State v. Fitch, Minn.S.Ct., 8/24/2016. Mr. Fitch shot and killed a police officer in Dakota County, then shortly thereafter got into a shoot out with officers in Ramsey County, injuring three of those officers before being shot himself. The state convened a multi-county grand jury under the provisions of Minn.Stat. 628.41, subd. 2. That grand jury then returned an indictment which charged Mr. Fitch with the homicide in Dakota County, and with multiple offenses in Ramsey County: three counts of attempted murder in Ramsey County and possession of a firearm by an ineligible person.
The statute authorized either a Dakota or Ramsey judge to convene this multi-county grand jury. Whether by coin flip or otherwise, a Dakota judge convened one of these multi-county grand juries and designated the Dakota County Attorney's Office to attend to the care and feeding of this grand jury. The order that impaneled the grand jury also designated Dakota County as the venue for any proceedings in the event of an indictment. This venue designation put Mr. Fitch's prosecution on a collision course with a provision of the state constitution, Article 1, Section 6, which says that Mr. Fitch "enjoys" the right to a "public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district wherein the crime shall have been committed..."
The statute authorized either a Dakota or Ramsey judge to convene this multi-county grand jury. Whether by coin flip or otherwise, a Dakota judge convened one of these multi-county grand juries and designated the Dakota County Attorney's Office to attend to the care and feeding of this grand jury. The order that impaneled the grand jury also designated Dakota County as the venue for any proceedings in the event of an indictment. This venue designation put Mr. Fitch's prosecution on a collision course with a provision of the state constitution, Article 1, Section 6, which says that Mr. Fitch "enjoys" the right to a "public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district wherein the crime shall have been committed..."
Mr. Fitch invited this collision by attacking the indictment in two ways. He moved to dismiss the indictment, saying that regardless of what the statute said the district court was constitutionally required to sever the Ramsey County offenses from the Dakota homicide offense because of the jury locale requirement of the aforementioned Article 1, Section 6 of the state constitution . This was an apparent if not explicit reference to the offenses that happened in Ramsey County. Mr. Fitch also moved to sever the Dakota homicide from the Ramsey County offenses under Rule 17.03, subd 3; he relied upon two provisions of that rule: that the Ramsey County offenses were not related to the Dakota homicide, or even if related joining the offenses for trial was too prejudicial.
At the same time, Mr. Fitch moved to change venue because, he said, all the pretrial publicity prevented him from getting a fair trial. The trial judge took up the venue change motion first and granted it, packing everyone off to Stearns County for trial. The trial court then took up Mr. Fitch's constitutional challenges and denied them. Then the trial court then denied the motion to sever the Ramsey County charges. A Stearns County jury convicted Mr. Fitch of all of the charges.
Mr. Fitch appealed the rulings on his constitutional challenge and on his Rule 17.03 severance request. The court first took up the constitutional challenge.
At the same time, Mr. Fitch moved to change venue because, he said, all the pretrial publicity prevented him from getting a fair trial. The trial judge took up the venue change motion first and granted it, packing everyone off to Stearns County for trial. The trial court then took up Mr. Fitch's constitutional challenges and denied them. Then the trial court then denied the motion to sever the Ramsey County charges. A Stearns County jury convicted Mr. Fitch of all of the charges.
Mr. Fitch appealed the rulings on his constitutional challenge and on his Rule 17.03 severance request. The court first took up the constitutional challenge.
Justice G. Barry Anderson acknowledges that Mr. Fitch had a right to be tried by a jury from a particular county or district; the constitutional provision is about the jury pool and not about the location of trial. With that understanding it's easy to reject any claim that Mr. Fitch had a right to either a judge or prosecuting authority from a particular county or district. Rather, Mr. Fitch's rights under Article 1, Section 6 cannot be violated until a judge impanels a jury from a county other than the one in which the offense occurred to adjudicate the case against him.
Addressing the right to be tried by a jury from a particular county or district, Justice Anderson says that past opinions establish that even this right is subject to at least two exceptions: this right can be overcome where it would be difficult to identify the county or district in which the offense occurred, and where an impartial jury cannot be drawn from the county or district in which the alleged crime occurred. The court does say that in most cases in which a multi-county grand jury returns an indictment, the district court should designate venue based on where the alleged offense occurred. So, although the statute gives the trial judge discretion in designating the venue of charges returned by a multi-county grand jury the state constitution does impose restraints on that discretion.
Addressing the right to be tried by a jury from a particular county or district, Justice Anderson says that past opinions establish that even this right is subject to at least two exceptions: this right can be overcome where it would be difficult to identify the county or district in which the offense occurred, and where an impartial jury cannot be drawn from the county or district in which the alleged crime occurred. The court does say that in most cases in which a multi-county grand jury returns an indictment, the district court should designate venue based on where the alleged offense occurred. So, although the statute gives the trial judge discretion in designating the venue of charges returned by a multi-county grand jury the state constitution does impose restraints on that discretion.
