Tuesday, June 28, 2016

Court Declines to Extend Miller v. Alabama to Adults

Munt v. State, Minn.S.Ct., 6/15/2016.  A jury convicted Mr. Munt of four counts of first degree murder and various other crimes, arising out of the shooting death of his ex-wife and the kidnapping of his three children. He pled not guilty by reason of mental illness.  The supreme court upheld his convictions, read here.

Mr. Munt eventually filed this post conviction petition.  The post conviction court concluded that the petition was untimely under the limitations provisions of the post conviction statute.  Minn.Stat. 590.01, subd. 4(a)(2) and that it did not meet any of the statutory exceptions to that two year limitations period.  

Chief Justice Gildea first chastises the post conviction court for wrongly concluding that the petition was untimely.  It was not; the post conviction court failed to include the ninety days window after disposition of his direct appeal.  

Mr. Munt argued that the trial court had given an incorrect instruction on circumstantial evidence.  It's not entirely clear just what instruction Mr. Munt wanted the trial court to have given. Chief Justice Gildea cites to State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373 (Minn. 2011), which talks about assuming that the jury believed the state's witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.  This may not be what the current law on sufficiency of circumstantial evidence is, but it doesn't matter as the court concludes that Mr. Munt's claim is procedurally barred under Knaffla.

Mr. Munt also argued that his sentence of life without possibility of release is unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama.  Mr. Munt said that failure to extend Miller to adults denies him equal protection. The Chief states that Miller applies only to juveniles and thus not to Mr. Munt who was thirty-five years old at the time of the crimes.

(More) Post Conviction Claims Are Knaffla Barred

Zornes v. Minnesota, Minn.S.Ct., 6/15/2016.  Mr. Zornes is serving a life sentence without possibility of release for two counts of first degree premeditated murder.  The supreme court upheld the convictions and sentences back in 2013, read about it here.  

Mr. Zornes then launched a post conviction petition.  He alleged seven trial errors denied him a fair trial.  Justice Hudson concluded that all of these errors were known or should have been known at the time of direct appeal and so they are Knaffla barred.  Mr. Zornes also alleged eight claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  Again, however, Justice Hudson points out that all but one of these claims is based on the trial record and thus barred.  The court concluded that Mr. Zornes was not entitled to relief on the one issue that perhaps is not barred.  Finally, Mr. Zornes argued that his appellate counsel was also ineffective.  He based this claim primarily on the assertion that appellate counsel should have raised the prosecutor's use of a Powerpoint presentation during closing argument that either contained information not admitted into evidence and not vetted to both the court and defense counsel prior to its use.  See Brabeck v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 264 Minn. 160, 167-68, 117 N.W.2d 921, 926-27
(1962). 

Post Conviction Claims are Knaffla Barred.

Davis v. State, Minn.S.Ct., 6/15/2016.  Mr. Davis is serving a life sentence for the felony murder of Armando Calix.  Mr. Davis appealed that conviction and sentence, in which he raised some fifteen claims.  The court denied relief on all of those claims.

He then filed a post conviction petition in which thirteen of the fifteen claims he presented were duplicate claims raised on direct appeal. Under the Knaffla rule those claims are procedurally barred. Neither the post conviction court nor Justice Stras addressed whether the statutory adoption of the Knaffla rule, Minn.Stat. 590.04, subd 3 is either a separate basis for denial of the post conviction petition; or has superseded Knaffla.  Justice Stras affirms the denial of relief on the other two claims - sufficiency of evidence, and an evidentiary ruling - because those claims were or should have been known to Mr. Davis at the time of his direct appeal.  Justice Stras also declined to address either the two Knaffla exceptions, or the limitations exceptions in the statute.

Monday, June 20, 2016

"Grooming" Statute is Facially Unconstitutional

State v. Muccio, Minn.Ct.App., 6/20/2016.  Ms. Muccio sent a close-up of a female's genitals, a close-up of a female's buttocks covered by a thong, and a female naked from the waist to the neck to a fifteen year old.  Ms. Muccio and the fifteen year old also had sexually explicit conversations and exchanged sexually explicit photographs.  The state charged Ms. Muccio with communication with a minor describing sexual conduct in violation of Minn.Stat. 609.352, subd. 2a(2).  She moved to declare this statute unconstitutional and the trial court granted that motion.  The state brought this appeal.

Here's what the statute says:
A person 18 years of age or older who uses the Internet, a computer, computer program, computer network, computer system, an electronic communications system, or a telecommunications, wire, or radio communications system, or other electronic device capable of electronic data storage or transmission to commit any of the following acts, with the intent to arouse the sexual desire of any person, is guilty of a felony . . . : engaging in communication with a child or someone the person reasonably believes is a child, relating to or describing sexual conduct. 
The objective of the statute is to criminalize "grooming," the process "whereby sexual predators engage in sexually explicit conversations with a child and expose the child to pornographic material in an attempt to lower the child's inhibitions and acclimate the child toward a sexual encounter."

