Judge Not Disqualified Even Though Negotiating During Trial To Become a Prosecutor

Troxel v. State, Minn.S.Ct., 2/17/2016.  A jury convicted Mr. Troxel of first degree murder while committing first degree criminal sexual conduct.  Mr. Troxel had attended an all night party at which a lot of drinking occurred.  Not only that, T.K. and others were playing a game which involved removing clothing.  T.K. removed her shirt and bra; whether this was a win or a loss the court doesn't say.  T. K. was also coming on physically to Mr. Troxel.  Around dawn, as the party was breaking up, a witness saw T.K. talking with Mr. Troxel, who was wearing black boots, near his car.  Meantime, M.W. was sending sexually explicit text messages to T.K and waiting for T.K. to hook up with him.  Later in the morning a fisherman found T.K. in a muddy ditch, dead with thirty-seven stab wounds among other injuries. Footwear impressions in the ditch matched a pair of black boots (which also had mud on them) that investigators found in Mr. Troxel's bedroom.

Mr. Troxel wanted to introduce third party perpetrator evidence that M.W. had killed T.K.  The trial judge denied that request. Justice Wright affirms that ruling.  Evidence of an alternative perpetrator must "inherently connect an alternative perpetrator to the commission of the charged crime..."  State v. Jenkins, 782 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. 2010).  In addition to the text messages, Mr. Troxel had M.W.'s statement to police that he had been at the location of the party because T.K. had asked him to pick her up. However, M.W. said that T.K. stood him up so that after a while he left.  The court said that just putting M.W. at the location of the party wasn't enough; it likely wasn't even the location where the killing occurred.

Mr. Troxel also wanted an instruction on the lesser-included offense of second degree intentional murder.  The court concluded that there was a rational basis for the jury to convict Mr. Troxel of second degree intentional murder; but, there was no rational basis for the jury to have acquitted him of first degree murder because the only way that the jury could have done that was by finding that T.K. (who by the way had consented to drunkenly play disrobing games) had then consented to sex in a muddy ditch:

the physical evidence demonstrates that the sexual penetration likely occurred in that mud-filled ditch, which is an improbable location for consensual sexual activity. 

It turned out that the trial judge was negotiating to become the county attorney in the next county over, which county was within the court's district.  The trial judge disclosed this information and stopped taking cases from that county, but then the chief judge of that district denied Mr. Troxel's motion that the judge recuse himself for an appearance of partiality. Any county attorney represents, among others, the "State of Minnesota".  Apparently, however, there's the part of the state that comprises a specific county, and then there's the rest of the state. 

This recusal part of the Opinion lead Justice Lillehaug, joined by Chief Justice Gildea and  Justice G. Barry Anderson to dissent:

the public’s confidence in the judicial process is undermined when we do nothing in a criminal case over which a judge presided while seeking to represent one of the parties—the State—as a prosecutor. As the concurrence in Pratt, applying Powell, aptly noted: “The citizens of Minnesota rely on the court to be vigilant in making sure that all cases will be decided in accordance with the highest traditions of the judiciary.”

2/22/20-16: No Court of Appeals Published Criminal Opinions

Petitioner Not Able To Satisfy Innocence Exception to Post Conviction Limitations Period

Rhodes v. State. Minn.S.Ct. 2/17/2016.  Remember Natalie Wood?Accidently fell out of a boat, drowned?  At least according to her spouse, Robert Wagner.  Same thing happened to Mr. Rhodes' spouse, only unlike Robert Wagner, the state charged Mr. Rhodes with homicide and a jury convicted him of it.

The state said that Mr. Rhodes forced his wife overboard with a blow to the neck, struck her with the boat multiple times, and subsequently lied to the police about the location of her drowning. A lot of medical experts testified at the trial and at the evidentiary hearing on Mr. Rhodes' first post conviction petition. The state's medical examiner testified at trial and at the first post conviction hearing that Ms. Rhodes had received some sort of trauma to the outer surface of the skin of her neck with enough force to have caused breakage of blood vessels.  The ME also testified that this neck trauma possibly had been done by a hand, used in a V position.  One defense expert said that the hemorrhaging in the neck could have  had been caused by some kind of pressure to the throat but equally as likely could have been caused during the drowning process.  Other defense experts testified that from a review of recent medical literature they believed that the hemorrhaging was a result of a breaking of rigor mortis.

