Uncharged Crime That Occurs In the Same Transaction as the Charged Offense is Not Subject to Spreigl Evidence Analysis.

State v. Hollins, Minn.Ct.App., 5/12/2009.  A paid informant went to Mr. Hollins' apartment asking to purchase crack cocaine from him.  The state claimed that Mr. Hollins then called Mr. Scott, who came over with the goods; Mr. Scott, on the other hand, testified that it was the paid informant who made that call and that Hollins had nothing to do with it.  The state charged Mr. Hollins with aiding and abetting the sale of cocaine, and with conspiracy to do the same.

To buck up its case against Mr. Hollins, the state introduced evidence that Mr. Hollins had been "rolling a blunt" when the paid informant came into Hollins' apartment.  The appellate court reviewed this claimed error under the "plain error" standard because there had been no objection at trial. 

Minnesota has apparently not ruled on the admissibility of otherwise Spreigl evidence that consists of uncharged crimes that occur in the same transaction as the charged offense.  The appellate court fills this jurisprudential gap with this new definition:

In a criminal prosecution, evidence of another crime is intrinsic to the charged crime and therefore admissible without regard to Minn. R. Evid. 404 if: (1) the other crime arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged crime, and (2) either (a) the other crime is relevant to an element of the charged crime, or (b) excluding evidence of the other crime would present an incoherent or incomplete story of the charged crime.

The appellate court then applies its new rule and finds that evidence of "rolling a blunt" does not satisfy it.  The evidence fails to satisfy either of part (2)'s alternatives of its new rule.  Alas, the error was harmless.

The other issue in the case had to do with a permissive inference instruction: 

A person’s presence, companionship, and conduct after an offense are relevant circumstances from which a person’s criminal intent may be inferred.

Again, there was no objection to this instruction, so plain error is the review standard.  The appellate court finds no error in the instruction because:

An instruction containing a permissive inference will pass constitutional muster if it instructs the jury that (1) the jury may—as opposed to must—draw the inference; (2) the defendant is presumed innocent and it is the prosecution’s burden to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) the jury must examine all the evidence in the case.