No Error, Prejudicial or Otherwise, In Admitting Spreigl Evidence, Gang Evidence; Or In Reasonable Doubt Instruction

State v. Thao, Minn.S.Ct., 2/24/2016.  Mr. Thao and company drove over to the Moonshine Saloon, shot and killed Adlai Xiong, a rival gang member; and wounded two others.  A jury convicted Mr. thao of numerous offenses, most of which were charged as crimes for the benefit of a gang.  In addition to evidence of these crimes the trial court permitted the state to introduce evidence of Mr. Thao's 2000 conviction for attempted murder, which involved a drive-by shooting.  The trial court also allowed testimony from an expert on gangs; and the trial court gave an instruction on reasonable doubt that varied from the standard JIG.

On the admission of Spreigl evidence - the 2000 drive by attempted murder conviction, there are two questions to answer:  Did the trial court abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence; and, was its admission harmful.  Justice Stras ducks the question whether the admission of this evidence was an abuse of discretion because regardless there was no reasonable possibility that any error significantly affected the outcome of the trial.  Justice Stras thought that the trial court's cautionary instruction to the jury on what not to do with this evidence, the prosecutor's minimal "allusion" to this evidence during closing arguments, and the state's "overwhelming evidence of guilt" precluded a finding that any error in admitting this evidence caused Mr. Thao harm.

The Justice runs through the litany of acceptable uses of gang expert testimony to conclude that there was no error in the admission of gang testimony. Justice Stras concluded that because the testimony was based on first-hand knowledge it was not speculative.  The testimony was not duplicative of other witness testimony, but, rather, was "necessary to provide context for the state's theory of the case, in addition to proving that several of the charged offenses were committed for the benefit of a gang."

Finally, the standard jury instruction on reasonable doubt says that reasonable doubt "does not mean a fanciful or capricious doubt, nor does it mean beyond all possibility of doubt.” See CRIMJIG 3.03. Instead of giving this instruction, the trial court gave this one:

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is simply that amount of proof that ordinary men and women rely upon in making their own most important decisions. You have a reasonable doubt if your doubts are based upon reason and common sense. You do not have a reasonable doubt if your doubts are based upon speculation or irrelevant details.

It's this italicized language to which Mr. Thao objected.  He said that the words "speculation" and "irrelevant details" allowed jurors to reject reasonable doubts that they formed inferentially."  In other words, one supposes, telling the jury that they either can or should disregard reasonable speculation waters down the state's burden of proof.  That's because, let's face it, some speculation is, well, reasonable.  Justice Stras says that the court already rejected this notion in State v. Smith, 674 N.W.2d 398 (Minn. 2004).  The court now extends this convoluted rationalization offered by former Chief Justice Blatz:

In our view, the instructions read as a whole conceptualize reasonable doubt in five different ways: 1) reasonable doubt does not require the case to be proved beyond all possibility of doubt; 2) reasonable doubt does not require the case to be proved to a mathematical certainty; 3) reasonable doubt is the amount of proof that ordinary men and women rely upon in making their own most important decisions; 4) reasonable doubt is based on reason and common sense; and 5) reasonable doubt is not based on speculation and irrelevant details. Thus, the word “speculation” cannot be viewed by itself, but must be read in context and in tandem with the words “irrelevant details,” the words with which speculation is coupled. Further, the word “speculation” must be viewed within the broader scheme of the instructions, i.e., the trial court's other descriptions of reasonable doubt as well as the presumption of innocence. When the word “speculation” is read in this context, we are satisfied that its inclusion does not impermissibly narrow the reasonable doubt standard nor mislead, confuse, or misstate the law.4 While modifications or departures from the CRIMJIGS in criminal cases must be done with considerable care so as not to impair fundamental principles of law, we conclude that the trial court's instruction on reasonable doubt did not constitute plain error.

Seems reasonable.