On appeal from the conviction and denial of the first post conviction petition the supreme court said that the evidence had been sufficient to support Mr. Rhodes' conviction, independent of the medical evidence. The court said this in order to reject one of the requirements to prevail on a claim of newly discovered evidence - in this case the additional expert testimony at the post conviction hearing - that this newly discovered evidence "will probably produce either an acquittal at a retrial or a result more favorable to the petitioner."  

Long after the two year limitations had run Mr. Rhodes filed two more post conviction petitions.  To prevail, therefore, he had to satisfy one of the exceptions; he went with newly discovered evidence that is not cumulative to evidence presented at trial, is not impeachment of trial evidence, and establishes by a clear and convincing evidence standard that the petitioner is innocent of the offense.  In pertinent part Mr. Rhodes said that there was even newer medical literature on drowning forensics, which said that when a dead body is angled downwards:

hemorrhagic lividity of the soft tissue of the neck (extravascular rupture and leakage of blood vessels due to gravitational pressure after death) may occur, causing “pseudo bruises” that may lead to “misidentification of violent neck injury.

He also submitted expert affidavits that said just that.

Justice Wright, as did the post conviction court, concludes that Mr. Rhodes has not satisfied the requirements of the limitations exception on which he relied to stay in court.  Specifically, this new scientific material does not establish that Mr. Rhodes is innocent. At best the Justice seems to be saying that this new information would have given the jury something more to chew on, after which it may have come back with a not guilty verdict or a guilty verdict on some lesser offense. Unfortunately for Mr. Rhodes, that was not the legal standard that he had to meet.  

Perhaps more disturbing going forward is the court's characterization of this new scientific information as either cumulative of trial testimony or only rebuttal.  If such new information that essentially slaps down previously accepted scientific theory, is only either cumulative or rebuttal evidence, then such new science will never be enough to obtain relief from a flawed conviction.  It's as though a conviction that relied upon the scientific assertion that the earth is flat could never be upended even after Frank Borman beamed backed that famous "Earth Rise" photo from Apollo 8.

Justices G. Barry Anderson, dissented, saying that Mr. Rhodes had sufficiently alleged the existence of evidence that, if true, would establish by a clear and convincing standard that no reasonable jury would have convicted Mr. Rhodes in the face of that new evidence. Justice Lillehaug joined this dissent.

Sloppy Compliance With Stipulated Evidence Rule Is Good Enough

State v. Myhre, Minn.S.Ct., 2/17/2016.  Once more the court dives into the sinkhole of stipulated evidence trials under Rule 26.01, subd. 4. Under that rule a defendant is supposed to maintain a not guilty plea, waive all trial-related rights, stipulate to the state's evidence in a "trial" to the court, and then appeal a dispositive, pretrial ruling.  

It seems that no one was really trying to do that.  First, Mr. Myhre entered a guilty plea.  Second he and his counsel said that they were proceeding with a "Lothenbach" plea, which the rules had abolished nearly a decade ago.  Third, despite the guilty plea, Mr. Myhre and counsel said that the plea was so that Mr. Myhre could appeal the trial court's pretrial ruling on the constitutionality of the implied consent statute, which he could not have done had he actually entered a guilty plea.  Fourth, Mr. Myhre believed that he could also appeal the trial court's finding of guilt, which is off the table under Rule 26.01, subd. 4.  And, fifth, the parties submitted stipulated facts rather than stipulated evidence.

Justice G. Barry Anderson accepts the state's basic argument that whatever it was that was going on back at the trial court it was good enough for government work.  The Justice declined the opportunity to yell at the bench and bar for continuing to screw up these kinds of resolutions even though the court has been imploring everyone for years to just read the rule - read the current rule - and do what it says.  The court latches onto two appellate review mainstays:  Mr. Myhre never objected to what was happening; and, he was an active participant in what was happening.  So, plain error is the review standard, along with some sort of "invited error" analysis.

By the time the case got to the supreme court only two of the five errors had survived:  the guilty plea and the incorrect acknowledgment about what exactly could be appealed.  The guilty plea was plain error, but Mr. Myhre could not show that it impacted his substantial rights.  The court figured that because everyone talked the talk there was no prejudice. The incorrect acknowledgment was also plain error, but again. Mr. Myhre could not show prejudice.  The court reasoned that in fact the pretrial ruling on the constitutionality of the implied consent statute was dispositive regardless and so it didn't matter in this instance that Mr. Myhre thought he could also appeal his guilt.

