The Gang's All Here, But They May Not Be Accomplices to Murder

State v. Pendleton, Mn.S.Ct. (1/29/2009).

The state charged Mr. Jeffery Pendleton with two counts of first degree murder for the stabbing death of Robert Berry, Jr. Mr. Pendleton got into a fight with Mr. Berry, in which various others either participated or egged on the participants.  The fight left Mr. Berry laying unconscious on the floor.  After a brief interlude, during which there was discussion among Mr. Pendleton and some of his associates about killing Mr. Berry, Mr. Pendleton and a few of his close associates bundled Mr. Berry into a blanket, drove him to the river bank where the state alleged that at least Mr. Pendleton stabbed him to death.   The jury convicted him of murder one.

On appeal, Mr. Pendleton argued that the trial court should have given an accomplice instruction that specifically stated that one of his close associates, A.C., was an accomplice as a matter of law.  The trial court gave only a general accomplice instruction, leaving it to the jury to decide who was or was not an accomplice.  Here's what the court had to say about A.C.'s role in these events:

A.C. was initially charged with the same crime as appellant,remained with the group the entire night, opened the house door while the group carried Berry to the car, initially lied to the police about the events of the night, and fled after the killing. But, there was no testimony that A.C. contributed to the conversation about killing Berry. Additionally, A.C. stayed near the car when the others stabbed Berry.

While the Opinion is a bit vague on this point, the implication is that the truck was not so far from where the stabbing was taking place.  Elsewhere in the Opinion, while discussing the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court threw out this dicta about Pendleton's liability for aiding and abetting an offense:

[E]ven if there was insufficient evidence to prove appellant’s direct involvement, he would also be guilty under a theory of aiding and abetting if he was intentionally present at the scene of the crime, knew his accomplices were going to commit a crime, and intended his presence to further that crime. State v. Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d 675, 681 (Minn. 2007).

This would seem to fit A.C.'s behavior, which would make her an accomplice; nonetheless, the Court concluded that there was no error in not fingering A.C. as an accomplice: 

A district court judge is only required to name specific accomplices in the jury instructions if the facts are “undisputed or compel but a single inference.” State v. Robledo-Kinney, 615 N.W.2d 25, 33 (Minn. 2000).

The state called another associate, Morris Pendleton (not to be confused with Jeffery), to testify that he saw Jeffery Pendleton stab Mr. Berry more than once.  Morris has already been convicted, himself, of first degree murder; at his trial, Morris claimed to have seen the stabbing from a distance, atop the river embankment.  At his trial, the state introduced DNA evidence that put Morris a tad closer to the action, on the riverbank where the stabbing occurred; the state didn't bring any of this up during Jeffery's trial; the defense did.  On appeal, Jeffery complained that the state had suborned perjury with Morris's testimony.  The Court concluded that it had not because the state only questioned Morris about facts that the state believed to be credible.

The Court dispensed rather quickly with the remaining arguments of the sufficiency of the evidence and claims of prosecutorial misconduct.