State v. Bjergum, Minn.Ct.App., 8/25/2009. Mr. Bjergum came to work drunk one day; his employer sent him home, then fired him. About a month later, a former coworker and her husband separately ran into Mr. Bjergum drinking at a local bar; on each occasion Mr. Bjergum said that if he didn’t soon get his unemployment he would go down to his former workplace and “go postal.” The state charged him with intentional terroristic threats. When Mr. Bjergum gave notice of an intoxication defense the state added a second terroristic threats count, this one alleging reckless conduct. At trial, the court refused to give an intoxication instruction on the reckless terroristic threats count. As luck would have it, the jury acquitted on the intentional terroristic threats but convicted on the reckless one. That was the issue on appeal.
Back in 1976, the Minnesota Supreme Court said that voluntary intoxication is a defense if a particular intent or other state of mind is a necessary element of the crime charged. City of Minneapolis v. Altimus, 306 Minn. 462, 238 N.W.2d 855 (1976). So, the legal question is whether making terroristic threats with reckless disregard for the consequences requires specific intent. Mr. Bjergum first argued that there’s no such thing as an unintentional threat and so terroristic threats requires intentional conduct. The appellate court says that this isn’t so. A declared threat, say, “I’m going to kill you.” may be just that or it may be a joke. It’s a crime regardless when the statement would reasonably cause fear that the speaker will act accordingly.
Next, Mr. Bjergum argued that the recklessness requirement is that “other” state of mind that triggers a voluntary intoxication instruction. Again, the appellate court rejects this. Although recklessness requires deliberate action in disregard of a known, substantial risk, it is not the same as specific intent. The reckless declaration, however intended, may violate the statute.
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