a lot, of malt liquor, with the occasional toke of marijuana at his uncle’s apartment.   Two sisters, and the three boys of one of the sisters, lived in a nearby apartment in the building.  When one of the sisters left to return to her apartment, Mr. Austin made remarks to her that she construed as a sexual proposition.  She went on to her apartment.

To make a long story short, Mr. Austin didn’t realize that the sister whom he had propositioned no longer lived in the other sister’s apartment.  They say that ignorance is bliss but see for yourself.  Mr. Austin let himself into the unlocked, darkened apartment of the other sister and climbed into bed with one of that sister’s young boys, age seven.  There was some inappropriate sexual touching before Mr. Austin learned of his error.  The state charged him with burglary and criminal sexual conduct in the second degree, victim under 13 years of age, defendant more than 36 months older.

At trial Mr. Austin said none of this ever happened.  He had a story having to do with the virtue of the woman he’d propositioned, but it didn’t really explain how he ended up in bed the the seven year old, which he didn’t deny anyway.  He just said it was a mistake, wrong apartment, wrong sex partner.

The trial court found Mr. Austin guilty.  The Court of Appeals concluded that Mr. Austin’s groping of the seven year old supported the “acting with sexual intent” element of the offense.  Mr. Austin said that he had every intent to touch the sister whom he’d propositioned (and whom he believed still lived in the other sister’s apartment) to satisfy his sexual desire, but he had absolutely no such intent to do so with the seven year old.  That is, he was saying there’s no such thing as transferred intent in sex crimes.  The appellate court says it’s no different from when a defendant intends to assault A but assaults B instead.  See, e.g., State v. Livingston, 420 N.W.2d 223, 229 (Minn. App. 1988).  Conviction affirmed.