"Plain Error" Instructions on Accomplice Liability Earn Defendant a New Trial

State v. Huber,  Minn.S.Ct., 4/6/2016.  A jury convicted Timothy Huber of intentionally aiding his Dad, Delbert, in the commission of second degree intentional murder, and second degree felony murder of Mr. Larson.  On appeal Timothy said that the trial court had botched the accomplice liability instructions.  Justice Dietzen agreed and sent the case back for a new trial.

These two families had been feuding for some years.  On the morning of the homicide Timothy and Delbert drove to N.L.'s farm where Mr. Larson lived; Delbert brought along a rifle.  Timothy went to a barn to commence doing some chores; Delbert remained seated in the car with the door open.  Mr. Larson arrived at the farm; he and Delbert had what Justice Dietzen described as an "altercation" at the end of which Delbert shot Mr. Larson.  Sometime later, Delbert got around to calling the authorities to report that he'd shot Mr. Larson.

Delbert testified that he did not tell Timothy that he planned to shoot Larson, that he did not ask him whether he should bring a gun to the farm, and that Timothy never touched the gun.

The trial court told the jury that Timothy was guilty of a crime committed by Delbert if he "intentionally aided [Delbert] in committing it."  The instructions did not, however, go on to explain what "intentionally aided" means:  Timothy knew that Delbert was going to commit a crime and he intended his actions or presence to further the commission of that offense.  State v. Kelley, 855 N.W.2d 269 (Minn. 2014).  This was "plain error."

But, wait, there's more.  The instructions also misstated accomplice liability in setting out the elements of the offense that Timothy was accused of aiding.  Thirteen times the instructions failed to include the modifier, "intentionally," that is, the instructions failed to inform the jury that any aiding and abetting be intentional.  This was also "plain error."

For two reasons these plain errors affected Timothy's substantial rights.  First, Timothy contested the state's claim that he intentionally aided Delbert, and presented evidence that he did not do so.  Second, the state's evidence that Timothy intentionally aided Delbert in shooting Mr. Larson "was not overwhelming."  

Lastly, Timothy has satisfied the requirement that these plain errors which affected his substantial rights also adversely implicated the fairness, integrity and public reputation of the judicial proceedings. 

The error in this case was particularly serious because it prevented the jury from fully considering Huber's defense that he did not   intentionally aid Delbert in committing any crime. The instructions allowed the jury to convict Huber merely because he was present at the farm or took some actions that may have assisted Delbert in committing an offense. The evidence presented at trial to prove that Huber intentionally aided Delbert was not overwhelming and was disputed. Based on the specific facts of this case, we conclude that allowing Huber to receive a new trial will protect the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of the judicial proceedings.

Timothy gets a new trial.