State v. Sam, Minn.Ct.App., 2/17/2015. A state trooper made a traffic stop. Mr. Sam was the driver and R.S. was the front passenger. One thing led to another – there were no challenges to either the stop or the search of the vehicle – and the officers found marijuana and a firearm in the center console. There was methamphetamine in the glove box and on R.S.’s person. The state charged Mr. Sam with several offenses, two of which were possession of narcotics with a firearm enhancement and prohibited person in possession of a firearm. Mr. Sam stipulated that he was ineligible to possess a firearm. A jury convicted him of these two offenses.
Mr. Sam moved for a judgment of acquittal after the verdict. He said that there was insufficient circumstantial evidence to convict him of possession of the methamphetamine and the firearm. The trial court declined to apply the Al-Naseer/Silvernail two-step analysis of the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, believing that this was an appellate standard of review that trial courts didn’t have to bother with.
The court of appeals says that the trial court is incorrect. Applying that two-step analysis,the court of appeals reverses both convictions. The state conceded that Mr. Sam was not a person who was prohibited from possessing a firearm. That was because he had been discharged from his conviction of felony escape from custody and he had had his civil rights restored.
The firearm was still in play, however, because it enhanced the drug offense. The firearm was in the center console and the meth was in the glove box. No one argued that these items were in a place over which Mr. Sam exercised exclusive control so the state had to prove that Mr. Sam consciously exercised dominion and control over the two items of contraband. The court concludes that the state failed to meet that burden.
As it turned out, it was R.S. whom the trooper saw squirming around in the passenger seat as the stop occurred; the trooper didn’t see Mr. Sam do anything other than drive the car. Ammunition for the firearm was in a backpack in the back seat and the meth in the glove box was directly in front of R.S., who had more meth in his wallet. The officers found no drugs on Mr. Sam’s person. These facts, the court concluded, are not both consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt. The narcotics could have been in the car when Mr. Sam borrowed it, or R.S. may have put the narcotics in the vehicle. Because there are reasonable inferences from the circumstances proved that are inconsistent with Mr. Sam having consciously exercised dominion and control over the narcotics the state failed to meet its burden of proving constructive possession.
Although not an issue presented to the court here, the court does teasingly discuss whether a jury instruction that incorporates the Al-Naseer and Silvernail analysis ought to be given:
In ruling on the motion, the district court discussed whether a jury instruction may properly be given explaining the limitations on the use of circumstantial evidence. While the district court correctly recognized that several Minnesota appellate opinions have commented about the efficacy of incorporating the Al-Naseer and Silvernail analysis into jury instructions, see State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 340 (Minn. 2010) (Meyer, J., concurring and writing for three justices); State v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849, 871 (Minn. 2008) (Meyer, J. concurring); McCormick, 835 N.W.2d at 505 n.2, appellant did not argue to the district court, and does not argue on appeal, that the jury instructions were erroneous or insufficient. The absence of a jury instruction concerning the limitations on the use of circumstantial evidence elevates the importance of the district court’s proper evaluation of a motion for judgment of acquittal in circumstances such as are present here.
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