State v. Smith, Minn.S.Ct., 3/11/2016. Mr. Smith, laying in wait in his basement, shot and killed two teenagers as each separately broke into his house and creeped down the basement steps. Following a series of break-ins that the local authorities had been unsuccessful in solving, Mr. Smith installed an elaborate video and audio surveillance system outside and inside his house. On Thanksgiving Day, Mr. Smith hid his vehicle to make it appear that he was enjoying the holidays elsewhere, and then he decamped to his basement to see who showed up. As first Nicholas Brady and then Haile Kifer descended the basement steps Mr. Smith assassinated them.
Mr. Smith made no apologies for the murders. Rather, he conveniently audio recorded the events. His defense at trial was defense of himself and of his dwelling. Now, the media was all over this case, curious to see if the courts would adopt a "castle doctrine" of justification, which eliminates any duty to retreat before using force in self defense. But, that's not what came up and it's not ever mentioned in Justice Lillehaug's opinion. The court doesn't explicitly say but it looks like the trial court gave the standard issue self-defense/defense of dwelling jury intructions.
Instead, Mr. Smith complained about various errors that occurred during the grand jury proceedings. The claim that stands out as of use in other cases had to do with presentation to the grand jury of "spark of life" testimony: the 8x10 glossy photographs of the two kids and the tearful account of each kid's life and accomplishments. Such testimony has consistently been permitted during trial, up to a point, State v. Graham, 371 N.W.2d 204 (Minn. 1895). Justice Lillehaug decides that the same rules apply in the grand jury, with this cautionary sentence:
We caution, however, that prosecutors must use this potentially inflammatory tool with care. A prosecutor who unreasonably relies on spark-of-life evidence to tip the grand jury’s decision risks dismissal of the indictment.
Well, two sentences.
So, what occupies the court in its fifty-seven pages? Closing the courtroom. In a pretrial hearing the defense asked to be able to present testimony from Nicholas Brady's mother and some of his friends about his involvement in the previous burglaries. This hearing was open to anyone who wanted to attend and Brady's actual name - not initials - was used throughout the hearing. Even so, right before the start of trial the trial judge closed the courtroom in order to announce that the defense could not call the witnesses it wanted on the previous burglaries but could elicit that information from other "more neutral (i.e. cops) witnesses. The trial judge seems to have closed the courtroom because he didn't want to use the actual names of the two teenagers, notwithstanding the multiple use of those names during the actual hearing on the motion.
The two Davids - Lillehaug and Stras - went at in on this closure, especially whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was even implicated by closing the court room during a preliminary hearing. Justice Lillehaug concluded that the closure was "administrative in nature" and did not violate Mr. Smith's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. Just what the reach of this "administrative in nature" rule is remains to be seen but at least encompasses "routine evidentiary rulings and matters traditionally addressed during private bench conferences or conferences in chambers."
Justice David Stras took a different approach. First, he said that the trial court had impermissibly closed the courtroom. However, unless this closure also violated a defendant's public trial right then there is nothing more to be said or done. Justice Stras takes us down memory lane, back to his view of "common law," to conclude that preliminary hearings are not part of the "trial" to which any Sixth Amendment protections attach. He rejects the "administrative in nature" analysis in favor of an analysis that sks whether the closed hearing was a "trial like proceeding":
When a criminal proceeding involves the presentation of witness testimony, the arguments of counsel on a disputed question, or invocation of the court’s fact-finding function, it is more likely to be subject to the requirements of the Sixth Amendment, whether or not it involves what appears to be an administrative task or a routine evidentiary motion.
Because the actual hearing on the defense motion was completely open, the subsequent closure to announce the ruling - no matter how right or wrong the closure was - did not meet this "trial like proceedings" test and so there was no Sixth Amendment protection available.
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