Despite Statutory Language To The Contrary a Motel Room is a "Building" Unto Itself Under the Burglary Statute

State v. Lopez, Minn.Ct.App., 4/24/2017.  Mr. Lopez was staying in a motel out in Wilmar.  He entered Z.D.'s motel room, which was unlocked, and stole Z.D.'s cell phone and wallet while Z.D. was in the shower.  The state charged Mr. Lopez with theft and with first degree burglary.  The trial court convicted Mr. Lopez of both counts.

On appeal Mr. Lopez said, as he had during trial, that he had not entered a "building" without consent because he was staying at the motel - a "building", surely -, and that Z.D.'s separate motel room was not a "building. The court of appeals said no to both of these claims.

Everyone agreed that Mr. Lopez had consent to enter the motel, itself; after all, he'd rented a room (different from Z.D.'s room).  So, the conviction for the burglary turns on whether Z.D.'s room is a "building," or more accurately, a "sub-building". Mr. Lopez said that it was not, pointing in particular to the arson statute that says that “If a building consists of two or more units separately secured or occupied, each unit shall be deemed a separate building.”  Minn. Stat. § 609.556, subds. 1, 3 (2014). 

Looking directly at the burglary statute - or to what's not in the burglary statute - he also pointed out that until 1983 the definition of "building" in the burglary statute expressly included "portions of such structure as are separately occupied." Like a motel room. Removing that language, he argued, indicated the legislature's desire not to treat individual, enclosed spaces within a larger building - alas, a motel room - as separate "buildings."  Rather than simply pointing to what's not in the burglary statute the court of appeals says that the post 1983 language is ambiguous.  Further, although it has skirted around the question of whether under the post 1983 burglary statute a "building" encompasses sub-units like Z.D.'s motel room it has not answered the question.  Time to haul out the dictionaries and Phoenix-like raise up the old statute.

Where the court finds that a "structure" includes anything intentionally constructed from component parts.  A motel room fits that definition so the court is half way home.  To complete the journey the court looks to the statutory definition of a "building." The statute says that a "building" is a  "structure" that is "suitable for affording shelter for human beings."  Well, a motel room is by its very existence "suitable for affording shelter for human beings." That's the whole point:

We are mindful of the fact that the legislature modified the definition of “building” for the crime of burglary in 1983 and, in doing so, did not expressly provide that a separate unit “shall be deemed a separate building,” as it did for arson. Minn. Stat. § 609.556, subd. 3. We are also mindful that our holding means that both a motel and a rented room within the motel qualify as a “building” for the purposes of the burglary statute. But inartful language is not necessarily ambiguous language. And we conclude that the statute as written unambiguously defines a motel room as a “building.” 

The court thus reinserts the very language that the legislature struck out thirty-four years ago.  Sigh.