Alford meets MOC's & Blakely

State v. Verdon, Court of Appeals (12/9/2008).

Mr. Verdon has been battling over his Department of Corrections inmate designation, which in his case is adversely impacting his eligibility for prison programs.  It turns out that upon conviction the district court assigns a "Minnesota Offense Code" (MOC) on the warrant of commitment.  The Department of Corrections uses this code, in part, to determine the conditions of his confinement.  But the case isn't really about any of that bureaucratic stuff; it's really a procedural about putting in an Alford plea.  There's also a novel Blakely argument that gets undeserved short shrift. 

The state charged Mr. Verdon with first degree arson, felony terroristic threats, and felony criminal damage to property.  Mr. Verdon eventually entered a guilty plea to felony arson, under the holding of North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).  At the plea hearing, the prosecutor asked Mr. Verdon about the state's evidence.  Mr. Verdon acknowledge that each piece of evidence that the prosecutor asked him about existed, and that, if believed, the evidence supported the state's claim that he started the fire.  The "firestorm," as it were, ignited over Mr. Verdon's understanding that an officer claimed to have seen him holding a lighter fluid container.  Mr. Verdon acknowledged that this officer would be making certain statements, but he did not concede that those statements included the claim that he was holding lighter fluid. 

Based on this colloquy the trial court accepted the plea; the initial MOC, when translated, told DOC that Mr. Verdon had used a firearm in the commission of his crime.  This was plainly incorrect; litigation ensued with the final MOC translating to mean that he had used a "flammable." Mr. Verdon didn't like this MOC any better than the first one so more litigation ensued.  The upshot of all that litigation is the rather obvious rule that the MOC designation must have an adequate basis in the court record.

That record consists mostly of the Alford plea.  The court reminds us of the "better practice" by which to do this:

The “better practice” for developing a factual basis for an Alford plea is to discuss the evidence with the defendant on the record at the plea hearing:

This discussion may occur through an interrogation of the defendant about the underlying conduct and the evidence that would likely be presented at trial, the introduction at the plea hearing of witness statements or other documents, or the presentation of abbreviated testimony from witnesses likely to testify at trial, or a stipulation by both parties to a factual statement in one or more documents submitted to the court at the plea hearing.

State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 649 (Minn. 2007).  Other acceptable methods include eliciting a defendant's testimony to establish a factual basis, State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712 (Minn. 1994); and using witness statements or testimony to develop a factual basis, State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758 (Minn. 1977). 

The Blakely claim is that the MOC is based on findings by the trial court that were neither found by a jury nor admitted by Mr. Verdon with resulting restrictions to his terms of confinement.  The court doesn't see this as an enhancement to sentence so Blakely has no application.

Oh, want to know what the final MOC turned out to be?  Ready?  "MOC F132A".  Really.