(Now departed) Justice Wright dissented, joined by Justice Lillehaug.  She said that enough was enough, that a quarter century of imploring the bench and bar to comply with the rule required action.  She thought that the court should announce that henceforth substantial compliance was required or there would be an automatic reversal.   She also thought that Mr. Myhre's failure to acknowledge that appellate review would be limited to the pretrial issue and not guilt that essentially meant that he didn't enter a knowing -can't say plea - resolution of the case.

An Unfriendly Push Which Results in Unintended Harm Is Still An Assault

State v. Dorn, Minn.Ct.App., 2/16/2016, review granted, 4/19/2016. Ms. Dorn attended what the court described as a "large outdoor drinking party."  Ms. Dorn took umbrage at something that a friend of the fellow who is about to fall into the bonfire said and so she pushed this fellow with two hands.  This fellow, whose back was to the bonfire, lost his balance; Ms. Dorn pushed him again, whereupon this fellow fell into the bonfire.  He got third degree burns.

The state charged Ms. Dorn with first degree assault, harm.  She elected for a bench trial.  The trial court found that while Ms. Dorn had not intended to push the fellow into the fire, she did intentionally push him two times, which resulted in him falling into the fire and causing significant burns.  Ms. Dorn argued that the state had to prove that she had intended to push him into the fire because "substantial bodily harm" is an element of the offense.  Ms. Dorn did not argue that there had been an intervening event between the pushing and the landing in the fire that relieved her of criminal responsibility.  

The court relies on State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303 (Minn. 2012) to conclude that because assault, harm is a general intent crime, all that the state has to prove is an intentional physical act, which resulted in the requisite harm.  The court recognized the harshness of this conclusion for Ms. Dorn:

We agree that this leads to a harsh result where Dorn engaged in rather de minimis behavior when viewed in the context of the spectrum of actions that lead to the infliction of harm. 

The court does temper the global application of its opinion by saying that the physical act must not only be intentional, but done in a "hostile and forceful manner."  

Because pushing is a volitional act and when committed in a hostile and forceful manner, is an assault, regardless of whether harm was intended, and appellant’s pushes were a substantial factor in causing the complainant’s injury, we affirm. 

So, one supposes, had Ms. Dorn tickled the fellow who then laughed so uncontrollably that he fell into the fire - well, that's not an assault.  Or, if the two had exchanged high fives which led the fellow to fall into the fire, well you get the idea, although the supreme court may not

Impaired Driver Arrestee Need Not Be Taken Before a Judge Before Administration of a Breath Test

State v. Shimota, Minn.Ct.App., 2/16/2016.  The DWI/Refusal wars are unrelenting.  Here's how the court set the tone for this latest set of challenges:

Appellant Michelle MacDonald Shimota grabbed her steering wheel, her gear shift knob, and a police officer’s wrist to prevent police from removing her from her car when she refused to be taken into custody on suspicion of drunk driving. After the officers pulled her loose and took her to the police station, Shimota would not submit to a breath test, demanding to be taken before a judge. Shimota challenges her convictions of obstructing legal process and chemical-test refusal, arguing that police violated her statutory right to be taken immediately before a judge after her arrest, that the district court violated her alleged Sixth Amendment right to create a video recording of the trial, that the district court improperly instructed the jury on the crime of test refusal, and that the evidence does not prove obstruction. 

Ms. Shimota said that the police were required to take her "immediately" to a judge, even before administration (or the offer thereof) of a breath test.  This lets the dogs loose for more of the court's favorite activity of late:  law by dictionary.  Just when does "immediately" mean, well "right now, dammit;" and when does it mean "will you give me some room here, I'm getting to it"? Here's how the court commences this inquiry:

 Tracing its literal meaning from its Latin origins, we know that the word means “not” (in or im) “intervening” (mediatus). See 7 Oxford English Dictionary 681 (2d ed. 1989). “Immediate” is therefore a relational word that joins two places, persons, or events with each other without any intervening place, person, or event.

The erudition does not improve thereafter. When all the dust settles, the court emphatically says that "immediately" does not mean that one who is arrested on suspicion of drunk driving gets to see the judge before being invited to blow into the machine.

On trial day, Ms. Shimota arrived with a filming crew and commenced to set up to record the trial.  The rules of practice require unanimous consent of the parties to permit that and the state was having none of it.  Ms. Shimota countered that the Sixth Amendment, in combination with the First Amendment, gave  her the right to record her own trial.  The court of appeals is not persuaded; mostly because the court couldn't find any court that had created this constitutional right to record one's own trial. Unsaid is the absolute chaos that creation of such a constitutional right would create.

