State v. Fleck, Minn.S.Ct., 2/15/2012. This comes up from the court of appeals, which had held that assault, bodily harm, was a specific intent crime for which voluntary intoxication was a defense. See here. The supreme court now reverses the court of appeals, holding, despite some sloppy language in earlier opinions, that assault, bodily harm, is not a specific intent crime. As a general intent crime, voluntary intoxication is not a cognizable defense.
Tuesday, March 20, 2012
Supreme Court Upholds Collection of DNA Exemplar for Adult Convicted of Gross Misdemeanor Arising out of Felony-Charged Conduct
State v. Johnson, Jr., Minn.S.Ct., 1/25/2012. This is the companion case, for grown-ups, to the juvenile case, In the Matter of the Welfare of: M.L.M., on the collection of DNA from a defendant originally charged with a felony but who pleads down to a misdemeanor. The court of appeals had upheld this practice. See here. The supreme court upholds this practice as well in a cut and paste opinion from the juvenile opinion.
Supreme Court Upholds Collection of DNA Exemplar for Juvenile Adjudicated of Gross Misdemeanor
In the Matter of the Welfare of: M.L.M., Minn.S.Ct., 1/25/2012. The state alleged that in 2008 M.L.M. and another juvenile used scissors to remove security sensors from un-purchased merchandise and then stole that merchandise. Possession and use of the scissors is a felony but the theft, because of the value of the merchandise, was only a gross misdemeanor. M.L.M. entered a guilty plea to the gross misdemeanor in exchange for dismissal of all other charges. The juvenile court ordered M.L.M. to provide a DNA exemplar.
M.L.M. challenged the DNA requirement as an unreasonable search and seizure, and as a denial of equal protection. Both the trial court and the court of appeals rejected these challenges. The supreme court, three justices dissenting, uphold the lower courts. Here’s the opening paragraph of Justice Meyer’s dissent:
I respectfully dissent. M.L.M. was adjudicated delinquent for the purpose of rehabilitation. It is a disposition at the other end of the harmlessness scale from a sentence for a felony conviction. The collection and retention of the biological specimen for DNA implicate strong privacy interests apart from those intruded upon by the collection of the specimen, amount to full-scale personal DNA searches because of the potential for exposure of exceptionally private information contained in the DNA, and operate as a permanent burden on privacy. I would conclude that the State’s interest in taking a biological specimen from a juvenile adjudicated as delinquent, without probable cause, does not outweigh the juvenile’s privacy interest. I would hold that the DNA collection statute is unconstitutional as applied to a juvenile adjudicated to be delinquent for a gross misdemeanor.
Monday, March 19, 2012
Admission of a Recording of Non-Testifying Co-conspirator Does Not Violate the Confrontation Clause
State v. Brist, Minn.S.Ct., 2/22/2012. A confidential informant made five separate controlled buys of methamphetamine from Ms. Brist’s boyfriend, Mr. Garcia. The state charged Ms. Brist with aiding and abetting and conspiracy to commit controlled substances crimes. Over objection, the state introduced an audio recording of a conversation between Mr. Garcia and the CI during one of the controlled buys. The district court admitted this recording on the theory that Mr. Garcia made the statements in the course of and in furtherance of a conspiracy between Ms. Brist and Mr. Garcia. Ms. Brist complained that admission of the recording violated her confrontation rights.
The court of appeals had rejected this argument earlier. See here. The supreme court also rejects this argument, relying on Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987). Ms. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) overruled Bourjaily. The Minnesota supreme court acknowledges that Crawford has cast doubt on Bourjaily’s reasoning, but concludes that only the U.S. Supreme Court can overrule Bourjaily.
Chief Justice Gildea and Justice Meyer would have affirmed the conviction by utilizing a Crawford analysis to conclude that the recording was not “testimonial.”
Possession or Use of a False Identification Card Does Not Support Aggravated Forgery Conviction.
State v. Reynua, Minn.Ct.App., 12/5/2011, petition for further review GRANTED, 2/28/2012. Ms. Reynua possessed and used a Minnesota identification card with another person’s name as proof of identification when Hormel hired her, and to register two cars. For this a district court judge found her guilty of aggravated forgery under Minn.Stat. 609.625, subd 1(1). Ms. Reynua argued that because the identification card did not create any legal right or privilege her conduct in possessing it did not constitute aggravated forgery. Here’s what the pertinent portion of the statute says:
Whoever, with intent to defraud, falsely makes or alters a writing or object of any of the following kinds . . . is guilty of aggravated forgery . . .:(1) a writing or object whereby, when genuine, legal rights, privileges, or obligations are created, terminated, transferred, or evidenced, . . . .
The court of appeals agreed, concluding that the identification card is merely a document to establish identity.
The state also charged Ms.Reynua with five counts for her conduct involving a federal I-9 form, a federal form used to verify eligibility for employment based on citizenship or other legal status. Ms. Reynua argued that federal law preempts any state prosecution for such conduct. The court of appeals agrees with this argument but only in part. A perjury prosecution for false statements on the I-9 form is preempted, but not so on a simple forgery charge based on the use of the Minnesota identification card.
Court of Appeals Rejects Second Amendment Challenge to Possession of Firearm by an Ineligible Person
State v. Craig, Minn.Ct.App., 12/5/11, petition for further review, GRANTED, 2/14/12. Police responded to a domestic abuse call and learned that the alleged abuser had left in a maroon car. Police eventually stopped a maroon car that Mr. Craig was driving. Officers conducted an inventory search of the vehicle and found a gun. Mr. Craig was not authorized to be in possession of a gun because of a prior drug conviction. Following his conviction of possession of a firearm by an ineligible person, Mr. Craig raised these issues on appeal:
I. Does Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2), as applied to appellant, violate the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution?II. Did the district court err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress the firearm as the product of an illegal search of the vehicle?III. Did the district court commit reversible error by accepting appellant’s stipulation to an element of the charged offense without obtaining a proper waiver of appellant’s right to a jury determination of that element?IV. Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of appellant’s prior felony controlled substance conviction for impeachment purposes?V. Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s request to challenge the credibility of hearsay statements that were made to the police by an unavailable witness?VI. Did the district court err by requiring appellant to make a copayment for the public defender without first determining his ability to pay?
The gun possession by an ineligible person statute establishes a life time prohibition; Mr. Craig argued that this violated the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2799 (2008). Mr. Craig argued that this statute cannot survive strict-scrutiny analysis. The court of appeals, however, elects for an intermediate level of scrutiny which looks to see if the statute is “substantially related to an an important governmental objective.” Clark v. Jeter, 686 U.S. 456, 461, 108 S. Ct. 1910, 1914 (1988). Under this analysis, the court of appeals rejects Mr. Craig’s Second Amendment challenge.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has accepted review of this issue.
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