No Published Criminal Opinions, But a Very Bad Day For Dogs

There were no published criminal opinions issued today by the Minnesota Supreme Court.  It was a bad day for dogs, however.

Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes, Minn.S.Ct., 12/19/2012.  Mr. Sawh has a dog, Brody, or, at least he has a dog for a few more days anyway.  Brody first bit a neighbor.  This got Brody tagged as “potentially dangerous,” but it didn’t mean anything beyond the label.  Six months later, Brody again bit someone, twice.  This got Brody tagged as “dangerous” and also made him subject to removal from the city; Mr. Sawh appealed this designation to the city council.  The council held a hearing and put Brody on a pretty short leash – probation.  The very next day Brody violated probation by biting the furniture delivery guy.  That was it for the city which ordered that Brody be put down.

Mr. Sawh appealed this order as well to the city council.  The council again held a hearing, and upheld the destruction order.  Mr. Sawh sought review in the courts by writ of certiorari saying that the city had deprived him of a property interest without due process.  The court of appeals thought that the city should have given Mr. Sawh a hearing on the “potentially dangerous” designation.  Writing for the Court, however, Justice Stras disagreed.  This designation did not interfere in any way with Mr. Sawh’s possession and enjoinment of Brody and so there was no “process” due.  On the other hand, the “dangerous” designation and the probationary sentence imposed upon Brody did interfere with Mr. Sawh’s property interest in his dog and so there was some “process” due.

But not a lot.  The court employs the three factors from Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).  The first factor is the private interest that will be affected by the official action.  Mr. Sawh’s property interest is not measured in sentimentality but in dollars:  Brody’s fair market value:

[W]hile animal owners have considerable sentimental attachment to their pets, Minnesota law treats an animal like any other item of tangible personal property. See Corn, 179 Minn. at 492, 229 N.W. at 870. Given that treatment, Sawh’s protected property interest at stake in this case is not nearly as substantial as the property interests that we have recognized in other contexts.

The second factor looks at the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a protected interest.  It turns out that it would be just about impossible for the city to err in deciding whether Brody lives or dies.  That’s because the council needed only to find that the animal control officer had previously declared Brody to be “potentially dangerous” and to have provided Mr. Sawh notice of that declaration.  The council did not have to decide whether that designation was correct.  The risk of erroneously putting Brody down doesn’t have to be faced.  If animal control made the “potentially dangerous” designation and gave Mr. Sawh written notice of it, then the subsequent designation of “dangerous” is an automatic. 

The third factor is the government’s interest, in this case, ensuring the health and safety of its citizens.  Brody hasn’t done too well in the community.  The court upholds the city’s order to put Brody down.