Felony Stalking Statute is Not Unconstitutional

State v. Stockwell, Minn.Ct.App., 8/11/2009.  On September 12, 2006, Ms. Stockwell rode M.H.’s bumper for several blocks on a four lane road in Rochester.  The two women did not know each other.  When M.H. pulled into her workplace parking lot, Ms. Stockwell followed her, then shouted at her about Islamic terrorism, about M.H.’s Islamic beliefs and about feeling like killing her.  M.S. is a Muslim woman who was wearing a headscarf at the time.  A jury convicted Ms. Stockwell of felony stalking.  On appeal, Ms. Stockwell argued that the felony stalking statute is overbroad in violation of the First Amendment, both on its face and as applied; and that the statute is unconstitutionally vague.  The appellate court rejects these arguments.

One who intentionally harasses another by stalking that  person, with knowledge or reason to know that this would cause the victim to feel frightened (among other feelings) and causes this reaction is guilty of felony stalking if the actions are undertaken because of a person’s religion.  The appellate court rejects Ms. Stockwell’s facial challenge for these reasons:

Because the statutory provision is specific as to the forms of conduct proscribed, because it requires that the actor knows her conduct will cause fear and causes that reaction, and because it is subject to a limiting construction, we conclude that the degree of overbreadth is not sufficiently substantial to require a holding that the statute is unconstitutional on its face.

The appellate court also rejects an “as applied” challenge, concluding that her bumper to bumper driving conduct did not convey a particularized message that might be deserving of First Amendment protection.  Lastly, Ms. Stockwell suggested, unsuccessfully, that the statute made any tailgating a stalking crime and thus the statute was void for vagueness.  The appellate court again points to the other requirements of the statute in rejecting this argument.