Wallace v. State, Minn.S.Ct., 9/26/2012. This is a post conviction appeal from the summary denial of Mr. Wallace’s second petition for post conviction relief. Mr. Wallace and Mr. Williams fought over R.L., which ended when Mr. Wallace stabbed Mr. Williams to death. On direct appeal from a conviction of first degree felony murder, the supreme court affirmed the conviction of life without possibility of parole, rejecting Mr. Wallace’s evidence sufficiency claim. Five years later, Mr. Wallace filed his first post conviction petition, arguing that his trial and appellate counsel had been ineffective, that the felony murder statute was unconstitutional, and that the trial court had denied him due process by sentencing him under this unconstitutional statute. The post conviction court summarily concluded that all of these claims were procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 309. Minn. 246, 242 N.W.2d 737 (1976), and denied the petition; Mr. Wallace started but did not finish an appeal of that ruling.
Last year, Mr. Wallace filed his second petition for post conviction relief, repeating most of the claims that he’d made in the first one, but he threw in a claim that application of the Knaffla rule to preclude review of his federal constitutional claims was, itself, unconstitutional. The post conviction court said that these claims were time barred under the limitations statute, Minn.Stat. 590.01, Subd. 4, and that and that no exception applied. On appeal, Mr. Wallace suggested that it was “ in the interest of justice” to consider the merits of his claims. This exception requires that petitioner establish that the petition is not frivolous, and that it is in the interests of justice. This gives Justice Stras the opportunity to parse just what “frivolous” means.
At least to Justice Stras, what the court said in Glassler v. State, 787 N.W.2d 575 (Minn. 2010) and in Rickert v. State, 795 N.W.2d 236 (Minn. 2011) wasn’t enough of an explanation. Glassler said that “frivolous” means that it is “perfectly apparent, without argument, that the petition is without merit.” Rickert said that it meant that the petitioner could show “a good-faith basis” for the claims made therein, and not that the petitioner would necessarily succeed on the merits. Justice Stras comes up with this definition:
[A] petition is “frivolous” under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(5) if it is perfectly apparent, without argument, that the claims in the petition lack an objective, good-faith basis in law or fact
Sounds pretty straight forward until you read footnote 3; here’s the real reason for this opinion, because what the court now requires is that each and every claim in the petition pass the “not frivolous” test. The post conviction court can’t pick and choose; it’s all or nothing:
The applicability of the interests-of-justice exception in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(5), depends upon whether “the petition is not frivolous and is in the interests of justice.” (emphasis added). Under the plain language of subdivision 4(b)(5), therefore, a postconviction court must consider the whole petition in assessing whether a petitioner has satisfied the interests-of-justice exception, not just whether some of the individual claims in the petition are frivolous or fail to satisfy the interests-of-justice requirement. In this case, Wallace’s petition is frivolous because it is perfectly apparent, without argument, that every claim in his petition lacks an objective, good-faith basis in law.
The court thus continues its aggressive, activist dismantling of the post conviction statute. The conclusion that the court adopts is neither readily apparent nor required from the text of the statute itself; it is this activism that leads to this “take no prisoners” approach. The statute only says that “the petitioner establishes to the satisfaction of the court that the petition is not frivolous and is in the interests of justice.” The statute does not say that “each claim of the petition” must satisfy the statutory test; Justice Stras has now written that into the statute. Litigants, pro se or not, will now have to choose carefully which claims to pursue and which to abandon. This will stifle the development of new legal theories as litigants will leave those “cutting edge” claims on the editing room floor to avoid getting tossed all together.
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