Sloppy Compliance With Stipulated Evidence Rule Is Good Enough

State v. Myhre, Minn.S.Ct., 2/17/2016.  Once more the court dives into the sinkhole of stipulated evidence trials under Rule 26.01, subd. 4. Under that rule a defendant is supposed to maintain a not guilty plea, waive all trial-related rights, stipulate to the state's evidence in a "trial" to the court, and then appeal a dispositive, pretrial ruling.  

It seems that no one was really trying to do that.  First, Mr. Myhre entered a guilty plea.  Second he and his counsel said that they were proceeding with a "Lothenbach" plea, which the rules had abolished nearly a decade ago.  Third, despite the guilty plea, Mr. Myhre and counsel said that the plea was so that Mr. Myhre could appeal the trial court's pretrial ruling on the constitutionality of the implied consent statute, which he could not have done had he actually entered a guilty plea.  Fourth, Mr. Myhre believed that he could also appeal the trial court's finding of guilt, which is off the table under Rule 26.01, subd. 4.  And, fifth, the parties submitted stipulated facts rather than stipulated evidence.

Justice G. Barry Anderson accepts the state's basic argument that whatever it was that was going on back at the trial court it was good enough for government work.  The Justice declined the opportunity to yell at the bench and bar for continuing to screw up these kinds of resolutions even though the court has been imploring everyone for years to just read the rule - read the current rule - and do what it says.  The court latches onto two appellate review mainstays:  Mr. Myhre never objected to what was happening; and, he was an active participant in what was happening.  So, plain error is the review standard, along with some sort of "invited error" analysis.

By the time the case got to the supreme court only two of the five errors had survived:  the guilty plea and the incorrect acknowledgment about what exactly could be appealed.  The guilty plea was plain error, but Mr. Myhre could not show that it impacted his substantial rights.  The court figured that because everyone talked the talk there was no prejudice. The incorrect acknowledgment was also plain error, but again. Mr. Myhre could not show prejudice.  The court reasoned that in fact the pretrial ruling on the constitutionality of the implied consent statute was dispositive regardless and so it didn't matter in this instance that Mr. Myhre thought he could also appeal his guilt.

(Now departed) Justice Wright dissented, joined by Justice Lillehaug.  She said that enough was enough, that a quarter century of imploring the bench and bar to comply with the rule required action.  She thought that the court should announce that henceforth substantial compliance was required or there would be an automatic reversal.   She also thought that Mr. Myhre's failure to acknowledge that appellate review would be limited to the pretrial issue and not guilt that essentially meant that he didn't enter a knowing -can't say plea - resolution of the case.