State v. Olson, Minn.Ct.App., 7/13/2015. On the date set for trial on Mr. Olson's driving while impaired - apparently a misdemeanor - the state's only witness, the arresting trooper was "voluntarily absent." The state asked for a continuance. The trial judge denied that request. The prosecutor then said, well then, I'll just dismiss and refile. The state did exactly that. Mr. Olson moved to dismiss the refiled charge. The trial judge denied that motion, concluding that the state had not dismissed the original charge in bad faith.
The court of appeals reverses the trial court. Here's what the court said:
Because a prosecutor does not act in good faith under rule 30.01 when he dismisses a criminal charge merely to refile it, effectively nullifying the district court’s refusal to grant his motion to continue, the district court erroneously concluded that the prosecutor acted in good faith.
The rule in play here, Rule 30.01, says that "The prosecutor may dismiss a complaint or tab charge without the court's approval ..." However, the court of appeals believed that this apparently unilateral authority to dismiss a Complaint or tab charge without court approval nonetheless must be exercised in good faith. The court cites State v. Couture, 587 N.W.2d 849 (Minn.Ct.App. 1999), review denied, Minn.S.Ct. 1999) for this proposition. What happened to Mr. Couture was just a bit different, however, than what happened to Mr. Olson. The state initially charged Mr. Couture with gross misdemeanor driving after cancellation and misdemeanor no proof of insurance. Later the state timely amended the complaint to charge what was then called aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol in lieu of the original charges. Following his conviction Mr. Couture complained that the state could not recharge him because the initial charges had been dismissed for non-curable jurisdictional defects. The appellate court disagreed with this assertion and instead concluded that the dismissal had been under Rule 30.01. Under that rule the state was free to amend the complaint as it saw fit so long as it was not acting in bad faith.
Still, though, there is authority for the court's conclusion. The court cites to federal authority, after which Rule 30 is modeled, to support its conclusion that this use of Rule 30 to effectuate a "do it yourself continuance" is an act of bad faith. United States v. Hayden, 860 F.2d 1483 (9th Cir. 1988). There the Ninth Circuit said, in interpreting a similar federal rule, that were the government to utilize the rule as a pretext to bypass the trial court's denial of a continuance request it would be acting in bad faith. The court of appeals also pointed to Minn.Stat. 631.02, which grants to the trial court the exclusive authority to grant continuances upon a sufficient showing of good cause. The court mused that if the state can use Rule 30.01 to obtain a continuance denied by the court then this authority "is almost useless":
How could district court judges effectively manage their trial calendars if, in any criminal case and at any pretrial moment of the prosecutor’s choosing, the prosecutor could cite rule 30.01 to fashion the state’s own continuance? What is the point of a statute that requires the moving party to show “sufficient cause” for a continuance if one of the parties can use rule 30.01 to obtain a continuance without that showing? What is the significance of the district court’s discretion to deny a motion to continue if the court no longer possesses the authority to prevent the state from unilaterally granting itself a continuance? To allow the state to use the rule for the express purpose of evading the district court’s continuance denial would erroneously suggest that rule 30.01 and its federal counterpart were crafted to give only the prosecutor the means to obtain a continuance at will, leaving the defendant alone to submit to the district court’s calendar-management authority.
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