Warrantless Entry Onto Property to Conduct Search Violates Fourth Amendment

State v. Chute, Minn.Ct.App., 11/21/2016.  B.W.F. called the police to report that he'd found the camper that he had reported stolen a couple of months back.  An officer met B.W.F. at the designated location and from the vantage point of a public road the officer confirmed that the make and model of the camper matched those of the stolen camper. The officer then parked his squad in one of two driveways on the property; from this vantage point the officer could see what were described as a "unique set of bolts" on the front of the camper.  The officer then walked down that driveway to the camper. 

The state charged Mr. Chute with receiving stolen property.  Mr. Chute challenged the search and seizure but the trial court said that the officer's actions were justified under the plain-view doctrine. This doctrine says that police may seize an object that they believe to be the fruit of a crime without a warrant if the object's incriminating nature is immediately apparent, the police are legitimately in the position from which the view the object, and the police have a lawful right of access to the object.  State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789 (Minn. 2012).  

The court of appeals reverses the trial court's ruling on the suppression motion.  The court said that the camper's incriminating nature only became apparent after the officer had entered upon the property. However, was the officer's position on the driveway lawful?  This raises the question whether the driveway was part of the "curtilage" which the Fourth Amendment protects the same as persons and houses.  Police may not search the curtilage without a warrant.  If, however, the curtilage included the driveway and was "impliedly-open" to the public then the entry was lawful.  State v. Crea, 305 Minn. 342, 233 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1976).  This doctrine, however, does not give the police license to enter the curtilage where their behavior objectively reveals a purpose to conduct a search.  Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409 (2013). Tracht v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 592 N.W.2d 863 Minn.Ct.App. 1999).   The court of appeals concludes that because the officer first walked down the driveway toward the camper and performed various other acts to identify the camper as the stolen camper before going over to talk to Mr. Chute, the officer was on the property to conduct a search.  That made the search unlawful.

Issuing a Worthless Check For A Service or Good Already Received Exempt From The Issuing Dishonored Check Statute

State v. Schouweiler, Minn.S.Ct., 11/16/2016.  Ms. Schouweiler sent a worthless check to the Wabasha County Treasurer to pay for her past year's property tax obligation.  When the treasurer invited her to make good on the check she ignored the request.  As a result, the state charged her with felony issuance of a dishonored check. Here's what the statute says:

Whoever issues a check which, at the time of issuance, the issuer intends shall not be paid, is guilty of issuing a dishonored check.

Ms. Schouweiler moved to dismiss the Complaint, invoking an exception to this statute that says that it does not apply to either a postdated check or to a check given "for a past consideration."  She said that the bill for her previous year's property taxes was "a past consideration" exempted from the grasp of the statute.

Justice Chutich agrees, with Chief Justice Gildea dissenting. Justice Chutich hauls out multiple dictionaries to define what a "past consideration" is, and reverses Ms. Schouweiler's conviction.  The court says that a "past consideration" includes checks given either for services already performed or for goods already received.  The statute is for the K-Mart crowd passing paper to some teenage cashier to buy some blue light special.  If that same person goes home and writes a bad check to pay for last month's Verizon cell phone calls, well, the money is still owed for that "past consideration," but there's been no crime.  Or, at least not this crime.

The Assumed Error in Admitting "Plan" Spreigl Evidence is Harmless

State v. Griffin, Minn.S.Ct., 11/16/2016.  A jury convicted Mr. Griffin of first degree felony murder.  Mr. Griffin and a buddy, Mr. Grant, had unsuccessfully tried to rob a guy who was talking down the street. Apparently undeterred, but perhaps frustrated, they tried again.  Here's what happened:

After the unsuccessful robbery, Griffin and Grant walked down a nearby alley until they reached the backyard of 3629 Columbus Avenue South, which was the home of Francisco Benitez-Hernandez and L.B-H. Benitez-Hernandez, L.B-H., and their brotherin-law P.Y-E. were in the backyard sitting at a table drinking beer. As Griffin and Grant entered the backyard, Griffin aimed the pistol at Benitez-Hernandez. When Griffin demanded money, Benitez-Hernandez said they had no money. Griffin then hit BenitezHernandez with the gun in the head above his eyebrow, causing Benitez-Hernandez to bend over and hold his bleeding head. L.B-H. stood up and threw a beer bottle at Griffin in an effort to distract him. Griffin ducked out of the way, fell backward, caught himself, and then “turned around and . . . fired at [L.B-H.].” The bullet struck L.B-H. just above the elbow of his left arm. As L.B-H. ran to get help, Benitez-Hernandez grabbed Griffin’s leg. Griffin redirected the pistol at Benitez-Hernandez’s chest and fired a shot. The bullet penetrated Benitez-Hernandez’s chest, fatally wounding him. Griffin and Grant fled the scene before the police arrived.

Over objection, the state was allowed to present Spreigl evidence, which Justice Hudson summarized:

At trial, the State called O.R-H., who testified that on January 3, 2008, he was walking to work and was at First Avenue and 27th Street in Minneapolis when he noticed two men walking behind him. Approximately one block later, one of the men ran up behind him. When O.R.-H. turned around, the man punched him in the nose and rummaged through his jacket and pants pockets for money. O.R-H. was unable to make an in-court identification. The State then called Officer Keia Pettis, who testified that on January 3, 2008, during a show-up identification procedure, O.R-H identified Griffin as the person who attempted to rob him.

Now, a couple of things.  First, Justice Hudson  never says why the state wanted to introduce this evidence.  As a result, the court doesn't have to engage in the analysis required by State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676 (Minn. 2006).  Instead, the court jumps straight to the prejudice consideration and summarily concludes that there was none.  The Court is down two members for this Opinion, neither Chutich nor McKeig having been part of the court at the time of submission, but were there really not three votes to uphold or reject the admission of this evidence?  Second, Justice Stras, although he concurs in the court's opinion, is unhappy with the ducking of the question. So, he puts on his professorial hat to write about why he thinks that when it comes to admitting Spreigl evidence  to prove "plan" the court's jurisprudence has come off the rails.  

Second, the next case to come along with "plan" Spreigl evidence can take some lessons from Justice Stras's concurrence.  While this opinion offers no assistance to ferreting out the correctness of admitting Spreigl evidence for such purpose, Justice Stras gives us the full treatise.

Air Powered BB Gun Is Still Not a "Firearm"

State v. Yang, Minn.Ct.App., 11/14/2016.  A few weeks back the Minnesota Supreme Court said in State v. Haywood, that the "firearm" family that lived at Minn.Stat. 609.165.1(b) did not include "BB guns".  The court of appeals, for the life of them, can't discern any reason why the "firearm" family next door at Minn.Stat. 624.713.1 could also include "BB guns."