The court of appeals agrees with the trial court that this statute is facially overbroad in violation of the First Amendment because it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech.  The court adopts these examples from the trial court as acts that would violate the statute:
A music video producer creates a video with sexually explicit depictions or lyrics, with the intent to arouse the sexual desire of some person who views or listens to the video, places that video on social media, and a child age 15 or younger sees or hears it. A film producer produces a movie with sex scenes, with the intent to arouse the sexual desire of some person who views the film, makes that movie available on an Internet streaming service, and a child age 15 or younger sees it. A writer of young-adult fiction electronically publishes a book describing a sex scene, with the intent to arouse the sexual desire of any one of the book’s readers, and a child age 15 or younger reads it.
Here's the conclusion of the court of appeals:
Minn. Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2a(2), proscribes protected speech and is facially overbroad in violation of the First Amendment. Further, because any attempt to construe the statute constitutionally would require that we rewrite the statute, which would constitute an invasion of the legislative domain and discourage the legislature from drafting a narrowly tailored law, we decline to do so. Finally, the statute is not narrowly drawn to serve the state’s compelling interest in protecting children from sexual abuse and exploitation on the Internet and therefore is an unconstitutional content-based regulation of speech. 

Tuesday, June 14, 2016

Only One Sentence Can Be Imposed For Two Burglaries Committed as Part of Single Course of Conduct

State v. Mitchell, Minn.Ct.App., 5/31/2016.  Mr. Mitchell entered K.K.'s apartment without her permission.  He physically assaulted her and then fled.  Within the hour police arrested Mr. Mitchell; he had a knife in his vehicle.  The state charged him with first degree burglary (assault) and first degree burglary (dangerous weapon).  It took took attempts but on the second try a jury convicted Mr. Mitchell of both counts.  It took another ten years to get Mr. Mitchell in front of the trial judge for sentencing whereupon the court imposed sentences on both counts of conviction.

Mr. Mitchell argued that the burglary (dangerous weapon) hadn't been proved.  The court said that the state did show that Mr. Mitchell was arrested "shortly after the burglary" with a knife, that the knife belonged to K.K.'s father with whom K.K. lived, that the knife was in the kitchen "just hours" before the burglary and wasn't there afterwards. These circumstances were enough to prove that Mr. Mitchell possessed the knife at some point during the burglary.

Mr. Mitchell's other arguments addressed why he could only be sentenced on one of the two burglary convictions.  First, he argued that first degree burglary (dangerous weapon) is a lesser-included offense of first degree burglary (assault).  The court disagreed, determining that each offense had elements that the other did not have and so "neither crime is necessarily proved when the other is proved."  

Mr. Mitchell's fall back -and successful - argument was that the two burglary counts were part of a single course of conduct and so he could only be sentenced on one of the two.  The state agreed that the two burglary counts were part of a single course of conduct, but countered that there was an exception that permitted sentencing on both counts:
[A] prosecution for or conviction of the crime of burglary is not a bar to conviction of or punishment for any other crime committed on entering or while in the building entered (emphasis added).
The court hauls out the dictionary to define "other" to mean "different from that or those implied or specified."  That leads the court to conclude that "any other crime" is a crime different from burglary.   The court sends the case back to the trial court to vacate the second burglary sentence.

Saturday, June 11, 2016

Rule 27.03, Subd. 9 Is Proper Method By Which To Challenge Restitution, Subject to The Restitution Limitations Period

Evans v. State, Minn.S.Ct., 6/8/2016.  Mr. Evans is serving a life sentence without possibility of release.  The trial court also ordered him to pay a bunch of money to the Crime Victims Reparations Board.  Mr. Evans filed a motion under Rule 27.03, subd. 9 to correct his sentence, arguing that the restitution statute did not authorize awards to the CRVB, and even if it did, the amount that had been awarded was wrong.

Justice Dietzen says that Rule 27.03, subd. 9 is a proper vehicle by which to challenge an award of restitution, provided that the challenge does not go beyond the sentence.  Restitution is part of a sentence so Mr. Evans was on firm ground by invoking the rule.  State v. Gaiovnik, 794 N.W.2d 643 (Minn. 2011).  The Justice also says that the trial court has the authority to award restitution to the CRVB.  Finally, because Mr. Evans' challenge to the restitution award came more than thirty days of receiving notification of the request or within thirty days of sentencing, whichever is later, the trial court correctly determined that his challenge was too late.

Evidence Sufficient to Support Conviction of First Degree Premeditated Murder


State v. Barshaw, Minn.S.Ct., 5/25/2016.  A judge found Mr. Barshaw guilty of first degree premeditated murder for the shooting death of Jeffrey Schutz.  Mr. Barshaw was having an affair with Jeffrey's wife, Mandy.  Mandy went to Mr. Barshaw's apartment to pick him up and bring him back to where she lived with Jeffrey; Mr. Barshaw brought along a semi-automatic assault rifle and a semi-automatic pistol.  Back at Mandy's Jeffrey wasn't pleased to see Mr. Barshaw and said that he could not stay there.  So, Mandy and Mr. Barshaw stayed in a motor home that was some fifteen to twenty feet from Jeffrey and Mandy's place.  When Jeffrey realized that Mandy and Mr. Barshaw might be inside the motor home he and his cousin Anthony, pounded on the door to the motor home. Mandy and Jeff talked, shared a cigarette and everyone seemed to have calmed down.

