No Basis to Withdraw Guilty Plea But the Court Chides the District Court For Relying on Leading Questions of Defendant to Establish Factual Basis.

State v. Raleigh, Minn.S.Ct., 2/4/1010.  Mr. Raleigh pled guilty to first degree premeditated murder for the death of Howard Porter, a probation officer at the time of his death and a basketball great – college and pro – back in the day.  He pled guilty in exchange for an agreement with the state that he would not be prosecuted for a triple homicide for which he was then under investigation.  (Alas, he’s being prosecuted by the feds for this triple murder.)

A few days after entering the plea Mr. Raleigh requested to withdraw it.  He said that he had been hearing voices, and was having trouble sleeping.  A psychiatrist examined him.  His attorney argued that Mr. Raleigh had not understood the consequences of the plea.  The trial court denied the motion to withdraw the plea, concluding that to permit withdrawal would prejudice the state and that Mr. Raleigh had not advanced any reasons why withdrawal would be “fair and just,” the standard for withdrawal of a plea before sentencing.  Rule 15.05, subd.2.

Mr. Raleigh argued to the appellate court that he not only met this standard but also the standard applicable for withdrawal of a plea after sentencing:  avoidance of a manifest injustice.  A manifest injustice exists if the plea is not valid, that is, if it is not accurate, voluntary and intelligent.  An “accurate” plea, the appellate court says, must be based on proper facts.  Okay, no controversy there.  What the appellate court really wants to talk about is how to get those facts into the record.  The appellate court seems to believe that the the factual basis requirement is best satisfied “by [the judge] asking the defendant to express in his own words what happened.” This harks back to a decision from a quarter century ago, State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248 (Minn. 1983).  The trial court should, they go on, be “wary of situations in which the factual basis is established by asking a defendant only leading questions.”

If this weren’t enough, the appellate court reaches even further back to a 1976 decision, State v. Hoaglund, 307 Minn. 322, 240 N.W.2d 4 (1976), to observe:

It is to be hoped that the trial judge, in [accepting a plea], will ask the questions with respect to the factual basis for the crime so as to avoid the rather common inclination of counsel to elicit these facts by leading questions.

This is all dicta, because Mr. Raleigh asked to withdraw his plea before sentencing under the “fair and justice” standard.  Nonetheless, the bench is already chattering so pack a lunch or a snack; plea hearings are apt to get lengthier.