State v. Fraga, Minn.S.Ct., 4/22/2015. This is a horrific crime – essentially the stomping to death of a two year old - that is now on its way back to the trial court for a third time, this time because the trial judge was perhaps a bit too impatient to seat a jury and the prosecutor was a bit too aggressive in wanting to keep a particular juror. In, of all things, a unanimous opinion, Justice Lillehaug pens a strong opinion about juror bias for this ever whimsical court.
During jury selection for the retrial, Mr. Fraga took the position that any potential juror who knew that he had been convicted in the first trial should automatically be excused for trial. The trial court seated two jurors who knew that the first trial had resulted in a conviction. Adopting the defense’s position would be an extension of the doctrine of implied bias, which assumes that certain relationships or experiences create a mindset that cannot be changed or set aside. See Williams v. State, 764 N.W.2d 21 (Minn. 2009); Rule 26.02, Subd. 5 of the rules of criminal procedure. The court is unwilling to extend this doctrine to potential jurors whose apparent sole disqualification was knowledge of the outcome of Mr. Fraga’s first trial. In large part, the court reaches this result by its literal reading of the rule, which it says provides “the exclusive grounds to challenge for implied bias.”
Also during jury selection the trial court seated “Juror M.” Mr. Fraga insisted that Juror M had expressed actual bias and had not been adequately rehabilitated. The trial court sat this juror anyway. Permitting a biased juror to serve is structural error requiring automatic reversal. State v. Logan, 535 N.W.2d 430 (Minn. 1995).
Juror M’s mother-in-law was a nurse who had worked in the emergency room at the hospital where the two year had been taken. Juror M thus knew about the case, had read about it, had discussed it with family or friends, including the case details. When the trial court asked him whether he could put all of that aside and decide the case solely upon what was presented in the courtroom, Juror M said, “Yeah, I guess.” When the trial court pressed with the question, “Do you know of any reason that you could not be fair and impartial?” Juror M said, “Besides the fact I know about the case, I don’t, no. I think it would be hard.” This juror also said that he knew two witnesses and that he would find their testimony more believable based on that familiarity. He walked that assertion back just a bit by telling the prosecutor that “I can form my own opinion, I guess.” Finally, Juror M said, “Yes.” to the prosecutor’s leading question, “So, you would be able to base your decision on what you see and hear in the courtroom?”
By this time the defense was out of peremptory challenges. The trial court denied the defense motion to remove Juror M for cause. Even then the court asked Juror M more questions, including, “Is there any reason you can think of you couldn’t be fair and impartial to both sides in this case?” Juror M said, (one supposes to the disappointment of the trial judge and prosecutor) “I don’t think so.”
Justice Lillehaug concludes from all this back and forth with Juror M that the juror had expressed “actual bias.” The remarks, “Besides the fact I know about the case, I don’t, no. I think it would be hard.” were enough for the court to make this conclusion. The other “I guess” remarks just solidified this conclusion. Justice Lillehaug also concludes that Juror M also was not adequately rehabilitated, which requires that the prospective juror state “unequivocally” that he will set aside preconceived notions and be fair. Logan. The prosecutor’s final leading question just didn’t get the job done, especially in the midst of all those “I guess” utterances.
Under Logan, Juror M, having expressed actual bias, can’t sit on the jury and if he does it’s structural error that requires a new trial. The state pleaded with the court to find a workaround to Logan to avoid yet another trial but the justices were unwilling to do so. Still and all, the court was embarrassed to have reversed the conviction:
We understand that the relatives of a little girl and others in the community of Worthington have suffered a grievous loss. We understand that they have endured the pain of two trials. We recognize that their grief may be sharpened by the decision today. Still and all, it is a bedrock principle of our law that for a person to be convicted of any crime—major or minor—the jurors must be both impartial and unanimous. Our constitutions and the fairness they embody require that, if we cannot say that each and every juror was impartial, we cannot say that justice was done.
It’s tempting to say that by the court’s unyielding fealty to literalism the court hoisted itself by its own petard. Juror M just kept saying, “I guess” way too many “Minnesota nice” times for the court to brush aside. (“To guess” means to “make a conjecture” about something, or to indicate that although one thinks or supposes something it is without any great conviction or strength of feeling.” ) After all, given the broad discretion that trial court’s have in ascertaining a potential juror’s qualifications to serve it would have been just as easy for the justices to conclude that despite the verbalized equivocations the trial court had the best seat in the house to discern Juror M’s true state of mind.
But wait, there’s more! Mr. Fraga also complained about the admission of evidence under Minn.Stat. 634.20, so called “relationship evidence.” The court had previously adopted this legislative rule of evidence for similar conduct of the accused against the same victim. State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153 (Minn. 2004). The court now extends adoption of this legislative rule of evidence to include similar conduct of the accused against other family or household members.
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