Tuesday, December 7, 2010

Asperger’s Evidence Rejected; Miranda Waiver Valid

State v. Anderson, Minn.S.Ct., 10/14/2010.  Katherine Olson responded to an e-mail request from “Amy” for a baby sitting job.  It wasn’t “Amy,” however, it was Mr. Anderson.  Acting on a tip, police found Olson’s body in the trunk of her car, which was parked at a park reserve.  She had been shot in the back.  Forensic evidence linked Mr. Anderson to Ms. Olson.  Mr. Anderson’s computer had postings from “Amy” for a baby sitter, to which Ms. Olson had responded. 

A grand jury indicted Mr. Anderson on first degree premeditated murder; told the police during a custodial interrogation that he had used the online service to solicit Olson “to babysit,” that he had been present when Olson was killed, and that a friend had said that he thought killing her would be funny.  While in jail, he said he had killed her to find out what killing someone felt like.  Mr. Anderson initially pleaded not guilty by reason of mental illness - defense experts said that Mr. Anderson had Asperger’s – but he later withdrew that defense.  He did, however, attempt to introduce expert evidence of the physical and cognitive effects of Asperger’s, which the trial court denied.

Mr. Anderson challenged his custodial interrogation on Miranda reasons.  The claim seemed something of a tag a long to the Asperger’s evidence issue.  The appellate court did rather timidly remind the cops that they should clearly inform suspects just what crimes that they want to ask questions about, but that telling Mr. Anderson that the subject of the questioning was a “missing person case” was close enough to the real subject –homicide; after that, they made short work of the Miranda claim and moved on. 

Mr. Anderson argued that there were three reasons why the jury should have heard evidence about Asperger’s.  First, it was necessary to explain the physical mannerisms associated with this illness, especially the inability to empathize, show remorse or respond properly to social cues.  The trial judge, after peering over the bench at Mr. Anderson, noticed nothing particularly unusual about his behaviors and excluded any expert testimony on that basis.

Second, Mr. Anderson said that expert testimony was necessary to explain how his Asperger’s brain functions differently from that of a “normal” brain, especially in considering mens rea.  The appellate court won’t go there because it leads to reconsideration of, if not the adoption of, diminished capacity.  What that means is that it’s not whether Mr. Anderson had the capacity to form intent but whether he did so, something that can only be determined from his physical actions.

So, if you are offering expert mental health evidence to show an absence of guilt based on a diminished capacity to form the required mental state for the offense charged, you can’t do it.  But, if you are offering that evidence to present the jury with an alternative explanation of behavior (that the state would argue supports a conclusion of guilt), you can.  See, State v. Maddox, Jr., Slip Op. A10-372 (10/12/2010), petition for review pending.

Mr. Anderson wanted an accident instruction but the trial court wouldn’t give one, instead instructing on culpable negligence manslaughter.  The appellate court said that the two instructions allowed Mr. Anderson to argue his accident theory to the jury so that was good enough.  The appellate court also declined to parse the premeditation instruction that says that a person has to “consider, plan, prepare for or determine to commit the act” before committing it.  The jury wanted to know if all of these things had to occur in order for them to find premeditation; the appellate court ducked the question by approving the trial court’s repetition of the very instruction.  Finally, the appellate court continues to approve the jury instruction that says that premeditated decision to kill may be reached in a “short period of time,” even though case law consistently said that “some appreciable time must pass” before premeditation can exist.  Justices Paul Anderson and Page, concurring, suggest that it’s time to revise this instruction.

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