Exclusion of Third Party Perpetrator Evidence Does Not Violate Defendant’s Due Process Right to Present a Complete Defense

State v. Pass, Minn.S.Ct., 6/26/2013.  A jury acquitted Mr. Pass of two counts of second degree murder for the stabbing death of Tina San Roman, but deadlocked on two other counts assault and attempted murder for the stabbing of a second victim, O.A.R.  In the run up to a retrial on these unresolved counts the state (eventually) wanted to be able to tell the jury that O.A.R. had found Mr. Pass in the garage standing over Roman’s body, that Mr. Pass told O.A.R. to  help him because Roman had stopped breathing, and as O.A.R. tried to assist Mr. Pass, Mr. Pass attacked him with a knife.  Mr. Pass wanted to introduce evidence in support of his third party perpetrator defense which he admitted would be inadmissible because it would be unduly prejudicial, confuse the issues, and mislead the jury.  Mr. Pass then said that if the court agreed that his third party perpetrator evidence was inadmissible then the court should dismiss the remaining counts on a due process argument that he was being denied the right to present a complete defense.

The trial court excluded all of the proffered evidence about Roman’s death.  The court also explained that Mr. Pass could not present his third party perpetrator defense without using evidence related to Roman’s death and granted the motion to dismiss.  The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal and now Justice Stras, writing for a six member court, reverses.

The first question is whether the state can even appeal the dismissal without violating Mr. Pass’s double jeopardy rights.  If the dismissal constituted an acquittal on the merits then the state can’t appeal.  This determination turns on whether the dismissal was a resolution in the defendant’s favor of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.  State v. Sahr, 812 N.W.2d 83 (Minn. 2012).  Here, however, the trial court granted the dismissal motion on due process grounds, explicitly stating that exclusion of all evidence related to Roman’s injuries and death would not significantly reduce the likelihood of a successful prosecution.  So, the state can appeal.

And concludes that the trial court had excluded the third party perpetrator evidence under Rule 403 of the rules of evidence even though it didn’t really say that. That rule does permit the exclusion of evidence that is unfairly prejudicial, confusing or misleading.  But, that exclusion is “unquestionably constitutional.”  Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996) (plurality opinion).  The court reverses the decision of the court of appeals and sends the case back to the district court.