Court Ignores Psychological Evidence In Concluding That Confession Was Voluntary

State v. Nelson, Minn.S.Ct., 10/26/2016.  Mr. Nelson, just barely eighteen, is serving a life without release sentence.  A jury convicted him of the murder of his father.  On appeal he argued that his confession was not voluntary.  Here's how Justice Chutich put the issue:

Nelson contends that his confessions were not voluntary and therefore the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress them. He asserts, in particular, that his on-scene confession was involuntary because the interrogating officers led him to believe that they were not his adversaries and that confessing would benefit him. He also asserts that his youth, inexperience, and upbringing made him “particularly susceptible” to the officers’ manipulative interrogation techniques, in part because childhood abuse had conditioned him to acquiesce to male authority figures. 

A confession is involuntary only when a defendant's "will was overborne at the time he confessed."  State v. Farnsworth, 738 N.W.2d 364 (Minn. 2007).  The actions of the interrogators, together with the circumstances surrounding the confession must be "so coercive, so manipulative, so overpowering that [a defendant" was deprived of his ability to make an unconstrained and wholly autonomous decision to speak."  State v. Pilcher, 472 N.W.2d 327 (Minn. 1991).  Both sides presented expert testimony on the question of the voluntariness of Mr. Nelson's confession. Tellingly, Justice Chutich never mentions this testimony - from either side - in concluding that Mr. Nelson's will had not been overborne.

Mr. Nelson committed this offense one week past his 18th birthday. He argued that psychologically and socially he was still a juvenile and thus should benefit from Miller v. Alabama's rule that a mandatory life sentence without release is unconstitutional.  Justice Chutich ducks this claim by pointing out that he had not raised it in the district court.  

Post Conviction Petitioner Failed to Show That Either The Court Or The Prosecutor Intimidated Witnesses From Testifying

Caldwell v. State, Minn.S.Ct., 10/26/2016.  Mr. Caldwell is serving a life without release sentence so understandably he's spending a lot of energy trying to get out from under that sentence.  The court previously upheld his conviction on direct appeal.  He commenced this post conviction petition arguing that three state witnesses had presented false testimony at his trial.  That got him an evidentiary hearing, but, alas, things didn't go too terribly well.

First of the recanting witnesses was a Mr. Turnage.  Before Mr. Turnage could open his mouth the judge threatened him with perjury.  Mr. Turnage withstood that threat and on direct examination he recanted his previous trial testimony.  It was then the prosecutor's turn to hurl a few stronger threats at Mr. Turnage. Specifically, the prosecutor threatened to charge Mr. Turnage with aiding an offender after the fact, which, in case Mr. Turnage didn't know, could carry a sentence equal of half what Mr. Caldwell got. Now, regrettably, no one explored just what half of a life without release sentence looked like, but Mr. Turnage apparently had enough of an idea of it to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights.  The final upshot was that the judge threw out all of Mr. Turnage's testimony. When Mr. Caldwell couldn't produce the other two recanting witnesses, the whole thing fell apart and the court denied the petition.

Mr. Caldwell said that both the judge and the prosecutor "substantially interfered with [Mr. Turnages's] decision to testify at the post conviction evidentiary hearing," which denied him the right to present a complete defense. Justice Hudson concludes that neither did that.  The Justice assumed without deciding that there was a Fourteenth Amendment right to present a complete defense during a post conviction hearing.  Applying the test that the Justice assumes applies, Mr. Caldwell had to prove that a government actor interfered with a witness's decision to testify, the interference was substantial, and the defendant was prejudiced by the conduct. Colbert v. State, 870 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 2015).  Mr. Caldwell could not meet even the first requirement of the test.  The Justice said that not only did the judge not interfere, the judge was "to be commended" for it's warnings to Mr. Turnage.  And the prosecutor was doing nothing more than aggressive cross examination.

Finally, the court said that it was within the judge's discretion to strike Mr. Turnage's testimony after he clammed up.  The state's absence of an opportunity to cross examine him and what the court said was Mr. Turnage's invalid waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights - his direct testimony - authorized 

Air-Powered BB Gun Is Not a Firearm

State v. Haywood, Minn.S.Ct., 10/19/2016.  The state charged Mr. Haywood with possession of a "firearm" by one who is prohibited from such possession.  The "firearm" in question was an air-powered BB gun.  Mr. Haywood said, no, an air-powered BB gun is not a "firearm" because every dictionary he consulted for the definition of "firearm" said that in order to pass muster as a "firearm" the object must use gunpowder or some similar chemical explosive force.