Ms. Shimota also complained about the trial court's instruction on the officer's requirement to have had probable cause that she was impaired before he could require her to submit to a breath test.  Essentially, she said that it was impossible for a juror to assess the "objective facts" from the viewpoint of a reasonable officer.  The court dismisses this argument with the rather flippant observation that jurors are required to apply a reasonable person standard all the time, so what's the problem here?

Omission of Elements of Underlying Offense Was Error, But Plain, And Not Affecting Substantial Rights

State v. Peltier, Minn.S.Ct., 2/12/2016.  A jury convicted Ms. Peltier of first degree murder, child abuse, past pattern of child abuse.  "Child abuse" consists of any of twelve enumerated statutes, one of which is malicious punishment of a child.  

The court's instructions correctly stated the definition of this offense, and correctly stated the elements of the particular "child abuse" at issue, malicious punishment of a child.  It was when the trial court moved on to the "past pattern" part of the instruction that it tripped up.  The court got it right that felony malicious punishment of a child is a crime that may constitute a pattern of child abuse.  But, the instructions on "past pattern" omitted the offense elements of the crime of malicious punishment;  all that the instruction said was that malicious punishment can be committed when the punishment is to a child under the age of four and causes bodily harm to enumerated body areas.  This language does not describe any of the elements of malicious punishment; rather, it describes circumstances that when present elevate the conduct to a felony offense.

Justice Dietzen, writing for six members of the court, said that this omission of the actual elements was plain error.  The court reached this conclusion even though elsewhere in the instructions the trial court had correctly stated all of the elements of malicious punishment of a child. Unfortunately, although trial counsel made other objections to the instructions, this particular objection to language buried in the "past pattern" part didn't make the cut. Counsel did object to the first degree murder instruction "as a whole," but Justice Dietzen was unwilling to let that count.  The Justice went on to conclude that the error did not affect Ms. Peltier's substantial rights, in no small part because the omitted elements had been included elsewhere in the instructions.

Ms. Peltier also complained that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting a pediatrician specializing in child abuse to offer his opinion that biting was a "particularly vicious" form of child abuse. Counsel did object timely to this testimony and so it's subject to harmless error. Justice Dietzen said that whether the trial court was wrong in admitting the "particularly vicious" statement was a "close call."  So, the court ducked it.  The court assumed that it was error but then concluded that there was no reasonable likelihood that the remark significantly affected the verdict.

Finally, Ms. Peltier complained about remarks that the prosecutor made in closing argument.  Two in particular:  Ms. Peltier said that the prosecutor disparaged her right to a trial by jury by remarks that essentially suggested that the only reason that Ms. Peltier had gone to trial was in the hopes that enough things would go wrong with the state's presentation of its case - missing witnesses, forgetful witnesses, etc. - that there wouldn't be enough evidence to convict.  Justice Dietzen said that this argument "mischaracterized the reason for a trial" and was improper.  The prosecutor also argued that Ms. Peltier had learned abuse behavior from a past romantic partner and had engaged in behavior common to child abusers.  The problem, was, though, that the state hadn't offered any proof to support those assertions.  The Justice said that this argument was thus "troubling" and improper.  These two improper arguments were not, however, objected to, and so under plain error the court finds no impact to Ms. Peltier's substantial rights.  

Removal of Post Conviction Judge Who Also Presided Over Trial Requires Showing of Good Cause

Rossberg v. State, Minn.S.Ct., 2/10/2016. Mr. Rossberg commenced this post conviction petition and moved to remove the judge because she had presided over the trial and because he alleged that she had been employed by the prosecutor's office when that office was investigating the case against Mr. Rossberg. The judge denied that removal request, observing, correctly, that Mr. Rossberg did not have an automatic right to remove her.  Hooper v. State, 680 N.W.2d 89 (Minn. 2004). Treating the removal request as a request to remove for cause the judge also denied that.

Justice Wright said that this was error, but harmless error.  A motion to remove a judge for cause must be presented to the chief judge.  Rule 26.03, subd. 14(3).  However, Mr. Rossberg's first cause reason - that the judge had presided over his trial - did not absent more, provide an adequate reason for removal.  His second cause reason - the judge's employment by the prosecutor's office - were, indeed, factually incorrect.  Although the judge had worked as an attorney for certain cities in the district, she had not worked for the prosecutor's office.