So, the court is creeping perilously closer and closer to having to answer the constitutional question: did keeping the Ramsey County charges in Dakota County violate Mr. Fitch's right to be tried by a jury of the county or district in which the crimes occurred? The state said no, for two reasons: because it avoids serial prosecutions, and because it would be just too traumatic and, frankly, inconvenient, for all of its witnesses to have to testify at two different trials. Justice Anderson found these justifications for trampling on Mr. Fitch's state constitutional rights just a bit too easy and more problematic, amorphous. The court said that under the state's rule there would be "no limiting principle for when witness convenience outweighs a defendant's rights under Article 1, Section 6 to trial by a jury of the county or district in which the crime was committed."
By rejecting the state's only reasons to try both sets of charges in Dakota County Justice Anderson is left with no justification to deny Mr. Fitch his state constitutional right to a trial by a jury of the county or district in which the crime was committed. Now finally face to face with the state constitutional question the court does what it is wont to do and punts it.
By rejecting the state's only reasons to try both sets of charges in Dakota County Justice Anderson is left with no justification to deny Mr. Fitch his state constitutional right to a trial by a jury of the county or district in which the crime was committed. Now finally face to face with the state constitutional question the court does what it is wont to do and punts it.
To do that things get a little fuzzy. This is because, remember, at the same time that Mr. Fitch moved to dismiss the indictment on state constitutional grounds he also moved to change venue because of publicity. This was just the out that the court was looking for. If Mr. Fitch could not get a fair trial in "the greater Twin Cities metropolitan area" - which is what he said - then what did it matter whether he was entitled to trial in Ramsey County before a Ramsey County jury on the Ramsey County charges?
Justice Anderson takes a breath at this point and rather sheepishly concedes in a lengthy footnote that Mr. Fitch had been asking the Dakota County court only that the homicide venue, which was initially and properly located in Dakota County, be moved out of Dakota County; while at the same time he was asking that the Ramsey charges be sent packing back to St. Paul, not as a venue change because of pretrial publicity from a properly venued action but as a recognition that under the state constitution Dakota County had no business trying the Ramsey charges in the first place. The court also accepted Mr. Fitch's assertions to them that he had not intended to waive his right to have the Ramsey County charges tried by a Ramsey County jury.
Despite all this, Justice Anderson fudges these concessions by then noting that by requesting a change of venue Mr. Fitch was admitting that he could not receive an impartial jury trial in either county. An "impartial" jury is one of the safeguards that Article 1, Second 6 protects. This lets the court off the hook because it could now pronounce that because of all that publicity about which Mr. Fitch so bitterly complained he simply "did not have a right to a trial by a Ramsey County jury on the Ramsey County charges..." because that trial would not be an impartial one. As a result the court offers no guidance on how to address these thorny issues the next time up. Whew, that was close.
Justice Anderson takes a breath at this point and rather sheepishly concedes in a lengthy footnote that Mr. Fitch had been asking the Dakota County court only that the homicide venue, which was initially and properly located in Dakota County, be moved out of Dakota County; while at the same time he was asking that the Ramsey charges be sent packing back to St. Paul, not as a venue change because of pretrial publicity from a properly venued action but as a recognition that under the state constitution Dakota County had no business trying the Ramsey charges in the first place. The court also accepted Mr. Fitch's assertions to them that he had not intended to waive his right to have the Ramsey County charges tried by a Ramsey County jury.
Despite all this, Justice Anderson fudges these concessions by then noting that by requesting a change of venue Mr. Fitch was admitting that he could not receive an impartial jury trial in either county. An "impartial" jury is one of the safeguards that Article 1, Second 6 protects. This lets the court off the hook because it could now pronounce that because of all that publicity about which Mr. Fitch so bitterly complained he simply "did not have a right to a trial by a Ramsey County jury on the Ramsey County charges..." because that trial would not be an impartial one. As a result the court offers no guidance on how to address these thorny issues the next time up. Whew, that was close.
The court then addresses the severance motion under traditional severance jurisprudence. The resolution of that question turns on the existence of prejudice, which in this case Mr. Fitch could not show. Joinder is not prejudicial, the court said, if "evidence of each offense would have been admissible Spreigl evidence in the trial of the other." State v. Conaway, 319 N.W.2d 35 (Minn. 1982). It was easy enough for the court to say that that was the case for Mr. Fitch, if for no other reason than the two sets of charges occurred roughly five miles and five hours apart. Finding no prejudice to Mr. Fitch by denying the severance request the court does not have to rule whether the refusal to sever was error.
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