Doubling Potential Punishment by Amended Complaint After a Defendant Waives Counsel Requires a Renewed “Comprehensive Examination” of the Waiver

State v. Rhoads, Minn.S.Ct., 5/23/2012.  The state charged Mr. Rhoads with second degree burglary.  Mr. Rhoads decided to represent himself, after which the state doubled down by adding a first degree burglary count.  This put him at risk of a sentence twice what he had been facing when he made the waiver.  On the day of trial, Mr. Rhoads persisted in representing himself (and also waived a jury trial); the trial court, however, neither arraigned Mr. Rhoads on the amended complaint, nor asked him if he understood what the new maximum punishment would be if he were convicted.  Justice Dietzen, writing for five members of the court, concludes that Mr. Rhoads’ renewal of his waiver of counsel was neither knowing nor intelligent so he gets a new trial.

In reaching this conclusion the court does not require that a pro se defendant renew a valid waiver of counsel every time he steps into the well of the courtroom; rather, so long as nothing has changed since the initial waiver he’s good to go.  The majority carves out an exception here, however, because the filing of the amended charge doubled the maximum possible punishment.  The majority labels this a “substantial change in circumstances” that requires a valid renewal of the waiver of counsel.  Here, Mr. Rhoads did continue to say that he wanted to represent himself, but:

when the State files an amended charge that doubles the maximum possible punishment, a district court should conduct a comprehensive examination of the defendant’s understanding of the increase in the maximum possible punishment. A district court’s failure to conduct such an examination, however, does not require reversal when the particular facts and circumstances of the case demonstrate that the defendant renewed his waiver-of-counsel with an understanding of the increase in the maximum possible punishment.

So, two ways to get it right:  formal renewal of the waiver, under the analysis from State v. Worthy, 583 N.W.2d 270 (Minn. 1998); or discern an implied waiver from the facts and circumstances.  The Worthy analysis requires  the trial court to conduct a “comprehensive examination” of a defendant’s “comprehension of the charges, the possible punishments, mitigating circumstances, and any other facts relevant to the defendant’s understanding of the consequences of the waiver.”   None of that happened for Mr. Rhoads, and there was nothing in the record from which the majority could pull out an implied waiver of counsel.

Justice Stras, joined by Justice Page, dissents.  Justice Stras says that the initial waiver of counsel is effective right through sentencing regardless of what either the state or the court do following the waiver.  Having taken over the wheel, Justice Stras would strap Mr. Rhoads in for the duration; the keys are in his pocket so his only recourse is to park the car, throw the keys back up onto the bench, and ask for his lawyer back.  The problem is, he’s only going to get that result  under the rather exacting standard of State v. Clark, 722 N.W.2d 460 (Minn. 2006).  That standard requires that the relinquishment request be timely, reasonable, and in the face of “extraordinary circumstances.”   In Clark, the request came on the third day of trial; not going to happen.