Potential Juror’s Repudiation of “Mental Illness” Defense, Rather than the “M’Naghten” Defense Does Not Express Actual Bias To Support Removal For Cause

State v. Munt, Minn.S.Ct., 5/31/2013.  A jury convicted Mr. Munt of four counts of first degree murder and various sundry other crimes, all arising out of the shooting death of his ex-wife Svetlana and the kidnapping of their three children.  Mr. Munt pled not guilty by reason of mental illness.

During jury selection, the prosecutor inquired of a prospective juror about her views on mental illness:

Q: I just want your opinion; what —in general what do you think if somebody comes into court and says, yeah I did it but I am mentally ill and—you know—I am really not responsible for what I did, what’s—what’s your thought on that?

A: My personal opinion about it [is] if you confess then you are aware that you did [it], so basically mental illness or not you are [aware] of what you did so you should be held responsible.

Mr. Munt believed that this answer expressed actual bias against his mental illness defense such that this potential juror should be struck for cause.  Justice Dietzen, writing for four members of the court with Justices Wright, Page and Paul Anderson dissenting on this issue, thought otherwise.  The justice came up with a couple of reasons to support this conclusion.  First, the potential juror, being unversed in the law, could not possibly have been expressing a bias against the M’Naghten standard since she knew nothing about it.  The trial court had not yet explained it.  Whatever she was rejecting it wasn’t that.  Justice Dietzen supports this assertion by hauling out Justice Stras’s dictionary to recite the “ordinary” definition of “mental illness,” and then contrasting that with the M’Naghten definition.

Second, she’d already told the trial judge that she could follow the court’s instructions.  So, when you looked at her entire set of answers, Mr. Munt had not shown actual bias.

Just before closing arguments the trial judge gave the jury some scheduling information.  Essentially his comments rather strongly suggested that there would be a second phase of the case – the mental illness defense – following deliberations on guilt/innocence.  He told them that they would be taking the upcoming Friday off and then returning for the next phase on Monday.  The trial judge also told the alternative jurors as he dismissed them that they did not have to return for the mental illness phase of the trial.  Mr. Munt thought that the judge was signaling the jury what verdict to return on guilt/innocence and thereby displayed bias.  The court rejects this argument, essentially editing the judge’s comments to soften the blow of what he really said.  Justice Dietzen also  pulled out the boilerplate where the judge tells the jury that nothing he’s said or done during the trial was intended to express an opinion on the facts or outcome.

Next, Mr. Munt complained that the trial court had wrongly denied his request to present surrebuttal testimony.  Rather than addressing the issue the court took its usual way out on this by assuming that the denial was wrong, then concluding that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Mr. Munt wanted to present testimony from his nine year old daughter but the trial court determined that she was not competent to testify.  The nine year old initially refused to leave her foster home to come to court, saying that  the was afraid of Mr. Munt, men, and specifically the judge (a man).  It took three adults to convince the nine year old to enter the courthouse, and even then she refused to speak with the judge.  The trial judge concluded that since he could not assess the nine year old’s ability to relate events truthfully he had to find her incompetent to testify.

A child under the age of ten is presumed competent to testify unless the judge finds that the child lacks “the capacity to remember or to relate truthfully facts respecting which the child is examined.”  Minn.Stat. 595.02, subd. 1.  While the refusal to appear in court does not, by itself, render a witness incompetent to testify, in this case the nine year old was incapable of relating any facts at trial. 

Mr. Munt complained at various points about the adequacy of his appointed counsel and requested substitute counsel be appointed.  The court said that Mr. Munt had not established the “significant circumstances” that would warrant further inquiry into his complaints or the appointment of substitute counsel.  State v. Worthy, 583 N.W.2d 270 (Minn. 1998).

Justice Wright, joined by Justices Page and Paul Anderson, dissented on the actual bias determination.  The dissent concluded that the majority was being hyper-technical and that everyone in the courtroom knew what was being discussed with this potential juror.  The dissent concluded that actual bias had been demonstrated and they would have reversed and remanded for a new trial on the mental illness defense.