Finally, Mr. Rossberg had wanted more time to file an addendum to his petition.  The court said, no and Justice Wright agrees.  Mr. Rossberg had said that he needed more time to access the prison library, but this explanation tripped him up.  The Justice pointed out that Mr. Rossberg didn't need to cite a bunch of law in his petition; rather, he needed to recite specific facts to support his claim for relief and he offered no satisfactory reason why had had not been able to do so in a timely manner.

Under "Totality" Test Probable Cause Existed to Search Car

State v. Lester, Minn.S.Ct., 2/10/2016.  Soon to be federal judge Justice Wright takes the court on an "error correcting" journey to slap down the court of appeals.  The court of appeals had reversed the trial court's conclusion that the search of Mr. Lester's car for drugs was lawful under either the automobile exception or the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement.

The cops got a tip that in roughly ten minutes a man whom the CRI knew as "J" would be at a certain location to deliver heroin. The tipster described this man as a black male, 28 to 30 years old, approximately five nine to five ten in height, medium build, and medium light complexion.  Cops set up surveillance at the described location.  They soon observed a man in the front passenger seat of a parked car who matched this description.  The CRI came over, who identified this passenger as "J".  Mr. Lester was behind the wheel.  Eventually "J" got out of this car, went over to another car and got into it.  That car drove off, as did Mr. Lester separately.  The cops then stopped both cars and arrested everyone; they searched Mr. Lester's car and found suspected heroin.  The court of appeals concluded that the cops didn't have probable cause to arrest Mr. Lester or to search his car,  mostly because "J" - who was supposed to be delivering heroin - was no longer in Mr. Lester's car when the cops stopped it.  Justice Wright thought that was just too narrow a view of the "totality of the circumstances":

Based on the totality of the circumstances, including the CRI’s tip, the officer’s observations of J. and Lester, and the officer’s training and experience, and with due weight given to reasonable police inferences drawn from experience and training, we hold that there was probable cause to believe that Lester’s car contained heroin.

Rule 30.02 Applies to Pre-Charge Delay But Requires A Showing of Prejudice

State v. Banks, Minn.Ct.App., 2/8/2016.  Rule 30.02 says that the trial court may dismiss the complaint if the prosecutor has unnecessarily delayed bringing the defendant to trial.  The claimed delay here occurred between the date of the offense and the date of filing the criminal complaint.  

The state said that this rule only applies to delays after the filing of the criminal complaint.  Essentially, a riff on speedy trial.  The court of appeals rejects this spin on the rule; why have two rules when one will do?  Rather, the two rules compliment each other.  A speedy trial infraction entitles a defendant at least to release - and in some instances dismissal, State v. Windish, 590 N.W.2d 311 (Minn. 1999) - while an "unnecessary delay" infraction permits the trial court to dismiss the complaint.  So, Rule 30.02 permits the trial court to dismiss a complaint for unnecessary pre-charge delay.

Dismissal under that rule does, however, require a showing of prejudice. The court's supposed authority for this conclusion, however, is a bit thin, mostly opinions that conflate constitutional considerations and procedural speedy trial requirements.  

Interests of Justice Exception to Post Conviction Limitations Provision Not Satisfifed

Taylor v. State, Minn.S.Ct., 2/3/2016.  This is Mr. Taylor's second post conviction petition.  While Mr. Taylor's first post conviction petition was on appeal the supreme court forcibly retired the judge who had presided over Mr. Taylor's trial and first post conviction petition.  Roughly ten years later Mr. Taylor filed this second petition, largely aimed at the retirement of his trial judge.  The post conviction court summarily denied the petition as time barred under the limitations provision of the post conviction statute.

Mr. Taylor said that his petition met the "interests of justice" exception to the two year limitations provision. Justice Stras rejects this assertion.  Mr. Taylor had said that he had been unaware of the judge's disabling condition at the time of his direct appeal, and that his understanding of the legal system was "lacking at best."  Justice Stras points out that just last year in Wayne v. State, 866 N.W.2d 917 (Minn. 2015), the court had rejected a petitioner's pro se status and limited educational attainment as meeting the interests of justice standard, at least where the petitioner has previously filed a post conviction petition.  The court continued to duck the question whether the Knaffla rule - raise it or waive it - survived the recent amendments to the post conviction statute. 

