Defense Expert on Alcohol Blackouts Cannot Testify Whether a Defendant Who Is In One Can Formulate Specific Intent

State v. Ptacek, Minn.Ct.App., 6/9/2009.  A jury convicted Mr. Ptacek of first degree criminal sexual conduct against his fifteen year old nephew.  Mr. Ptacek raised an intoxication defense; he offered testimony from an alcohol abuse counselor to testify about alcohol blackouts in general, the effects of a blackout, and whether Mr. Ptacek was in one at the time of the offense.  Essentially, the expert would state that Mr. Ptacek's blackout state prevented him from formulating the specific intent required for commission of this offense.  The trial court would only permit this expert to testify about what blackouts are and about the factors that cause them.

The trial court relied on rather well settled law in Minnesota, State v. Griese, 565 N.W.2d 419, 425 (Minn. 1997), best stated in State v. Provost, 490 N.W.2d 93 (Minn. 1992):

[J]urors must look to „what a defendant says and does‟ to determine whether a defendant acted with the requisite intent.

Here's what the trial court said about what the expert could not say to the jury:

I don't want you to give an opinion whether there was an en bloc blackout or a fragmentary blackout in this case. I don't want you to give an opinion that people do things in blackouts that they normally wouldn't do under normal circumstances. I don't want you to give any opinion that people seek treatment after these events. I don't want you to talk about OCB, your coined phrase of out-of-character behavior. And I don't want you to try to estimate or guesstimate a blood alcohol concentration of [appellant] or what the blood alcohol concentration needs to be in order to get it a blackout state.

Mr. Ptacek also griped about the JIGS definition of fellatio; if you want to know about that, follow the link to the opinion.