State v. Yang, Minn.S.Ct., 10/29/2009. A jury convicted Mr. Yang of multiple counts of first degree murder, including “for the benefit of a gang” counts, for the resulting deaths of two people; and of four counts of attempted first degree murder. The trial court imposed two consecutive life sentences for the murder convictions; and four consecutive 186 month sentences for the attempted murder counts.
Various officers responded to Jimmy’s Pro Billiards on a report of shots having been fired. In addition to finding the first of six bodies – two dead and four injured, an officer saw a black four door Honda leave a nearby parking ramp, driving with its lights off and in the wrong direction. Another officer topped a dark blue Honda Civic in which Mr. Vang was the front seat passenger. Police found three handguns in that car and one other handgun in another car that turned out to have Mr. Yang’s buddies in it.
Mr. Yang moved to suppress the evidence found in the Honda Civic, and to limit the state’s gang expert testimony. The trial court denied the motion and the appellate court upheld that ruling. That the only car that the cops saw leave the ramp after the shooting did so with its lights off and driving in the wrong direction established a reasonable articulable basis to have stopped the Honda.
Mr. Yang wanted to question the three jail snitches and the cooperating codefendants about the deals that they got for testifying against him. Specifically, he wanted to ask them how much time each was getting off their sentences. The trial court said no. The appellate court upheld this restriction, in keeping with its previous rulings on this issue, for instance, State v. Dobbins, 725 N.W.2d 492, 505 (Minn. 2006). Close enough is good enough; so long as the jury has some notion that a snitch or cooperating defendant got “a pretty good deal” the jury knows enough.
The state’s gang expert described the history of the gang in play in this prosecution and described some of its symbols. This was okay because the state had to prove that the gang in question was a “criminal gang,” whether it had a common identifying sign or symbol, and whether it existed to commit violent acts. The expert went on, however, to opine that this particular gang’s primary activity was to commit violent crimes. This was also okay although pretty close to the line. The appellate court concludes that a gang expert cannot express an opinion that a particular gang is a criminal gang under the statute, and cannot express an opinion that a defendant committed a crime to benefit a criminal gang. Because this expert did not express such opinions there was no error in receiving the testimony.
The appellate court rejected a complaint about the jury instructions, having more to do with the way in which the trial court corrected errors in the written instructions on the fly as they were being read. Ultimately, Mr. Yang could not point to any incorrect instruction as finally presented to the jury so he was not entitled to any relief.
Mr. Yang complained that the permissive consecutive sentences exaggerated the criminality of his conduct. He presented several arguments in support of this complaint but the appellate court rejected them all.
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