Except for Mr. Barshaw, who began to yell, while also holding the assault rifle.  Mr. Barshaw and Jeffrey continued to yell at each other.  Mr. Barshaw "came barreling out" of the motor home with the rifle; Jeffrey began to back away.  Mr. Barshaw pursued Jeffrey for about a hundred feet.  Mr. Barshaw eventually pointed the rifle at Jeffrey and repeatedly pulled the trigger.  Of the nine shots that Mr. Barshaw got off, six or seven of them struck Jeffrey's body.  At least two of the them were fatal.

At trial Mr. Barshaw said that he was too intoxicated to  have formed the intent to kill, or, that Mandy was the one who shot Jeffrey.  He also said that  shooting Jeffrey was a "snap response" and so there was no premeditation.  The court rejected all of these defenses.  On premeditation the trial court said that Mr. Barshaw:
prepared for the potential use of his firearms by removing them from the trunk . . . and taking them into the motor home. If the rifle was not loaded and ready to fire when he took it into the motor home, it certainly was by the time he burst out of the motor home with the murder weapon in hand. Defendant still had a few minutes to consider what he was doing. He menaced Jeffery Schutz with his weapon and deliberately followed him a distance of some 80 to 100 feet around the motor home to the area of the utility pole before taking aim and firing repeatedly at Jeffery Schutz. 
On appeal Mr. Barshaw said that the state had not proven premeditation. Chief Justice Gildea disagreed and said that they had.  The court applied the two-step analysis for circumstantial evidences cases by first identifying the circumstances proved, and then independently examining the reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved to determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.State v. McAllister, 862 N.W.2d 49 (Minn. 2015).  State v. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 2010).  The Chief said that the court looks at three kinds of evidence relevant to determining premeditation: planning activity, motive, and the nature of the killing.  Since the trial judge did not make any findings about motive the Chief focused on the remaining two categories of evidence and found that the evidence of both planning activity and the nature of the killing were sufficient.

Planning activity can be pretty minimal.  Grabbing the murder weapon just before the killing is sufficient planning.  So is fetching the murder weapon from one one and bringing it into another room. The number of shots fired, the number of wounds inflicted, being a good shot by wounding "vital areas" of the body, and escaping are the kinds of things the court is looking for when it examines the nature of the killing.

Monday, June 6, 2016

To Be Guilty of "Taking" a Car You Have To, Well, Take a Car

State v. Thonesavanh, Minn.Ct.App., 6/6/2016.  J.V. called the local constabulary because a man who turned out to be Mr. Thonesavanh was banging on his door.  By the time the cops arrived Mr. Thonesavanh was sitting behind the wheel of J.V.'s car, which was parked in the driveway. The engine was running and the reverse lights were illuminated.  But the car never moved.  Or at least no one was willing to say that it moved.

The cops eventually persuaded Mr. Thonesavanh to get out of the car. The state charged him with theft of a motor vehicle under Minn.Stat. 609.52, subd 2(a)(17.  One is guilty of this offense if she "takes or drives a motor vehicle without the consent of the owner or an authorized agent of the owner, knowing or having reason to know that the owner or an authorized agent of the owner did not give consent.  Mr. Thonesavanh moved to dismiss the charge, saying that he never "took" J.V.'s car.  The trial court agreed, saying that the "takes" in this statute" requires that a defendant exercise "independent, absolute control over the property involved, even if only for a short time" and that a defendant be involved in "movement of the property."  The state appealed.

And lost.  The court of appeals said that the "take" language of the statute was ambiguous and then hauled out the dictionaries.  A lot of dictionaries, including the sixteen pages dedicated to the word "take" in the Compact Oxford English Dictionary.  

Whether this conclusion "takes" remains to be seen.  Mr. Thonesavanh was behind the wheel of car whose engine was running and in gear.  And there's all that money flowing out of the U.S. Justice Department to prosecute car thefts.

Wednesday, June 1, 2016

Any Criminal Vehicular Operation Conviction Can Be Used to Enhance a DWI to a Felony Regardless of Statutory Language

State v. Boecker, Minn.Ct.App., 5/23/2016.  Back in 1998 Mr. Boecker was convicted under 609.21, subd. 2a(2)(i) of criminal vehicular operation.  In 2015 the state charged Mr. Boecker with first degree DWI based on this 1998 CVO conviction.  Mr. Boecker pointed out, however, that the DWI statute in play, enacted in 2014, listed as an enhancer a 2006 CVO statute, which of course didn't exist in 1998 and so how could his charge be enhanced?  

Somehow the court of appeals concludes that the 2014 DWI statute is ambiguous, which gives them the green light to uphold the enhanced charge and conviction.  Along the way it points to legislative history where the legislature says that it doesn't care what words and numbers it uses in the DWI statute it intends all CVO convictions to be enhancers:
rime. The legislature’s intent has always been that criminal vehicular operation convictions under both the pre- 2007 law and the post-2007 law be used for enhancing driving while impaired penalties consistent with the provisions of the driving while impaired laws.