Expungement Based Upon Acquittal Cannot Be Denied In Order To Avoid Setting Bail Too Low on Some Future Charge

State v. D.R.F., Minn.Ct.App., 4/25/2016.  Back in 2012 the state charged D.R.F. with criminal sexual conduct in the third degree.  In the run up to trial D.R.F. booked to Texas, California, maybe other places as well.  It wasn't until January 2015 that the state could get its hands on him. D.R.F. went to trial on a consent defense and the jury acquitted him. D.R.F. then moved to expunge the record under both the expungement statute and the court's inherent authority.  The trial court denied the motion on both grounds and D.R.F. appealed, but only on the expungement statute.

The statute, 609A.03, subd. 5(b), says that D.R.F.'s acquittal entitled him to the expungement unless the state established by clear and convincing evidence that the interests of the public and public safety outweigh the disadvantages to D.R.F. of not sealing the record.  The statute goes on to list twelve factors, the last of which is the obligatory catch-all "whatever else you can think of" that the court is to consider in deciding whether the state has met this burden. The court made findings on all of these factors.  When the court got to the catch all it threw in D.R.F.'s absconding before trial.  The court of appeals knew of no authority to deny expungement essentially to punish D.R.F. for skipping out.  

The trial court also threw in the possibility that should D.R.F. be charged with another crime in the future the judge in that new case would set the bail too low because of ignorance of the previous skipping and then D.R.F. would skip yet again.  The court of appeals said that this was "simply too speculative to constitute clear-and-convincing evidence" to satisfy the state's burden.

Happy trails to R.D.F.

4/20/2016: No Supreme Court Published Criminal Opinions

4/18/2016: No Court of Appeals Published Criminal Opinions

Rule 27.03 Request To Reduce Sentence Properly Treated as Post Conviction Petition

Johnson v. State, Minn.S.Ct., 4/13/2016.   Mr. Johnson is serving a life sentence with possibility of release after thirty years.  Mr. Johnson had pleaded guilty under a deal whereby he could be sentenced between thirty and thirty-six years if the prosecutor thought he'd provided "useful information" about something; otherwise, he would get life with possibility of release.  The prosecutor apparently didn't think much of Mr. Johnson's information so the court gave him the life with possibility of release.  About a year later, Mr. Johnson filed his first post-conviction petition, complaining about the prosecutor's "sole discretion" to decide if his information had been "useful."  The supreme court rejected that claim back in 2002, Johnson v. State, 641 N.W.2d 912 (Minn. 2002).

This go around, Mr. Johnson is still complaining about the plea deal, but he also threw in a claim that his sentence is "repugnant to the Eighth Amendment ... because it is disproportionate and unfair when compared to the shorter sentences and more culpable conduct of his codefendants."  Mr. Johnson made this claim under Rule 27.03, subd. 9 to correct his sentence.

Mr. Johnson threw in under this rule because his claim would be time-barred as a post conviction petition.  Chief Justice Gildea agrees with the trial court's conclusion that Mr. Johnson's claim was really a post conviction claim that was outside the limitations period or any of its exceptions.  State v. Coles, 862 N.W.2d 477 (Minn. 2015) pretty much seals Mr. Johnson's fate.  There, the court said that when the requested relief would alter the benefit of the plea deal then Rule 27.03, subd. 9 doesn't apply.  In reaching this conclusion the court continues to dodge the question whether the limitations amendments to the post conviction statute overruled the Knaffla exceptions; the court also ducks whether Rule 27.03 can be used to raise Mr. Johnson's Eighth Amendment question.

"Conditional Release" Term is Consecutive to "Supervised Release" Term When Still Incarcerated

State v. Roy, Minn.Ct.App., 4/11/2016.  This appeal is about the calculation of conditional release time.  Recall that an executed sentence consists of two parts:  the first part is serving 2/3 of the pronounced sentence; the second part is "supervised release" for the remaining 1/3 of the sentence (parole).  For certain offenses, however, there is an additional part of the sentence, "conditional release." Supervised and conditional release terms overlap.  

