9/23/2015: No Supreme Court Published Criminal Opinions

9/21/2015: No Court of Appeals Published Criminal Opinions

9/16/2015: No Supreme Court Published Criminal Opinions

9/14/2015: No Court of Appeals Published Criminal Opinions

Claims in Second Post Conviction Petition Barred Under Knaffla

Williams v. State, Minn.S.Ct., 9/9/2015.  Mr. Williams is serving  a sentence from a 1997 conviction for first degree premeditated murder.  He filed this, his second post conviction petition, in 2013 claiming that both his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. The post conviction court denied the petition without a hearing. Justice Stras concludes that Mr. Williams' claims are procedurally barred.

Mr. Williams alleged that his trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to investigate an alternative perpetrator defense; and that his appellate counsel has been ineffective for not raising trail counsel's aforesaid ineffectiveness.  The post conviction court said that Mr. Williams could have raised these claims in his first post conviction petition and thus he could not raise them now under Knaffla. Justice Stras agrees with that conclusion.  Once again, the court declines to address the question whether the Knaffla exceptions survived the enactment of the statutory two year limitations periods with its own exceptions.  Mr. Williams also said that his mental illness prevented him from filing the claims within the two year limitations period.  The post conviction court said that Mr. Williams had been sufficiently competent to file a direct appeal, the first post conviction, and an appeal of that order.  Justice Stras affirms that conclusion.

Minn.Stat. 244.10.5a(b) Permits Aggravated Sentence Based on Any Aggravating Factor Arising From Same Course of Conduct

State v. Fleming, Minn.Ct.App., 9/8/2015.  The state charged Mr. Fleming with possession of a firearm by an ineligible person, and with assault in the second degree.  Someone cut Mr. Fleming with a knife while the two were, one supposes, playing basketball.  In response, Mr. Fleming pulled a gun out of his backpack and fired off six rounds.  There were lots of adults and kids around when this happened.  Mr. Fleming pled guilty to both of these offenses.

The trial court imposed a 90 month sentence on the firearm possession conviction, stayed for eight years.  This represented a dispositional departure - probation - and a durational departure - 90 months instead of 60.  The court also stayed a 36 month sentence on the assault, concurrent with the other stayed sentence.  The court explained that the dispositional departure was because the victim had been the initial aggressor and Mr. Fleming had an imperfect self-defense claim.  The court explained the durational departure was because of the "unique seriousness" of the offense.  The court went on to say:

Going back to the caselaw and taking into account the general nature of the aggravating factors that may be considered, this court finds the danger to the general public— those innocent children, families, and community members in the area of Folwell Park—cannot be overstated. Bullets kill and maim. Bullets do not know their target, and can kill or maim unintended victims. Mr. Fleming’s actions threatened to harm or kill at least six people. And, as is readily apparent, his actions negatively impacted the lives of hundreds[, and] added to the steady drumbeat of negative reports of crime in North Minneapolis. Nothing good came out of Mr. Fleming’s actions. 

This might have been the end of the story except that subsequently Mr. Fleming violated certain conditions of his probation.  The court revoked the previously stayed 90 months sentence on the firearm possession charge, (after which Mr. Fleming demanded execution of the concurrent 36 month sentence.

Mr. Fleming appealed, reaching  back to the initial sentence and saying that the trial court made a mistake by the upward durational departure from 60 to 90 months.  Mr. Fleming agreed that his conduct created a greater than normal danger to the safety of other people, but said that he created this greater danger by committing the assault.  Case law says, Mr. Fleming said, that a court can't rely on conduct underlying one conviction to support a sentencing departure for a separate conviction.  State v. Spaeth, 552 N.W.2d 187, 196 (Minn. 1996).

Well, that was true back in the '90's but the legislature changed the law in 2009 when it amended Minn.Stat. 244.10, subd. 5a(b):

Notwithstanding section 609.04 or 609.035, or other law to the contrary, when a court sentences an offender for a felony conviction, the court may order an aggravated sentence beyond the range specified in the sentencing guidelines grid based on any aggravating factor arising from the same course of conduct.

The Court of Appeals says that this is the first judicial opinion applying this 2009 amendment.  The court concludes that the amendment means exactly what it says: it authorizes a departure based on any aggravating factor that arises from the same course of conduct as the felony sentencing offense.  Just to be sure, however, the Court also says that because multiple punishments are permissible for Mr. Fleming's convictions there is no prohibition against basing a departure on conduct underlying another conviction.  State v. Grampre, 766 N.W.2d 347 (Minn.Ct.App. 2009), review denied, (Minn. Aug. 26, 2009).

The court also examined the revocation, itself, and concludes that the trial court properly applied the Austin factors in revoking Mr. Fleming's probation.

9/2/2015: No Supreme Court Published Criminal Opinions