District Court Lacked Jurisdiction to Consider Post Conviction Petition To Challenge Stay of Adjudication

Lunzer v. State, Minn.Ct.App., 2/1/2016.  Ms. Lunzer pleaded guilty to a fifth degree drugs crime and received a stay of adjudication.  A few years later, the district court discharged her from probation and dismissed the charge.  When Ms. Lunzer found out about the various problems that befell the St. Paul Police Department Crime Lab she filed a post conviction petition seeking to withdraw her plea.  There was also the small matter of getting charged with a new drug crime the punishment for which could be enhanced because of the first drug charge. The post conviction court summarily denied the petition, concluding that the petition was time barred and that none of the exceptions to the limitations provisions applied.

The court of appeals wanted to know whether the post conviction court had subject matter jurisdiction.  Now, a stay of adjudication in a felony case is appealable as an appeal from a sentence.  The problem is, just last year in Dupey v. State, 868 N.W.2d 36 (Minn. 2015) the supreme court said that a stay of adjudication is not a judgment of conviction or sentence that triggers the limitations provisions for filing a post conviction petition.  For Ms. Lunzer that meant:

Because a stay of adjudication under Minn. Stat. § 152.18, subd. 1, is not a conviction for purposes of the postconviction relief statute of limitations, it clearly follows that a person who receives such a stay is not “convicted of a crime” for purposes of Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1. Hence, such a person cannot seek postconviction relief. 

Rule 27.03, Subd. 9 Proper Procedure to Challenge Post Sentencing Imposition of Conditional Release Term

Reynolds v. State, Minn.Ct.App., 1/25/2016.  Mr. Reynolds pleaded guilty to failure to register under the predatory offender registration statute. Three months after sentencing the trial judge amended the sentence to add a ten year conditional release term.  Four years later Mr. Reynolds moved to vacate that conditional release term under Rule 27.03, subdivision 9 of the criminal rules.  The trial judge treated the motion as a post conviction petition and denied it summarily as time-barred under the post conviction statute.  The trial judge also addressed the merits of the request and concluded that because Mr. Reynolds was a "risk-level III offender" he was subject to the ten year conditional release term.

Rule 27.03, subdivision 9 does not have a limitations provision; quite the contrary:  the district court "may at any time correct a sentence not authorized by law."  The post conviction statute, on the other hand, has a two year limitations provision.  The question of which to apply has vexed the courts ever since the legislature added the limitations provision to the post conviction statute:

The answer depends on the nature of Reynolds’s challenge. We have held that the two-year statutory time limit does not apply to or restrict motions “properly filed” under rule 27.03. Vazquez v. State, 822 N.W.2d 313, 318 (Minn. App. 2012). And a motion is properly filed under the rule if the offender challenges a sentence on the grounds that “the sentence is contrary to an applicable statute or other applicable law.” Washington v. State, 845 N.W.2d 205, 213 (Minn. App. 2014); see also Vazquez, 822 N.W.2d at 318 (holding  that a challenge to a sentence based on the district court’s incorrect calculation of the offender’s criminal-history score was properly raised under rule 27.03); State v. Amundson, 828 N.W.2d 747, 751 (Minn. App. 2013) (holding the same for a challenge based on an unauthorized upward departure at sentencing). The supreme court has held that a challenge is not properly filed under rule 27.03 when it implicates more than simply the sentence and instead effectively challenges the validity of the underlying conviction or plea agreement. State v. Coles, 862 N.W.2d 477, 480–81 (Minn. 2015); see also Wayne v. State, 870 N.W.2d 389, 391–92 (Minn. 2015) (applying Coles and deeming the claim outside the rule because a victory would have entitled the claimant to “a new trial, not a reduced sentence”)

The state wanted the court to limit the "law" of "not authorized by law" to "laws enacted by the legislature.."  The court of appeals rejected this miserly interpretation.  Instead, the court stuck with the formula from the supreme court's opinion last year in State v. Coles, 862 N.W.2d 477 (Minn. 2015) which said that a challenge under Rule 27.03 is not proper when it implicates more than simply the sentence.  So, Mr. Reynolds gets to stay in court.

Turning to the merits, while this appeal was kicking around the supreme court decided State v. Her, which held that a district court can impose a conditional release term based upon a defendant's status as a risk level II offender only if that defendant admits to that status or a jury finds it.  It's a Blakely problem.  So, on the merits of Mr. Reynold's challenge the district court got it wrong by imposing the conditional release term itself, never mind about the lack of notice and opportunity to be heard beforehand.

The court of appeals punts the case back to the trial court to figure out what relief is available to Mr. Reynolds.  This likely includes a Blakely jury trial to determine his risk status.  See State v. Hankerson, 723 N.W.2d 232 (Minn. 2006).