Because Defendant Was Not In Custody, No Miranda Warning Required

State v. Scruggs, Minn.S.Ct., 10/24/2012.  A jury convicted Mr. Scruggs of first degree premeditated murder and second degree intentional murder; the trial court imposed a life sentence without possibility of release.  The main issue on appeal was the trial court’s decision to admit Mr. Scrugg’s police interrogation; he argued unsuccessfully that the police should have given him a Miranda warning before questioning him.

Police came to an apartment complex in response to the finding of a body, later determined to be Michael Fonta, near the rear door of the building.  Several hours into the investigation, officers knocked a second time on Mr. Fonta’s apartment door; when there was again no response they attempted to enter the apartment with a key.  It turned out that Mr. Scruggs and H.J. were inside Mr. Fonta’s apartment.  Somewhat curious, one supposes, the officers invited the two of them down to the police station for a chat; they agreed and afterwards officers released Mr. Scruggs but arrested H.J. on a misdemeanor warrant.  It was apparently only after these interviews that police found evidence that led them to believe that the murder had occurred in Mr. Fonta’s apartment.  About a week later, H.J. rolled on Mr. Scruggs, telling the police that she had watched Mr. Scruggs kill Mr. Fonta and dispose of the evidence; she also admitted that she helped Mr. Scruggs move the body outside.

Mr. Scruggs moved to suppress the police interrogation because no Miranda warning had been given to him.  Here’s how Justice Dietzen, writing for a unanimous court – absent Justice Wright – described the events at the station:

At the suppression hearing, police officers testified that at the time of the interview, they did not know the location of the murder and Scruggs and H.J. were not suspects in the murder investigation. The officers testified that it was standard practice to interview important witnesses at the police station because video recording equipment is available. Both Scruggs and H.J. were told they would be brought back to the apartment after their interviews. Before leaving the apartment, the officers allowed Scruggs to put on a shirt and Scruggs brought Fonta’s cell phone to the interview.

A Miranda warning is required only when the suspect is both in custody and subject to Interrogation.  State v. Thompson, 788 N.W.2d 485 (Minn. 2010).  Whether a reasonable person would believe that she was free to leave is only part of the test.  State v. Champion, 533 N.W.2d 40 (Minn. 1995).  The top six reasons for a suspect to believe that she is in custody include:

(1) the police interviewing the suspect[] at the police station; (2) the suspect being told he or she is a prime suspect in a crime; (3) the police restraining the suspect[’]s freedom of movement; (4) the suspect making a significantly incriminating statement; (5) the presence of multiple officers; and (6) a gun pointing at the suspect.

State v. Vue, 797 N.W.2d 5 (Minn. 2011).  On the other hand the top seven reasons for a suspect to believe that she is not in custody include:

(1) questioning the suspect in his or her home; (2) law enforcement expressly informing the suspect that he or she is not under arrest; (3) the suspect’s leaving the police station without hindrance; (4) the brevity of questioning; (5) the suspect’s ability to leave at any time; (6) the existence of a nonthreatening environment; and (7) the suspect’s ability to make phone calls.

Vue.  Justice Dietzen concludes that Mr. Scruggs was not in custody:

Scruggs voluntarily agreed to go to the police station for an interview. The police initially told Scruggs he was a witness; the police never referred to him as a suspect. The police also stated that they would return Scruggs to Fonta’s apartment after the interview to collect his clothes. Scruggs had Fonta’s cell phone during the interview, including while he waited in the interview room. The police did not hinder his ability to use the cell phone while he waited for the interview. Moreover, although the interview-room door was locked for security reasons, the police promptly came to the door when Scruggs knocked on the door to ask a question. Scruggs did not, at any time, express a desire not to speak to the police or to terminate the interview. And Scruggs was allowed to leave the police station unhindered at the conclusion of the interview.

Mr. Scruggs also complained that the trial court should have instructed the jury that H.J. was an accomplice as a matter of law.  The court concludes that the trial court had not abused its discretion by not giving this instruction, that H.J.’s role was subject to differing interpretation and was thus a jury question.  Mr. Scruggs had also wanted the trial court to instruct the jury not only on the need for an accomplice’s testimony to be corroborated, but also to provide an instruction that explained what an accomplice is by including the instruction on liability for crimes of another person.  The court says that while this might be nice it had never required this instruction and is not going to start doing so now.  Instead, the court assumed that an error had occurred but concluded that it was not plain error.

The state got to put in evidence that Mr. Scruggs had assaulted H.J.  Justice Dietzen said that this was okay to rehabilitate her in advance of the defense’s expected attack on her credibility because she had given prior inconsistent statements to the police.  Evidence of these prior assaults was admissible to explain H.J.’s fear of Scruggs; her fear, in turn, explained the discrepancies in her statements.  Without really explaining why the court says that it was okay for the state to anticipate the defense attack on H.J.’s credibility by allowing this preemptive rehabilitation of her at Mr. Scruggs’ expense.