Now, the court of appeals had affirmed Mr. Haywood's conviction, relying upon a supreme court opinion, State v. Seifert, 256 N.W.2d 87 (Minn. 1977).  "Law by dictionary" wasn't in vogue back then so the courts were much freer to decide cases with the result in mind, based upon what the particular make of the court perceived the legislative purpose to be. Seifert invoked a game and fish statute, among other authorities, to satisfy itself that the legislature meant "firearm" to be all encompassing:

In our opinion, the fact that the gun defendant used required gas rather than gunpowder to discharge its projectile does not mean, as defendant contends, that the gun could not be a firearm within the meaning of the term “firearm” used in [section] 609.02. Having statutory purpose in mind, we think that term should be defined broadly to include guns using newer types of projectile propellants and should not be restricted in meaning to guns using gunpowder.

Not so now.  Justice Hudson says that the "plain and ordinary" meaning of "firearm" is an object that requires gunpowder or some similar chemical explosive force.  The use of compressed air is nowhere in any of the dictionary definitions of "firearm."  

Warrant Based Upon Probable Cause Is Required to Issue GPS Tracking Device

State v. Liebl, Minn.Ct.App., 10/17/2016.  The DNR had a bad week, from both the court of appeals and the supreme court.  Here, the DNR invoked a statute, Minn.Stat. 626A,37, which said that a judge could issue an order authorizing the DNR to covertly install a GPS tracking device on a showing of "reason to believe" that the data obtained from the GPS device would be relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.  The DNR suspected that Mr. Liebl was hunting deer in violation of various gaming statutes.  Eventually, the state obtained a search warrant for Mr. Liebl's home and truck, where evidence of such unlawful gaming was found.  The search warrant application relied, at least in part, on the data obtained from the GPS tracking device.

Back in 2012, SCOTUS said that installation of a GPS tracking device was a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  United States v. Jones, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 949 (2012).  It necessarily follows that the court could authorize the DNR to install the GPS only upon a warrant application supported by probable cause, or if there were some exception to the warrant requirement.The DNR did not even suggest to the district court that there was probable cause, relying instead on the statutory standard of "reason to believe," so the authorization was invalid.

The state's fallback position was to argue for an extension of Minnesota's limited adoption of the good faith exception to the warrant requirement.  The court of appeals rejects this attempt, pointing out that Jones had been good law for quite some time; the state could point to no cases that applied a good faith exception  to preserve the admissibility of evidence that had been obtained through a post-Jones, warrantless GPS tracking device:

In sum, Officer Picht lacked an objectively reasonable basis for his belief that warrantless GPS tracking of Liebl’s truck was constitutionally permissible after Jones. We believe that the exclusionary rule’s deterrence rationale was served here, because law enforcement has a duty to stay abreast of changes in the law.

Refusal Statute As Applied to Warrantless Urine Test is Unconstitutional

State v. Thompson, Minn.S.Ct., 10/12/2016.  Chief Justice Gildea takes something of a victory lap to celebrate the SCOTUS adoption of the Minnesota Court's pronouncement that a breath test is nothing more than search incident to a lawful arrest.  State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762 (2015), aff’d sub nom. Birchfield v. North Dakota, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016).  Somewhat, because the court unanimously throws in the towel to declare Minnesota's refusal statute unconstitutional as applied when what's refused is either a blood or urine test.  This opinion is the urine test refusal.

The state wanted the court to expand its recent limited adoption of the good faith exception to the warrant requirement.  However, the Chief points out that nothing had really been suppressed; after all the cops didn't collect any evidence sought to be introduced at trial.

Refusal Statute As Applied to Warrantless Blood Test is Unconsitutional

State v. Trahan, Minn.S.Ct., 10/12/2016.  Chief Justice Gildea takes something of a victory lap to celebrate the SCOTUS adoption of the Minnesota Court's pronouncement that a breath test is nothing more than search incident to a lawful arrest.  State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762 (2015), aff’d sub nom. Birchfield v. North Dakota, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016).  Somewhat, because the court unanimously throws in the towel to declare Minnesota's refusal statute unconstitutional as applied when what's refused is either a blood or urine test.  This opinion is the blood test refusal.

The state wanted the court to expand its recent limited adoption of the good faith exception to the warrant requirement.  However, the Chief points out that nothing had really been suppressed; after all the cops didn't collect any evidence sought to be introduced at trial.