Crime of Clergy Sexual Conduct Does Not Require Proof That Clergy Had Knowledge that Complainant Sought or Received Religious Advice

State v. Wenthe, Minn.S.Ct., 6/24/2015.  A jury convicted Mr. Wenthe of third degree criminal sexual conduct for "sexually penetrating A.F. - a member of the parish where Wenthe served as priest - at a single meeting at which A.F. sought spiritual counsel." Mr. Wenthe has been in and out of the appellate courts several times now, go here, here, and here.  Most recently, the court of appeals had (again) reversed that conviction and the state sought review.  Justice Anderson, for four members of the court - Dietzen and Wright not participating and Page dissenting - now (again) reverses the court of appeals.  Justice Anderson addressed each of the three issues on which the court of appeals had reversed.

At trial the court gave the standard instruction on unanimity.  On appeal Mr. Wenthe argued successfully that it had been plain error for the trial court not to have given an instruction that the jury must unanimously agree on which of several meetings between A.F. and Mr. Wenthe that he violated the statute.  The trial court declined to give that instruction but the court of appeals said that it should have done so, that it was plain error and that it required a new trial. Justice Anderson awards this decision to the trial court without really deciding the question.  Instead, the justice said that if there were error it did not affect Mr. Wenthe's substantial rights.

Second, the defense did ask the trial court to instruct the jury that a clergy member must have subjective knowledge of the purpose of the meeting at which sexual penetration occurs.  The trial court declined the request and gave a knowledge instruction that only went to the element, intent to sexually penetrate.  The court of appeals concluded that this was error because the statute required proof of a "particularized knowledge" that the complainant sought spiritual counsel.

Justice Anderson says, no, that's not what the statute says so that's not what it requires.  Here's the pertinent portion of the statute, Minn.Stat. 609.344, subd. 1(I):

A person who engages in sexual penetration with another person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the third degree if any of the following circumstances exists: . . . .

(l) the actor is or purports to be a member of the clergy, the complainant is not married to the actor, and: 

...

(ii) the sexual penetration occurred during a period of time in which the complainant was meeting on an ongoing basis with the actor to seek or receive religious or spiritual advice, aid, or comfort in private. Consent by the complainant is not a defense . . . .

The justices can't find anything about a knowledge requirement here and under its literalist approach to jurisprudence are not about to insert one. That's a legislative function. Also, because previous case law requires that sexual penetration must be intention, then the statute survives the claim that without an additional knowledge requirement its a strict liability offense.

Finally, at trial Mr. Wenthe had sought to introduce evidence of A.F.'s sexual history. The state parried the request by promising only to introduce evidence of A.F.'s sexual abuse as a child. The state broke that promise, however, when it elicited testimony from A.F. that she was sexually inexperienced. Justice Anderson said that the state should have kept its promise and that the trial court made a mistake by permitting the receipt of the "inexperience" evidence. That mistake, however, did not amount to an abuse of discretion, which is the appellate review standard of evidentiary rulings. And, to cover the bases, if the ruling was an abuse of discretion it was harmless.

Justice Page dissented on all three of the majority's rulings.