Unless, it turns out, that the supervised release term is spent still in prison on something else.  That's Mr. Roy.  A court sentenced Mr. Roy to an executed sentence of sixty months for first degree robbery. While serving that sentence, the state charged him with, and he was convicted of, third degree criminal sexual conduct.  A court imposed a concurrent executed sentence of twenty-eight months for that sex offense.  By this time Mr. Roy had served the entire twenty-eight months plus two more months.  

The Department of Corrections determined that Mr. Roy finished serving the twenty-eight month CSC sentence on the day he got sentenced on it, and that his conditional release term began to run the very next day.  Mr. Roy countered that when he reached the two-third's point of that twenty-eight month sentence his status on that sentence changed to "supervised release" the following day. This meant that his conditional release term also began the next day and that he should get credit toward the conditional release term for the remaining one-third of the twenty-eight month sentence.

The court of appeals concludes that "supervised release" only happens to guys who are "in the community," and thus rejects Mr. Roy's argument that it's not where you are but what you are that matters. The court says that because Mr. Roy was still in prison during what would otherwise have been the "in the community" supervised release term he does not get credit toward the supervised release term.  Along the way the court overrules a previous opinion, State v. Koperski, 611 N.W.2d 569 (Minn.Ct.App. 2000) that said exactly what Mr. Roy was arguing.  

"Plain Error" Instructions on Accomplice Liability Earn Defendant a New Trial

State v. Huber,  Minn.S.Ct., 4/6/2016.  A jury convicted Timothy Huber of intentionally aiding his Dad, Delbert, in the commission of second degree intentional murder, and second degree felony murder of Mr. Larson.  On appeal Timothy said that the trial court had botched the accomplice liability instructions.  Justice Dietzen agreed and sent the case back for a new trial.

These two families had been feuding for some years.  On the morning of the homicide Timothy and Delbert drove to N.L.'s farm where Mr. Larson lived; Delbert brought along a rifle.  Timothy went to a barn to commence doing some chores; Delbert remained seated in the car with the door open.  Mr. Larson arrived at the farm; he and Delbert had what Justice Dietzen described as an "altercation" at the end of which Delbert shot Mr. Larson.  Sometime later, Delbert got around to calling the authorities to report that he'd shot Mr. Larson.

Delbert testified that he did not tell Timothy that he planned to shoot Larson, that he did not ask him whether he should bring a gun to the farm, and that Timothy never touched the gun.

The trial court told the jury that Timothy was guilty of a crime committed by Delbert if he "intentionally aided [Delbert] in committing it."  The instructions did not, however, go on to explain what "intentionally aided" means:  Timothy knew that Delbert was going to commit a crime and he intended his actions or presence to further the commission of that offense.  State v. Kelley, 855 N.W.2d 269 (Minn. 2014).  This was "plain error."

But, wait, there's more.  The instructions also misstated accomplice liability in setting out the elements of the offense that Timothy was accused of aiding.  Thirteen times the instructions failed to include the modifier, "intentionally," that is, the instructions failed to inform the jury that any aiding and abetting be intentional.  This was also "plain error."

For two reasons these plain errors affected Timothy's substantial rights.  First, Timothy contested the state's claim that he intentionally aided Delbert, and presented evidence that he did not do so.  Second, the state's evidence that Timothy intentionally aided Delbert in shooting Mr. Larson "was not overwhelming."  

Lastly, Timothy has satisfied the requirement that these plain errors which affected his substantial rights also adversely implicated the fairness, integrity and public reputation of the judicial proceedings. 

The error in this case was particularly serious because it prevented the jury from fully considering Huber's defense that he did not   intentionally aid Delbert in committing any crime. The instructions allowed the jury to convict Huber merely because he was present at the farm or took some actions that may have assisted Delbert in committing an offense. The evidence presented at trial to prove that Huber intentionally aided Delbert was not overwhelming and was disputed. Based on the specific facts of this case, we conclude that allowing Huber to receive a new trial will protect the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of the judicial proceedings.

Timothy gets a new trial.

4/4/2016: No Court of Appeals Published Criminal Opinions